Day 93 - PM Leveson Inquiry 1 1 all too easy to think this is a unified entity that is (2.15 pm)2 3 3 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes, Mr Jay. 4 4 MR JAY: We now have Dr Neil Manson, please. 5 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you. 5 6 DR NEIL MANSON (affirmed) 6 7 7 Questions by MR JAY 8 MR JAY: You don't have in front of you, but maybe you know 8 9 9 it off by heart. Your written --LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Oh, let's not put him under that 10 10 11 11 pressure. 12 12 A. If you're going to refer to numbered paragraphs, your 13 13 pagination is different from mine and I haven't 14 14 memorised it off by heart, so it might be helpful if you 15 are going to refer to it. 15 16 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Better have mine. 16 17 17 MR JAY: This is your submission of 14 June 2012. I'm just 18 going to ask you to confirm it's obviously your work and 18 19 19 that in as far as there are facts and opinions honestly 20 held, that's the case. 20 21 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. You've given us your full name. You're a senior 22 23 lecturer in philosophy in the department of politics, 23 way in which we frame the debate in terms of freedom of 24 24 philosophy and religion at Lancaster University? the press in contrast to something else -- say, 25 25 censorship of the press -- isn't really finetuned enough A. That's correct. Page 1 1 Q. Can I ask you, please, to tell us about your main 1 2 2 research and intellectual interests.

the press, and of course, that's just a kind of accident of linguistics and had linguistic history been very different, there might well have been different names. There might have been -- I mean, prejudicing -- the top press and the bottom press or press number one and press number two and so on. Were that the case, were the language more finetuned from the start, there would be less slippage between arguments that are relevant to preserving the freedom of one kind of press, less slippage that would then transfer across to preserving the freedoms of other kinds of press insofar as they do very, very different things. Giving it the label "the press" covers all sorts of different activities, both in terms of different institutions, different newspapers, different media, but even within the media, within the newspaper, within a particular issue of a newspaper, there's going to be many different kinds of actions and activities, some of which are ethically absolutely fine and justifiable and permissible, and others which are much more questionable. So it's just an underlying worry that the

- 3 A. The research interests, broadly, are to do with things 4 to do with the ethics of communication and knowledge.
- 5 Over the past few years, I've written particularly in
- 6 the area of medical ethics rather than the ethics of the
- 7 press, but many of the same issues arise there in terms
- 8 of privacy, confidentiality, what sort of things ought 9 we know or not be allowed to know and so on.

More recently, my research has turned to the press and I've written on the nature and ethics of spin, political spin, and also upon the ethical importance of, in certain cases and contexts, not finding things out and not seeking knowledge. So as I say, broadly, the ethics of communication and knowledge, which are, of

15 16 course, directly relevant to the issues at hand.

17 Q. Thank you. We're not going to be able to cover, in the 18

- time available, each and every point which you argue with considerable care in your presentation to us. I'm
- 20 going to alight on the highlights, as it were. I know
- 21 you have this general observation: when we talk about
- 22 a press, are we referring to a monolithic entity and if
- 23 we aren't, what are we referring to?
- 24 A. This is an underlying worry, that when we talk about --25 particularly talk about freedom of the press, that it's Page 2

to sort of tease out where the ethical issues actually

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- lie. So it's that sort of sensitivity that I was trying 3 to allude to.
- 4 Q. Without placing newspapers into individual categories,
- 5 what are these two kinds of press you're referring to,
- 6 or rather what sort of journalism is each one carrying 7 out?
- 8 A. You could divide up presses in all sorts of different
- 9 ways, but for the purposes of this submission, one of
- 10 the key distinctions that I wanted to make was -- it's
- 11 something that links us to certain kinds of argument,
- 12 which maybe we'll come back to in a minute. Certain 13
- kinds of argument are supposed to justify freedoms of 14 the press, and those arguments are about a certain kind
- 15 of press that provides truthful relevant claims to
- 16 an informed populace or in order to inform the populace
- 17 for reasons of furthering and facilitating democratic
- 18 participation. So that would be one way of
- 19 distinguishing actions when the press did do that kind
- 20 of thing from actions in the press that do other kinds 21
- 22 The other kind of thing obviously includes lots and 23 lots of things which are perfectly innocent, perfectly 24 permissible. I mean, the editors of Good Housekeeping I

take it write lots and lots of things which aren't

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1 specifically about furthering democracy. There's 1 expand on as we go along. Obviously that's not without 2 2 obviously notwithstanding wrong with writing with sofas bounds, without limits and so on, because any act of 3 3 and furniture and so on. communication takes place within a rich normative 4 4 So at the other end, there are problematic actions, context -- legally, ethically -- where there are further 5 activities and so on, where the press engages in 5 constraints upon things like finding things out. So we 6 activities which may breach important rights, which may 6 mentioned the investigative role of the press. The fact 7 7 harm people and where this argument from this appeal to that the press has certain investigative powers doesn't 8 8 democracy or furthering democracy doesn't really come mean automatically that it has carte blanche to do 9 9 into play. I wouldn't want to give them labels. That whatever it wishes to find things out. 10 10 was just for a hypothetical reasons --Similarly, its communicative powers will 11 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Can I ask you to slow down a bit? 11 automatically be limited because all speech has certain 12 A. Oh ves. 12 constraints on it. Some of it's to do with contents, 13 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'm conscious that first of all 13 some to do with other elements. So if the proprietor of 14 I have to carry forward what you're saying, but also it 14 a very decent newspaper decides to broadcast their 15 all has to be written down. 15 important content through a megaphone at 3 o'clock in 16 A. All right. 16 the morning, that might be ethically improper, even 17 MR JAY: Justifications in a free press, or rather the value 17 though that was nothing to do with the content. In 18 of a free press. You define those on the second page, 18 other cases -- the standard case of things like 19 our page 00888. You describe them as content-based 19 obscenity and hate speech -- it may be much more to do 20 instrumental justifications. You then say immediately 20 with the content. 21 21 that there are considerable limitations in relations to So the two points there is that the democracy-based 22 those justifications. First of all, what do you mean by 22 argument is focusing on content, and the instrumental 23 "content-based instrumental justifications", and 23 argument -- even that kind of argument isn't 24 24 secondly, what are the limitations? unconstrained. It has limits because considerations of 25 A. All right, so by content-based, one kind of argument in 25 speech always take place within a context, where there Page 5 Page 7 1 favour of freedom of the press, which I've just 1 2 2 mentioned briefly before, is that the press is in 3 3 a special position to provide knowledge of certain kinds 4 of facts to the populace that they otherwise would not 4 which works along the lines that suppression of

know. So the investigative role and the communicative role of the press is very valuable, not in providing any old facts -- not just, you know: "Here's a list of all the things we thought of this week, or here's a list of all the cars this have driven down The Strand since Thursday." Those are facts, but not facts relevant to an informed populace making democratic decisions and so

on. So immediately, we've narrowed the field of facts to the content that is relevant to achieving that goal. Now, it's an instrumental justification because the special kind of privilege of the press is being justified by appeal to its instrumental role. It's not valuable necessarily in itself; it's valuable insofar as it facilitates and furthers the provision of these special kinds of facts. So that's what we mean by "content-based" and "instrumental". So "instrumental" is furthering some other end, and "content-based" is: that further end requires certain things to be known. Not all contents, some contents. In terms of limits, I think this is something we'll

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- are other rights, other normative considerations in
- Q. The argument from truth, which you deal with on page 3,
- 5 publications is problematic insofar as it reduces our
- 6 chances of gaining true rather than false beliefs, you
- 7 trace that back to Milton and its carried through to
- 8 Charles Mill. What, in essence, is wrong with that
- 9 argument?
- 10 A. Well, there's two general things that are wrong with it. When I say "wrong with it", there are two limitations to 11 12 it. First of all, it only applies to those areas of the 13 press or those actors in the press who are committed to 14 getting at the truth. It certainly doesn't apply to 15 people who are just saying whatever comes into their 16 head or saying whatever is sensational in order to sell 17 newspapers. So the argument on truth is limited in that 18

Much more problematically, the argument on truth is also limited in the sense that there's no guarantee that a free and unconstrained kind of free-for-all in terms of putting forward people's opinions is going to generate truths at all. One move you might make is to define truth in terms of whatever survives the competition, but that just seems crazy. Throughout Page 8

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history, lots of truths -- opinions have emerged to the fore, believed by lots of people that have, as it were, survived the competition of opinion at the time but they have been fundamentally flawed or false.

So the deeper problem of the argument on truth is it seems to be appropriate and work very well if we picture certain contexts: an academic seminar or a small town village debating society where everybody listens critically to everyone else, each has one voice and no more than one voice, and all are reasonably well informed and committed to observing certain standards of communication. It doesn't work very well where you have people expressing their opinions with other aims in mind other than getting the truth -- for example, if their aims are to influence people, to sell newspapers, to rouse the rabble into doing something -- and where audiences themselves are not perfect. They may be -already have false beliefs, prejudices, biases or lack the critical competence or the information needed to assess the claims that are being offered to them.

We know from the history of how prejudices and biases and so on take hold of communities that the argument on truth seems to present this -- partly tempting but peculiar picture where if we all allow everybody to say what they want, somehow the truth will Page 9

Now, freedom of movement you might think is central to democracy, but my freedom to go to Slough doesn't thereby give me permission to drive there in the car across your garden without an MOT whilst drunk. There are lots and lots of standards there that are restrictive on movement in certain contexts which in that case would stop me going to Slough, and it would be absolutely insane of me to then say, "But my freedom of movement -- you're being anti-democratic, even though I'm drunk, have no licence, no insurance, have driven across your garden."

I'm analogously going back to the press. Of course we're committed to the press being an absolutely central part of democracy and in a democracy you want to permit freedom of expression. That's absolutely right. Just as you want to permit freedom of movement. But it's not limitless. There are other norms in play, and then, even more strongly in the case of freedom of the press, if the press really is free, then of course it's free to, if you like, oppose democracy, to do things which actually might be undermining of democratic participation. So then you get into the slightly more paradoxical area where, in order to further democracy or democratic participation or the democratic wellbeing and civil health or civic health, then certain kinds of

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1 out in the marketplace of ideas. But a little more

- of -- and this isn't my original line of thought.
- 3 A number of philosophers have criticised quite heavily
- 4 the whole idea that the marketplace of ideas will lead
- 5 to emergence of the truth.
- 6 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'm just concerned for the smoke that
- 7 is emerging from the lady who has to write is down, so
- 8 I would be grateful.
- 9 A. All right.

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- 10 MR JAY: It might be said it's a hallmark of a liberal
- democracy that the press is free, therefore any
- interference with a free press is inimical to the ends
- 13 after democracy and is per se objectionable. Do you see
- any force in that contention?
- 15 A. Well, not exactly, because, of course -- I mean, here we
- 16 have an analogy with something else outside the press.
- 17 Suppose we argue that freedom of movement is absolutely
- 18 central to a democracy. Seems quite plausible.
- 19 I shouldn't, as the Prime Minister, be allowed to forbid
 - people to go to Slough just because I don't want them
- 21 to. It's very anti-democratic. We should be allowed to
- 22 move where we wish, to assemble, meet people where we
- 23 wish and so on. Various countries across the world
- 24 don't have freedom of movement. You can't go certain
- 25 places, meet certain people, and so on.

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- 1 restriction might be necessary.
 - Q. What are the points of contact and the points of
- 3 dissimilarity between concepts of freedom of expression
- 4 on the one hand and a free press on the other?
 - A. They are -- I'd like to say they were obviously
 - different but if one reads a lot of things which are
- 7 written in the public domain on freedom of the press,
- 8 they're often articulated in terms of freedom of
- they're often articulated in terms of freedom of expression. But freedom of expression and free
 - expression. But freedom of expression and freedom of

the press are very different.

Freedom of expression primarily, in the first instance, applies to individuals. Individuals have

a freedom to express themselves in a wide variety of ways. It may be in linguistic ways, symbolic ways. It

ways. It may be in linguistic ways, symbolic ways. It may be -- freedom of expression can include things like

your hairstyle or what hat you want to wear.

Now, that's on, if you like, the content of freedom,

but the distance between freedom of expression and
 freedom of the press becomes even greater when we think

20 about the justifications of those two freedoms. Why are

21 they ethically important? Well, freedom of expression

22 is ethically important for the development of

individuals, to allow them to form relationships, for

their psychological wellbeing and so on.

Now, the press, although it involves individuals, is

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1 not an individual. It doesn't have interests. It 1 One of the examples I allude to in the submission is 2 2 doesn't form relationships in the way that individuals the simple lack of clarity about what constitutes the 3 3 do. It doesn't develop from being a creature that can't distinction between private and public. There's lots of 4 4 allusion to that in debates about press freedom, speak to eventually being one that can and has formed 5 5 its own path through life. particularly things like: if I do something in a public 6 When you add in the further facts about the 6 space, is it thereby private? 7 7 differences between individuals and the press --Now, here it's all too easy to draw a simplistic distinction, either in terms of spatial privacy or 8 8 individual such as myself or anyone in this room, we can 9 9 information privacy, which says that when we are in express ourselves in all sorts of different ways, but 10 10 when I talk to you or I talk to someone on the bus, I'm a public space, then all of a sudden all legitimate 11 11 not broadcasting my views to 4 and a half or 5 million claims of privacy disappear, which seems to me to be 12 12 people. So there's an important disanalogy there in underargued for, to say the very least. 13 13 terms of press power. For example, suppose I have an embarrassing spot on 14 14 my nose, and I walk down the street with that So if you start adding up those differences, it 15 looks like freedom of the press is very different from 15 embarrassing spot on my nose. It's clear that my 16 individual expression and freedom of individual 16 embarrassing spot, although in a sense I'd rather it 17 17 remained private, I'm exposing it to people when I'm expression. 18 Q. Thank you. 18 walking down The Strand and walking down Oxford Street. 19 Now, that's a form of controlled exposure. I might not 19 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: And may have different 20 counterbalancing features, therefore. In other words, 20 behave in the same way if people were three inches away 21 21 from me with little cameras, broadcasting -- or with nobody would deny that there are legitimate restrictions 22 on free expression: hate crime, the famous shouting 22 a long lens camera, broadcasting it to 10 million other 23 23 "fire" in a crowded theatre. Equally, there are and people. There, our privacy interests doesn't seem to 24 should be limitations on the freedom of the press, which 24 correspond to -- the fact that I'm in a public space 25 25 doesn't immediately justify -- if you need an argument are not necessarily the same. Page 13 Page 15 A. And of course, logically, they might be the same --1 to justify -- the kind of broadcast of that information 2 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Not necessarily. to 10, 20 million --

- 3 A. You would need an argument to establish why they would
- 4 be the same but given the major and important
- 5 differences between them, it would be very unlikely that
- 6 they would be the same. I don't believe they are the
- 7 **same --**
- 8 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: No.
- 9 A. -- just because I don't believe there is an argument 10 that connects the two of them automatically.
- 11 MR JAY: Balancing the public interest in a free press, as
- we're defining it, with other public interests and
- private rights -- this is section 4 of your submission.
- 14 You focus on privacy, which I suppose is one of the
- preeminent private rights. You say first of all one
- over-arching problem is lack of clarity about the key
- 17 concepts and their normative significance. Can I ask
- 18 you to explain that for us?
- 19 A. Yes. The notion of privacy -- I have quite abstract
- 20 philosophical views, which I shall spare you, here, just
- 21 to spare everybody -- but more relevantly there is
- 22 unclarity about what we mean by privacy, both in the
- descriptive sense and then there's unclarity in the
- 24 normative sense as well, in terms of what private rights
- we're recollecting and what their limits are.
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- 3 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But you don't need the spot on the
- 4 end of your nose at all, do you?
- 5 A. That was just an example.
- 6 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: No, no, because if you're a famous
- 7 person because you've made a film or you've written
- 8 a book or for whatever reason, there is an argument that
- 9 you are entitled to go about your life as a privacy
- 10 citizen without having long lenses and all the
- 11 paraphernalia of lost privacy and your movements spread
- around the world, isn't there?
- 13 A. I agree with you, but the difficulty here is
- 14 articulating in a clear and defensible way why that
 - distinction should hold, because one of the -- the
- 16 counterargument that could be used by a journalist is:
- 17 "They're already in a public space. All I was doing was
- ineg to aircard in a public space. This was doing was
- 18 recording something that were a reader of the newspaper
- $19 \hspace{1cm} \textbf{to have been there, they would have seen what I saw.} \\$
- Were they to have been on that beach with binoculars,
- 21 they would have seen what I saw, so in a sense they were
- in a public space."
- 23 But the problem with that line of argument -- it
- 24 just assumes a very, very simplistic conception of the
- 25 private/public distinction. It doesn't take into any

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| 1 | account what our privacy interests in particular are. | 1 | can ever do about it. You can't ever escape. |
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| 2 | Our privacy interests part of our privacy | 2 | A. You can't ever escape. I'm agreeing with you. We're |
| 3 | interests and there's lots of evidence from | 3 | arguing about something one step down the line, which is |
| 4 | psychology, right down into animal ethology and animal | 4 | why we should think that that claim holds true, and what |
| 5 | behaviour we don't like being looked at, for example. | 5 | I was trying to allude to was there is a difference |
| 6 | It's distressing if people are staring at you. When you | 6 | between walking down Oxford Street just normally, with |
| 7 | walk down Oxford Street, people tend not to look at you. | 7 | people going about their business who occasionally turn |
| 8 | Imagine walking down Oxford Street and everybody turns | 8 | their heads and go: "Oh look, it's Hugh Grant", or |
| 9 | and stares at you and walks I know this happens to | 9 | whoever, "walking down over there", and being in |
| 10 | famous people, but there's a sense in which the | 10 | a situation where you are being exposed to millions of |
| 11 | responses that we make to knowing we're being looked at | 11 | people in a different way. |
| 12 | that way are very different to being just in a public | 12 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I know we're agreeing. I'm trying to |
| 13 | space. | 13 | obtain from you the best articulation of why it isn't |
| 14 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: So you agree with the argument that | 14 | good enough to say, "Well, they're in public, therefore |
| 15 | those who are publicly known are entitled to a degree of | 15 | it's open season." |
| 16 | privacy, even though anybody who was in Oxford Street at | 16 | A. I think the best there's more than one thing. What |
| 17 | the time could see them? | 17 | I was trying to allude to was the way that our privacy |
| 18 | A. Yes, because | 18 | interests vary depending upon the situations that we |
| 19 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: How then do you defeat the argument | 19 | believe ourselves to be in. |
| 20 | that actually they are in Oxford Street and therefore | 20 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes. |
| 21 | anybody can see them? Why do you reach that side of the | 21 | A. You're absolutely right. There are lots of things |
| 22 | equation rather than the other? | 22 | a famous person walking down the street can't conceal |
| 23 | A. Of course, because the fact that anybody could see them | 23 | themselves and alter their behaviour in every |
| 24 | is very different because we would behave very, very | 24 | circumstance, but that wasn't the claim. It was about |
| 25 | differently if we thought everybody was looking at us, | 25 | having an interest in, if you like it's the classic |
| | Da 17 | | Dago 10 |
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| 1 2 | and we shape our behaviour this is why I pointed to | 1 2 | privacy interest, the right to be let alone, and there's |
| | and we shape our behaviour this is why I pointed to the spot on the nose example. I would behave very | | privacy interest, the right to be let alone, and there's a difference between being let alone in the street where |
| 2 | and we shape our behaviour this is why I pointed to | 2 | privacy interest, the right to be let alone, and there's |
| 2 3 | and we shape our behaviour this is why I pointed to the spot on the nose example. I would behave very differently walking down Oxford Street with a spot on my | 2 3 | privacy interest, the right to be let alone, and there's a difference between being let alone in the street where people occasionally glance at you had and sort of murmur |
| 2 3 4 | and we shape our behaviour this is why I pointed to the spot on the nose example. I would behave very differently walking down Oxford Street with a spot on my nose to if somebody said, "You are going to appear at | 2 3 4 | privacy interest, the right to be let alone, and there's a difference between being let alone in the street where people occasionally glance at you had and sort of murmur into their phone: "Guess who I've just seen", and from |
| 2 3 4 5 | and we shape our behaviour this is why I pointed to the spot on the nose example. I would behave very differently walking down Oxford Street with a spot on my nose to if somebody said, "You are going to appear at Wembley Stadium with a spot on your nose with 30,000 people watching you and it's going to be floodlit for | 2 3 4 5 | privacy interest, the right to be let alone, and there's a difference between being let alone in the street where people occasionally glance at you had and sort of murmur into their phone: "Guess who I've just seen", and from having your face or image plastered on every newspaper. |
| 2 3 4 5 6 | and we shape our behaviour this is why I pointed to the spot on the nose example. I would behave very differently walking down Oxford Street with a spot on my nose to if somebody said, "You are going to appear at Wembley Stadium with a spot on your nose with 30,000 | 2 3 4 5 6 | privacy interest, the right to be let alone, and there's a difference between being let alone in the street where people occasionally glance at you had and sort of murmur into their phone: "Guess who I've just seen", and from having your face or image plastered on every newspaper. It's the legitimate interest in not having the latter |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 | and we shape our behaviour this is why I pointed to the spot on the nose example. I would behave very differently walking down Oxford Street with a spot on my nose to if somebody said, "You are going to appear at Wembley Stadium with a spot on your nose with 30,000 people watching you and it's going to be floodlit for all to see." I might put a bit of powder or concealer | 2 3 4 5 6 7 | privacy interest, the right to be let alone, and there's a difference between being let alone in the street where people occasionally glance at you had and sort of murmur into their phone: "Guess who I've just seen", and from having your face or image plastered on every newspaper. It's the legitimate interest in not having the latter seems to be enough to justify a protection of that kind |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | and we shape our behaviour this is why I pointed to the spot on the nose example. I would behave very differently walking down Oxford Street with a spot on my nose to if somebody said, "You are going to appear at Wembley Stadium with a spot on your nose with 30,000 people watching you and it's going to be floodlit for all to see." I might put a bit of powder or concealer on. | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | privacy interest, the right to be let alone, and there's a difference between being let alone in the street where people occasionally glance at you had and sort of murmur into their phone: "Guess who I've just seen", and from having your face or image plastered on every newspaper. It's the legitimate interest in not having the latter seems to be enough to justify a protection of that kind of privacy interest. |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | and we shape our behaviour this is why I pointed to the spot on the nose example. I would behave very differently walking down Oxford Street with a spot on my nose to if somebody said, "You are going to appear at Wembley Stadium with a spot on your nose with 30,000 people watching you and it's going to be floodlit for all to see." I might put a bit of powder or concealer on. Then the point is you can't run with the fact | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | privacy interest, the right to be let alone, and there's a difference between being let alone in the street where people occasionally glance at you had and sort of murmur into their phone: "Guess who I've just seen", and from having your face or image plastered on every newspaper. It's the legitimate interest in not having the latter seems to be enough to justify a protection of that kind of privacy interest. MR JAY: One of the points you develop under this section is |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | and we shape our behaviour this is why I pointed to the spot on the nose example. I would behave very differently walking down Oxford Street with a spot on my nose to if somebody said, "You are going to appear at Wembley Stadium with a spot on your nose with 30,000 people watching you and it's going to be floodlit for all to see." I might put a bit of powder or concealer on. Then the point is you can't run with the fact that were each of those 4 million people stood in front | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | privacy interest, the right to be let alone, and there's a difference between being let alone in the street where people occasionally glance at you had and sort of murmur into their phone: "Guess who I've just seen", and from having your face or image plastered on every newspaper. It's the legitimate interest in not having the latter seems to be enough to justify a protection of that kind of privacy interest. MR JAY: One of the points you develop under this section is the preamble to the code, which refers to the public's |
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are talking about the right to know, there only really is any content if we can appeal to or identify some correlative duty. It may not be a duty to bring about knowledge, because there couldn't really be any duty to do that, but there could be a duty to inform and there are lots of cases and lots of contexts where individuals or institutions are under a duty to inform or a duty to warn.

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Now, if we look at the right to know as the correlative of the duty to warn, then certainly there seems to be lots of activities of the press which seem to fall under that heading. So if the press discover a serious wrongdoing by the Prime Minister or serious discrimination in the higher echelons of the judiciary or that a world famous football team has been taking bribes, then there seems a -- the obligation or the duty to inform relevant publics who would have an interest in -- a legitimate interest in knowing that, that looks okay.

But there isn't a correlative duty to warn people about the state of Cheryl Cole's kneecaps or, you know, the kind of thing that appears in lots of newspapers, where again a journalist might cite in defence: the public have a right to know this. The simple response is: no, they don't. They don't have any right to know Page 21

"public interest" here, "public interest" has been used in a much wider and general sense to mean something along the lines of what is the over-arching interest for all of us or what is the over-arching interest for the populace at large, in freedom of the press, truthfulness, privacy and so on.

So the primary interest in truthfulness is that without it, we end up having no communication, or risk end up having no successful communication and no knowledge at all. If it becomes -- if a lack of truthfulness becomes widespread, then we undermine trust. If I routinely lie, others routinely lie or mislead, then eventually communication itself becomes something that's much harder to achieve. If you suspect everybody of perhaps -- actually, as a matter of logic, it doesn't work if everybody lies all the time, because then you just take the negation of what they've said, assuming certain competences, but if a sufficiently large number of people are sufficiently misleading then when somebody says something, unless you have further independent evidence, really you can't really do anything with what they have said without those further checks, and one of the fantastic things about communication is that we rely upon others for our knowledge. In order to rely upon others for our Page 23

that at all. There's no obligation to warn them. They may have an interest in knowing it in the non-normative sense. They may be very keen to know it. They may buy the paper for the reason of finding it ought. But it doesn't mean that they have a right to learn of that, nor does it mean that any other person is under any obligation to inform them of it.

So as with the notion of freedom of the press that we the started off with, this notion of right to know is one which, when you push it a bit further, doesn't really have the normative or legitimating mileage some people might think it has.

Q. Thank you. The public interest in truthfulness. You deal with that. I think we're particularly interested in the issue of sources and Milton on the bottom of the 10th page. Before we get there, could I invite you to explain what you mean by this public interest in this particular context?

A. When we're talking about the public interest here, there's two different roles that public interest is playing, both in my submission and within the Inquiry more generally. In the one sense, public interest is used quite narrowly talking about the specific public interest defence. That's not the sense I'm concerned with in this particular section. When we talk about

Page 22

1 knowledge, a sufficiently large number of people have to 2 be truthful.

So that's the kind of deep and over-arching concern

with truthfulness. Much more narrowly, of course, we all have much more specific and involved concerns with truthfulness, just in the sense that it's actually hurtful, distressing and so on to be lied to. And that's just a fact about human beings. Leaving aside any sort of detriment that might be caused if we act upon the basis of a false belief -- if we're deceived into believing that a certain investment opportunity will pay us lots of money and in fact it was going to pay us nothing at all, then obviously we've suffered financially and maybe in other ways, but even if we don't suffer financially or in other ways -- we're not going to be sort of lied today and led to our deaths,

17 for example -- just the actual fact of being lied to is, 18 by and large, one that is distressing, particularly if 19 we're being lied to for self-interested reasons, ie

20 self-interest on the part of the other party.

21

LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: And if that happens, at a public

22 level, from public authorities, that has itself 23

a damaging impact on our democratic process and the way

24 in which we live our lives.

25 A. Indeed. There's A term I used elsewhere which I didn't Page 24

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1 use in here, which is epistemic pollution -- "epistemic" 2 means to do with knowledge and "pollution" just being 3 pollution -- where people who routinely deceive at the 4 level of public life and in the media -- it is akin to 5 a form of pollution, because we rely upon the great sea 6 of others to provide us with knowledge, as a -- sorry, 7 the metaphor does run a bit thin when the sea is 8 something you're going to drink because you wouldn't 9 drink from the sea, but we need to drink from the sea of 10 knowledge in order to know that other people pollute 11 that, make it unusable. So when the lying gets to 12 a grand scale and is widespread, in particular, then the 13 effects may be much, much greater than if it's just you 14 know sort of localised and involving individuals in their own sort of everyday lives. 15 16 MR JAY: The point at the end of page 10, our page 00896, 17 derived from Milton: a requirement that publications

18 identify their author. Almost a moral requirement to 19 identify a source in contradistinction to clause 14 of 20 the code, which creates a moral obligation to protect 21 confidential source. How do you see those two norms 22 working out in practice? 23

A. Milton's claims aren't abouts journalistic sources, though he's particularly concerned with political pamphleteering. So it is the source of opinion.

Page 25

kind of information was accessible. Whether it ought to

2 be disclosed in hard copy print might be quite difficult

because it would make hard copy print unreadable, if you

4 have, you know: here's a 400-word article about

5 something and here's 600 words of footnotes telling you 6

everything about it.

But these days, given changes in information technology, that kind of information could be made

9 readily accessible on a newspaper's website and I don't

10 really see anything being wrong with that, if you are 11

committed to truthfulness and being co-operative with

12

13 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But it's quite the reverse from there

14 being nothing wrong with it. As I understand your

15 argument, that would positively improve the value that

16 those who read the article can derive from it, because

17 they can factor into their assessment of what the

18 journalist has written the advantage that the journalist

19 has received. So if it was somebody who said -- well,

20 is it the Michelin inspectors who go into restaurants

21 without disclosing who they are, paying the bill and

22 simply experiencing the food? That is different to the

23 journalist who is invited to the restaurant, given

24 a free meal and then writing about it. So it's -- am

25 I right? It's not merely not a bad idea; it's

Page 27

Now, actually, in the statement here, I don't specifically address anything to do with the protection of journalistic sources. The claim here was more narrowly focused on the information that we need as audiences to assess and evaluate the claims that we're given. I think that more can be done to allow us, as audiences, to understand what we're getting. So if the source of a news story -- this is particularly true of sort of PR and churnalism, people just cutting and pasting stuff from PR companies -- if we were to know the source of a claim -- I mean, lots of papers publish lots of things all the time that say things like: "A fantastic new holiday resort has just opened in Wales and we think it's brilliant." Now, if it's said the source is a PR company for that company, we would evaluate it very differently than if we thought it was a discovery made by the journalist his or herself and so on.

19 As for the --

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20 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: How far can you take that? Let's 21 assume that holiday company had offered the journalist

22 a free holiday at the resort. Should that be 23

identified?

24 A. There's a balancing act here because in an ideal world, 25 it would be useful if there were somewhere where that Page 26

1 positively beneficial?

2 A. Absolutely. It's positively beneficial, but my note of 3 caution was in moving from the positively beneficial to 4 a stronger claim that therefore it ought to be required,

5 because there are lots of other considerations that

6 might be relevant for why that might not be the first

7 port of call in terms of obliging people to publish that

8 type of thing.

9 Philosophically, yes, of course, it would make that 10 information much more accessible, evaluable by people in 11 relevant ways, which would be a very good thing and thus

12 not only, as you say, permissible but actually something

13 that, were we to be -- what's the word? -- trying to

14 construct a set of press practices that were going

15 towards the ideal, from the point of view of audiences,

16 then yes, it would be required.

17 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'm a long way short of ideal.

18 A. Yes.

19 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's a question of balance.

20 MR JAY: Section 5, the extent to which the overall public

21 interest is currently well served. Your short response

22 is "could be better", and you identify two main

problems, which it's fair others have spoken to as well.

24 I was going to ask you to focus on one key aspect of

25 this, which is your call for a properly independent

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- 1 regulatory body, and drawing up the distinction between
- 2 statutory underpinning of that body and the state
- 3 determining the content of news media, which is at the
- 4 bottom of page 12, 00898. Could I ask you, please, to
- 5 explain that for us?
- 6 A. Yes. This just, again, returns to the point we started
- 7 with, which is the way that the debate is framed in
- 8 terms of an opposition between censorship on the one
- 9 hand and freedom of the press on the other seems to be
- 10 misleading and ill-conceived, and that when we think
- 11 about sort of developments and changes to regulation it
- 12 becomes relevant once again, because the enforcement or
- 13 the assurance of good standards in communication
- 14 isn't -- doesn't involve censorship of content any more
- 15 than having an MOT test on your car determines where
- 16 vou're allowed to drive. It makes sure that when you do
- 17 drive somewhere, others can rely you on not to crash
- 18 into them because your wheels have fallen off.
- 19 Similarly, ensuring standards of truthfulness in the
- 20 press means that others can rely on what you say and
- 21 take it into account in their actions, their voting
- 22 decisions or whatever it might be. So that doesn't tell
- 23 you anything about what the content is -- so it's not 24 restriction on content; it just says that if you are
- 25
- going to put content in the public domain, it has to Page 29
- 1 meet certain standards. Now, that seems to me to be --
- 2 those seem to be so clearly distinct, it makes me
- 3 confused as to how anybody could move from suggestions
- 4 that standards be enforced -- whether they be standards
- 5 of truthfulness or standards where -- respecting norms
- 6 of privacy -- how that would thereby directly entail any
- 7 restriction on content.
- 8 It does do indirectly, of course, because, for
- 9 example, norms of privacy protect the discovery of
- 10 certain facts. So doubtless there are facts about all
- 11 of us which are -- would it would be a breach of privacy
- 12 for a enough to inquire and find out about. So in
- 13 a sense, the norm of privacy and rights of privacy
- 14 protect those facts from exposure in the public domain.
- 15 But the norm itself isn't concerned with content. The
- 16 link to content is always indirect.
 - Similarly with norms of truthfulness, to say that
- 18 you ought to be truthful -- you can say anything you 19 want as long as it's truth unlawful. So there's no
- 20 restriction on content at all. It doesn't allow you to
- 21 lie, so those contents are ruled out, but those are
- 22 contents we should be ruling out anyway.
- 23 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Therefore it's not -- it doesn't
- 24 impact adversely on free speech for an individual or
- 25 a free press or the press?

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- 1 A. No, especially if the main justification for a free
- 2 press is in terms of its utility in informing us of
 - relevant facts. I mean, I'm not ruling out
- 4 entertainment, because entertainment is something else
- 5 that the press does and there may be different questions
 - that arise there, but in terms of factual reporting or
- 7 putatively factual reporting, that's one of the main
- 8 arguments. It gives us truth and those truths are
- 9 relevant for our participation in democracy and to then
- 10 say: in order to do that, the communication has to meet
- 11 certain standards -- well, that's obvious and obviously
- true. There can be no possible complaint that that 12
- 13 somehow constitutes illicit censorship which is
- 14 inconsistent with democracy because it's a requirement
- 15 of democratically relevant communication that it meets
- 16 standards of communication.
 - MR JAY: Can we just see how the indirect argument might
- 18 work, just to test the contrary view.
- 19 Suppose you had a code which was within a statutory
- 20 regime which recognised the right to privacy as the
- 21 existing code does but said in relation to public
- 22 interest that the right to privacy can only be
 - overridden in exceptional circumstances where an
- 24 overwhelming public interest is identified and that
- 25 interest is limited to detecting or exposing crime or
 - Page 31
- 1 serious impropriety. It might be said that that regime
- 2 would be limiting freedom of the press indirectly and be
- 3 allowing politicians to get away with murder, some would
- 4 say -- I'm speaking metaphorically, of course --
- 5 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: You'd better choose a different
 - analogy, because I don't think it would allow that.
- 7 MR JAY: No, but it would make them unaccountable, since
- 8 they would be effectively protected unless you could
- 9 demonstrate extreme circumstances where their private
- 10 lives could be exposed. So you wouldn't have direct
- 11 intrusion, but you would have indirect intrusion and
 - that would be objectionable. Is it not just a question
- 13 of fact and degree then?
- 14 A. It is a question of the drawing the line in the
- 15 appropriate place. So the mood that I wanted to
 - highlight was keeping apart the notion of content
- 17 censorship from enforcement standards.
- 18 Now, once you get enforcement standards in place,
- then of course you have this indirect restriction on 19
- 20 content. It's not content regulation, because content 21 isn't being regulated at all, but it does, as you say,
- 22 restrict it.
- 23 But what types of content get to be restricted
- 24 depends very much on where you draw the line, how you
 - formulate -- is it serious impropriety, risk of serious

Page 32

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1 impropriety, evidence of? Whatever it might be. But 2 that's a matter for -- might be for Parliament or the 3 courts to work out the detail of. But whatever details 4 they work out, it's still very, very important to 5 highlight the distinction between censorship -- content 6 regulation on the one hand and standard enforcement or 7 enforcement of standards on the other. 8 Q. I understand. Can we move on to section 6, please, the 9 distinguishing features of the conduct and practices of 10 a media industry which would make it an ethical one. 11 Could you identify the hallmarks, please, of such 12 a system? 13 A. Yes. I did put a brief warning at the beginning of that 14 that a full response to that question might take 15 considerably longer than we have here -- several 16 lifetimes -- but particularly because in philosophy 17 there are lots of different ethical theories with very 18 long and distinguished histories. But all of them --19 all the ethical theories that one finds in philosophy,

all philosophical systems, and one thing that I was struck by in reading through some of the earlier evidence on the Inquiry was -- when I was linking it over to a lot of my work in medical ethics, is over the past 50 to 60 years, there's been a massive transformation in medical ethics. It's undergone a serious ethical culture change where it has put this notion of respect for persons at the fore. So the old paternalistic days of doctors deciding what to do on patient's behalf and so on has been replaced by a very different set of practices.

all give considerable weight to the notion of respect

for persons. There are different routes to getting to

respect for person -- if you're a consequentialist, you

get there one way; if you're a Kantian, you get there a

different way and say slightly different things about

it -- but respect for persons is absolutely essential to Page 33

Now, obviously medicine and the media are very, very different in many respects, but in the very abstract level, it does look like the media or some aspects of the news media in particular are operating without any respect for persons at all, either respect for -actually, listening to the NUJ the other day, the NUJ evidence, they have no respect for their journalists, no respect for audiences, no respect for the subjects whose privacy they invade. So across the board --LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: That's not the NUJ you're talking about? A. No, no, the NUJ had highlighted the fact that there

was -- in an economically competitive media environment,

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especially younger journalists are put under incredible

pressure. That's all --1

2 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes, I understood what you said, but

I just wanted to make it quite clear before somebody

4 takes a headline out of that.

5 A. Yes. All right, thank you.

6 So respect for persons seems to be missing from at

7 least part of the sort of everyday practices of

8 a sizeable part of the media, and so -- the question was

9 about what would make it ethical? It would become much

10 more ethical if there were standards enforced where

11 respect for persons was put to the fore, and also there

12 would have to be something that actually enforced

13 compliance with that. That was -- do you want me to say

more about --

15 MR JAY: It leads into the points you make under section 8,

16 page 00901. My understanding of this is that it's not

just being an adequate code, but you say something about

the social, institutional, legal or practical contexts 18

19 that motivates and secures compliance. That appears to

20 be directed to a culture which ensures or secures and

21 motivates compliance. Have I correctly understood it,

22 first of all?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Secondly, how are we going to bring about that culture?

25 It's not just the code which is going to do it, on my

Page 35

1 understanding of what you're saying. 2 A. That's why I thought the analogy with medical ethics is 3 quite a useful one, because obviously then -- from the

4 1960s onwards, with the major changes in clinical ethics 5 across the globe, there was also resistance, people who

6 would say, "We're not engaged in all this stuff about

7 informing patients. We know best." But a generation

8 later, when you have compulsory ethics training as part

9 of your GMC registration and so on, things gradually 10 changed. But they changed -- it takes time to change.

11 If you don't have that cultural change, it's less clear

12 how -- certainly self-regulation wouldn't be effective

13 at all unless there was appropriate cultural change, so

14 I mean -- the short answer is: I don't know. It's

15 likely to be long and difficult and resisted, partly

16 because of economic pressures, partly because the media

17 is not restricted to a particular geographical location.

18 So you could change the culture here, but if other areas

19 of the culture hasn't changed --

20 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's not just the areas; it's also

21 media. So the press can say: well, it's true that the

22 broadcasters have to be impartial but the Internet

23 doesn't have to be anything.

24 A. That's true, but then something's limited about that 25 line of argument because -- and I've heard it said that

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1 if you regulate us too heavily, people will just go to 2 the blogosphere and that will be all the worse. I don't 3 think that follows at all. My mum, who is in her 70s, 4 she may suspect some things they reads in her daily 5 newspapers, but that doesn't make her want to rush off 6 to the blogosphere. She'll put on BBC News. 7 I don't think there's a rush to the kind of Wild 8 West. It may go the other way. If you are worried 9 about content regulation and all you're left with is 10 regulated broadcast news of a different kind -- the 11 broadcast media -- then that seems to be as likely as 12 people somehow disappearing off to the blogosphere for 13 their content. 14 MR JAY: Dr Manson, you subjected the Editors' Code of 15 Practice to a narrow analysis. Can we go through that 16 quite carefully, please, and identify the key areas of 17 concern to you. I don't know whether you have a copy of 18 the code to hand? 19 A. I don't, but --20 Q. Maybe you should borrow mine, since --21 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: We can possibly put it on the screen. 22 Can we do that? 23 THE TECHNICIAN: I do believe I have a copy here. 24 MR JAY: Excellent. 25 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Super. Page 37 MR JAY: Can you read it, Dr Manson? 1

A. Well, the worry about "misleading" is misleading is an audience-relative notion. You can mislead some but not others. So in order to assess what kinds of misleading are relevant, we have to say a lot more about what kinds of misleading we're concerned with. Is it misleading the average person? Is it misleading the average person who is really ill-informed about science? Is it misleading the average person who has an understanding of the base rate fallacy?

Unless you can spell that out, there's lots and lots of room there for either a misunderstanding at the top, in the PCC or -- in looking at: is this a breach of the code? Because if it's all blurred at the edges -- is this a breach of the code? Well, it sort of looks like it didn't mislead. Well, it might not have mislead you. It might have misled 3 million people out there.

I haven't got the answer. I haven't got the detailed response to giving that account of what it means to mislead and what's the ethically relevant sense of misleading, but if it's not there, then really that's just waving a flag, saying, "We don't want to do bad things but we're not going to tell you what the bad things are."

Q. Another point you make is there's nothing in the code to suggest the press has positive duties --

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2 A. I can.

3 Q. You already made the point about the public's right to

4 know. Clause 1:

5 "The press must take care not to publish inaccurate, 6

misleading or distorted information, including

7 pictures."

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8 You have a concern, I think, about that provision?

What is it?

A. Well, one major concern is it doesn't tell you what "inaccurate" or "misleading" or "distorted information" amount to. There ought to be an addendum at the bottom which says, "And by this we mean ... here is a further expansion of what we mean by that."

So if I publish -- I can publish something that's true. One example I used in the submission was -there's the reporting of science, a lurid headline that said some sort of terrible cancer has doubled, you're 100 per cent more likely to get it than you were yesterday, but it doesn't mention the base rate. It doesn't tell you how unlikely you were to get it in the first place. You're still fantastically unlikely to get it.

24 In a sense there is -- it's accurate, it's true --25

Q. It's misleading, isn't it?

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- A. Yes.
- 2 Q. -- in any respect.
- 3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Where would you expect the positive duties to be in the 5 code and what sort of duties would you like to see spelt

6 out?

> A. Well, I don't know -- I mean, the -- I don't know if it is the place of this code to have positive duties because if it's a heterogeneous press and a free press, then I certainly don't have a direct argument that says all media outlets, all news media must present -- must have political reporting. That might be a very good thing, but I don't think there's a solid philosophical

13 14 argument that would support that.

So in terms of positive duties, I've actually --I noted the absence of it but that was actually linked to slightly different point earlier on. I haven't got an argument that says there ought to be positive -particularly positive duties to provide certain kinds of content. I don't think I'd want to offer that argument. I think the key concern that I have with the Editors' Code as it stands is, first of all, its lack of clarity, and second of all, that it really doesn't get across any

23 24 of the implication -- any implications for breaches. 25

So it's along -- as I mentioned in the submission,

1 the word "must" is used 32 times in the Editors' Code, 1 absolute "musts" still permit, if it's not inconsistent 2 2 but when you actually follow it through, it's like: to say so, exceptions. So, for example -- I take one at 3 3 "Well, you must do X and Y otherwise you'll be breaking random -- 6(3): 4 the code", to which the response would be: "And?" Or: 4 "Pupils must not be approached or photographed at 5 5 "So what?" Well, you'd be breaking the code. school without the permission of the school 6 It's -- a very different kind of code would link 6 authorities." 7 7 that "must" to: "You must do X or these will be the But that's subject to public interest. It's quite 8 consequences." And we know -- we've had the debate 8 difficult to see what public interest might justify 9 9 about the PCC -- the consequences might not be that taking a photograph of a child at school without the 10 10 great for breaches of the code anyway. So it was as permission of the school authorities, but I won't press 11 11 for examples. a -- as something that's supposed to be action-guiding 12 and action-directing, it fails on two counts, just 12 MR JAY: Can I ask you, please, about sections 10 and 11 of 13 because it's unclear and thus can't direct action in 13 your evidence, starting at page 18, 00904. The code is 14 clear ways, and secondly it doesn't have any kind of 14 underspecified and very unclear with regard to key 15 motivating force because it can lead to the "so what?" 15 concepts. You propose a code which might have a summary 16 response. "You must do that." "Well, suppose I don't?" 16 list of requirements, coupled with a richer and clearer 17 Q. The "so what?" response relates arguably to a different 17 set of addenda that clarified key concepts and 18 issue; namely the sanction is inadequate. But if you 18 constraints. Well, that's self-explanatory. 19 19 look at the code itself, just to run the contrary Section 11, other changes -- and these are cultural 20 argument by you, if we look at our imperative auxiliary 20 changes. I think we did touch on some of those before. 21 21 "must" -- you say it comes up 32 times -- it comes up in A. Yes. 22 clause 1, against which there's no asterisk. So if it 22 Q. And we looked at cultural change within the sphere of 23 says you "must" do something, that is unqualified; you 23 medical ethics. It might be said that the main engines 24 24 must do it. But it if you have an asterisk case like 3, for change were general dilution in culture elsewhere in 25 privacy, then you must do it unless you can show the 25 paternalism and in deferential society. That was Page 41 Page 43 1 public interest exception applies. So although it's not 1 diluted and it became reflected in what medicine did. 2 2 That leads to the final point you make about the 3 3 A. But -responsibility of audiences, because at least one 4 Q. -- the editor, who has experience of this code, will 4 witness has said that part of the problem here is not 5 work out what the obligations are, won't they? 5 just the culture in the press; it's the culture 6 A. When you say the one -- the subsequent one -- the press 6 everywhere. If the press doesn't have an audience, it 7 7 is dead. What's the precise point you're making in this must take care not to publish inaccurate -- well, again, 8 I think that's -- it's not unqualified. It's 8 final paragraph? 9 9 syntactically unqualified, there's no explicit A. It was just something I wanted to put in for 10 10 qualification, but it's "must" or what? completeness' sake, because a lot of the debate focuses 11 11 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'm not so sure that's right in on -- can paint the press as somehow people sitting 12 itself, because all it's saying is the press must take 12 around in a room making up evil things to do. There's 13 13 care not to publish inaccurate or misleading no -- if there's no demand for salacious gossip and long 14 14 information. lens photos, then -- people wouldn't be paying paparazzi 15 15 A. Sorry, it's even stronger. six-figure sums for photos of this or that member of 16 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: In other words, it's not saying it 16 royalty or whatever if people didn't want to see them 17 mustn't publish something that's inaccurate. It can 17 and if it didn't make a difference to how they behave, 18 take care, and if it's got it wrong, well, it's got it 18 if they didn't click once more on the website, didn't 19 wrong. But then it's not a breach of 1(1) of the code. 19 keep on buying a copy of whatever the paper was for 20 A. Yes. Some of the "musts" are even weaker than others 20 another week in order to -- or switch their paper, even 21 and that's a particular -- that's a hedged "must". 21 better, from one paper to another. 22 22 MR JAY: Yes. There's some absolute "musts", there's some So I really want to highlight that audiences have 23 23 qualified "musts" and there's -a responsibility too. If we're thinking about the 24 A. Even the absolute "musts" are limited here. 24 culture, we're thinking about -- it's not about blame 25 25 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's interesting that some of the but in terms of characterising what normatively has gone

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1 wrong, then audiences have a part to play as well. 1 society and what rights do people have and what 2 2 Of course, the concern with audiences is primarily practices breach those rights? 3 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'm very pleased that you said that a concern about the privacy intrusion, not a concern 3 with truthfulness, because audiences are actually the 4 4 rather than I did. 5 victim of breaches of truthfulness, whilst in terms of 5 MR JAY: Thank you, Dr Manson. 6 paying or contributing towards a culture of privacy A. Thank you. 7 7 invasion, they actually share some of the responsibility LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Dr Manson, thank you very much 8 8 indeed, not merely for this afternoon but for the for it. 9 One thing that occurred to me which I hadn't 9 detailed submission you made. I've said to all your 10 mentioned in the submission would be -- it would be very 10 colleagues: I'm very conscious that these philosophical 11 11 concepts do require thinking out and if there's anything interesting just to explore further the idea of whether 12 audiences would be quite so keen to commit themselves to 12 you want to elaborate on in what you've said, you're 13 buying these papers if -- there's a famous kind of 13 very welcome to do so in writing at some stage, but it's 14 thought experiment in philosophy. It derives from Kant 14 not compulsory. 15 and the philosopher John Rawls developed it in his 15 A. Okay. 16 ethics, where you have to imagine the world where you 16 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you very much. 17 17 MR JAY: We'll have five minutes. don't know which person you're going to be born as and 18 then you have to reach a conclusion about what kind of 18 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: We'll take a break. 19 19 society that would be. (3.25 pm)20 Q. The veil of ignorance? 20 (A short break) 21 21 A. Yes. Behind the veil of ignorance, what kind of society (3.32 pm)22 would you choose? You can do a similar thing for the 22 MR JAY: Sir, finally today, Professor Onora O'Neill, 23 purchase of newspapers. If you didn't know whether or 23 please. 24 24 not you were going to be you or one of the victims of PROFESSOR ONORA SYLVIA O'NEILL (sworn) 25 this paper's intrusive privacy policy, would you 25 Questions by MR JAY Page 45 Page 47 MR JAY: May I ask you, please, for your full name? 1 continue to do it? What kind of newspaper policy --2 2 what kind of set of standards would you want for the A. Onora Sylvia O'Neill. 3 3 Q. You've kindly provided us with a statement dated 14 June press if you didn't know whether you were going to be 4 just yourself or whether you were going to be someone 4 of this year and which you're content to adopt at your 5 5 whose child had just died in an accident and had 16 formal evidence to us; is that correct? 6 6 A. Yes. camera people trying to get their lens through the hole 7 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Professor, thank you very much indeed in the curtains? That kind of thought experiment is 7 8 very interesting to see what people's actual thoughts 8 for this statement and indeed for the debate that you 9 9 were, but I'm guessing that most people would say, started with your 2002 Reith Lectures, which has now 10 "Actually, I want the press to have standards." 10 led -- I don't say inexorably but certainly by 11 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But you put it the way that you do, 11 a somewhat torturous route to the way in which I've 12 12 that audiences have responsibilities. The press would spent the last nine months. So thank you very much. 13 spin that straight back at you and say, "But our job is 13 A. Thank you. 14 to provide the public with what we know the public 14 MR JAY: Professor, you've been Professor of Philosophy at 15 15 actually wants", and the contrast is then made between the University of Essex and Cambridge. You were 16 16 Principal of Newham College, Cambridge for 14 years the very substantial sales of tabloid and mid-market 17 17 ending in 2006, President of the British Academy ending papers as opposed to the sales of broadsheet newspapers. 18 A. We know from the history of ethics and the history of 18 in 2009, Chair of the Nuffield Foundation, ending in

2010, and you're now a cross bench member of the

Q. Thank you very much. Can I ask you, please, first of

all -- in the second paragraph, you say that in your

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House of Lords. In a nutshell, is that --

House of Lords since 1999.

A. That is all correct and I have been in the

the law that those kinds of arguments aren't very

slavery and bear baiting. "People really like bear

torn apart!" Therefore we have to keep it? No, of

course we don't. We reflect upon things as rational

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powerful. If they were powerful, we would still have

baiting! They really like the Colosseum, seeing people

human ethical subjects and think how should we organise

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opinion:

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1 "Most public discussion of press freedom and 2 regulation during the last year has made little useful 3 progress because contributors assume some favoured 4 configuration of media freedoms without argument, then 5 infer that certain types of media regulation are -- or 6 are not -- acceptable."

7 I'm sure most of us know what the point you're 8 making there is, but could you make it absolutely 9 explicit, please?

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A. Yes. I think if we just say we're in favour of press freedom, we beg all the important questions. The important question is: which conception of press freedom and how do you justify it?

Some people, including some who have given evidence to this Inquiry, have said that they're in favour of complete press freedom except where the law requires otherwise. That too seems to me a question-begging move, not only because the law is changing a lot -- we have to think at present about new legislation on defamation, the new draft directive on data protection and other pieces of legislation on freedom of information has just been amended -- but also because a law is probably not the whole story, and some of your other witnesses have said that, and I shall confirm that that's my view.

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Q. Thank you. When we look at the term "freedom of 1 2 expression", you rightly point out that it's used in 3 various international, European Conventions and 4 declarations of rights. But can I ask you to amplify 5 the point you make on the second page of your statement 6 at page 01155 of our bundle:

> "Contemporary claims about freedom of expression are quite often confused with JS Mills' much more specific claims about individual rights of self-expression."

What did you mean by that, please?

A. I take it that the contemporary use -- by which I mean across the last 60 years -- has been about freedom to express content -- that is to say, a new term was needed because "freedom of press" was too narrow, the written word. Broadcasting had become important. Film was important. So "freedom of expression" is taken to be freedom to express content through whichever medium, technological or other, whereas "freedom of self-expression" was, as the term states very directly, freedom to express one's own individuality or sense of self and the like.

- 22 Q. Thank you.
- 23 A. So they require different arguments to justify them.
- 24 Q. And the arguments, of course, are different in relation 25

to the speech rights of organisations, which of course Page 50

is the principal focus of our Inquiry. It's not

- 2 individual self-expression. You list three
- 3 considerations towards the bottom of this second page;
- 4 is that right?

5 A. Yes, I do, without going into (iii) there, which is

a comment about Mill's famous harm principle, in that

7 I don't think it does as much work as is popularly

8 supposed in liberal societies. It is very difficult to

9 work out the harm that a given speech act causes or is

10 likely to cause.

> Q. So the difficulty is in unpacking Mill's concept, because there may always be some degree of harm from the exercise of freedom of self-expression, but it's

14 a question of factor and degree? Is that the point?

A. It's partly degree. It's partly that, of course, within the context of Mill's argument, you're looking at the whole utilitarian apparatus, where you're meant to argue about the harm of types of act, and that is extremely hard. If one considers, for example, the arguments about press freedom and the Danish cartoons, great harm was caused. There were hundreds of people dead at the end of that episode. But showing whose act, at what

23 stage of a complex series of events, actually led to

24 those harms would have been very difficult.

25 Q. Thank you. Then, on the next page, our page 01156, you Page 51

1 look at other arguments. Under (c):

2 "A quite different argument for freedom of speech and of the press appeals to the importance of seeking and establishing truth."

Now, what are the strengths and limits of that

argument?

A. Its strength is that truth matters in every domain of life, and by that I don't mean something particularly grand. I mean just being accurate about what is the case and what is not the case insofar as it's possible, and the arguments from truth-seeking are the great arguments of the 17th century, absolutely fundamental to our whole modern constitutional tradition, but they are arguments that, in my view, have two limitations. First of all, they're not going to establish anything about speech acts that don't aim or claim to say anything about what's true or not. So they're not adequate arguments for the media, because I think it's important that the media be able to publish plays and crosswords and the rest. So we need broader arguments than those that appeal to truth.

Secondly, where we do rely on those arguments, where truth is the aim, I think that we get an argument for a highly restricted and conditional form of press freedom. That is to say, it has to observe the

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disciplines of truth-seeking. This is a highly useful argument. I think it's absolutely crucial to make the case for investigative journalism, but of course what it makes is not an unrestricted case.

Q. All these considerations lead you to conclude -- and this is subparagraph (d) -- that:

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"The public interest in freedom of expression and specifically in a free press is best construed as an interest in adequate or better than adequate standards of public communication that allow readers, listeners and viewers to gain information and form judgments so to participate in social, cultural and democratic life."

So you're focusing there on the adequacy of standards, which include, of course, ethical standards?

A. They would also include ethical standards, but I think that, as it were, standards that some people will not think of as ethical standards. For example, standards in making judgments and in giving evidence, carefulness in formulation, are also relevant here. Perhaps they should count as ethical standards but not everybody sees them that way.

Q. Thank you. Can I ask you, please, to develop the pointyou made towards the bottom of that page:

"Readers, listeners and viewers need to be able to grasp and assess not only speech content -- what is Page 53

1 **A. Yes.**

Q. Can we be clear what those interests were and what, asit were, the seriousness of our omission amounts to?

4 A. You specifically probed asking for omissions and
 5 I thought it was a useful question because when
 6 I thought about it, the public interest in good
 7 governance, things are that public goods for the wh

governance, things are that public goods for the whole
 community -- good governance, a sound currency and so

on -- is one case of a public interest, and the public

interest in there being goods for individuals -- for
 example, a right of self-expression, also a right to own

property, a right to take part in things -- is another
 sort of interest. But it didn't seem to cover the whole

spectrum because there are many things that we would

regard as matters of public interest which are neither those of individuals nor concern the public as a whole.

So we have a public interest, by two examples, that

18 research and inquiry take place, not just that

19 individuals be free to participate in research and

20 inquiry. We have a public interest in there being many

21 associations in civil society, not just in people being

22 free to join such associations if they exist.

Q. Yes, I understand.

Question 5 now, where the question was: to what
extent -- I paraphrase -- is the current performance of
Page 55

1 said -- but speech acts -- what is done in saying it."

A. I think the import of that is the following: the distinction between speech content and speech act is familiar, I think not only among philosophers, certainly there. What I do is quite important. I may say something and it may be understood, but the question of whether it is a joke or a truth claim matters quite a lot, and we have many cases of things going awry in daily life because people mistook not what a sentence meant but what the act of saying it imported, and I think we need to bear that distinction in mind.

The speech act that the media most routinely perform is that of communicating, and in communicating I have somehow to convey to my audience what I'm saying. Is it serious or is it not? Am I, for example, conveying a warning of some impending catastrophe, something utterly serious, or am I just making a joke? That's the most obvious example where taking things up the wrong way, grasping the speech act the wrong way, will make a huge difference.

Q. Thank you. Question 4, which is the top of the next
 page, 01157. The question was looking at balancing
 various public interests against the interest in the
 freedom of the press. Your point was that our
 formulation omitted certain types of public interest.

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the press, I suppose, adequate or inadequate? Your pithy response is that the current balance appears to

3 you to be out of kilter:

"It is evidently a matter of widespread and intense public concern."

6 Can I ask you, please, as you do in your statement, 7 to elaborate that point?

8 A. I suppose that one way of thinking about it would be to 9 suggest that parts of the media express themselves in 10 ways that might not be inappropriate if they were 11 individuals and relatively powerless, but which, given 12 that that is not their situation because they are quite 13 powerful organisations, are not appropriate, and the 14 constant reiteration of the importance of press freedom 15 without thinking about the sorts of constraints under 16 which it is well configured seems to me inappropriate, 17 and not justifiable for the reasons I gave at the 18 beginning of this evidence.

Q. The standards which you look to to judge current performance: accessibility, intelligibility and assessibility. You find the UK media as a whole generally meeting the first two of those standards but maybe not the third, assessibility. Can we be clear what you mean by that and the respects in which the media are falling short?

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to pursue these cases, because there are no victims who

2 2 report a crime to the police and it's very difficult to reader to know whether claims that they read in the 3 3 press are well-founded. It's as elementary as that. uncover information and once you do, then there are all 4 4 sorts of good reason why it's quite difficult to get They can't even know with any certainty whether those 5 5 claims are, in effect, paid-for content. They can't through to the possibility of prosecution. Then there's 6 know in whose interests they are being made. They can't 6 the civil law in its complexity and its expense and all 7 7 that surrounds there. But I am also looking at that tell how good the evidence behind them is. 8 8 area which isn't necessarily a breach of the criminal We all know that the standards can be met by the 9 media, because we have parts of the media that meet them 9 law or the civil law. 10 10 A. Yes. to a high standard. 11 11 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: And I think that your third category Q. Do you feel that that is the main defect, as it were, in 12 12 actually encompasses that. You mention intimidation, the press as currently configured? You're not directly 13 addressing now -- I know you do elsewhere -- issues such 13 and there may be other examples as well. It's how to 14 14 as harassment and intrusion of privacy rights, cope with that --15 et cetera, but --15 A. I think that is the difficult thing, and, as it were, 16 A. It's once we get beyond the standard legal constraints, 16 the substance of the discussion of adequate press 17 17 regulation comes up there, in that it is not a matter which I think, by and large -- there are exceptions when simply of extending the criminal or the civil law. 18 we're discussing in public interest journalism, but by 18 19 19 I take it that there may be reasons for such changes. and large, defendants of present media practice have not 20 been keen to say, "But we should be allowed to defame, 20 I suppose that the promised defamation legislation is an to harass and so on." They will say that they should be 21 21 example of such a change, if it comes about, but I had 22 permitted to make everything -- to say anything that 22 in mind here something which is not a matter of civil or 23 23 lies within the law. criminal law. 24 24 Of course, it is the context of this Inquiry that The atmosphere of intimidation surprised me, because 25 25 a great deal has been done that was a breach of the it turned out that it was not what I think was Page 57 Page 59 1 current legislation, so we now do know that there has 1 frequently alleged, that newspapers or journalists led 2 2 been hacking, we know that there are cases of politicians to be fearful of loss of support come the 3 3 defamation, we know that people are frightened to speak next election; it was that they were afraid of, to put 4 up because of the fear of what will be done to them. 4 it crudely, their personal lives being turned 5 5 I was quite struck last summer, as the scandal broke, to upside down, and everybody has some person within their 6 6 hear members of the Commons culture, media and sport family or circle whom they would not wish to see 7 committee saying quite publicly that they had refrained 7 exposed. 8 8 from saying certain things not because they were afraid LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I understand. That's merely -- I say 9 9 that the media might turn against their political party "merely". That is one example of the concern that's 10 and lose them the election, which I had supposed might 10 been expressed in the Inquiry, among a number of others 11 have been a consideration, but because they were afraid 11 as well, of course. 12 for themselves, and that seems to me very unhealthy in 12 A. Yes. Yes. No, but I think it's a serious one because 13 13 when people who are not shrinking violets, like MPs, say any democracy, that people are intimidated --14 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But you've just given three examples. 14 that they have pulled their punches in a routine way 15 15 The first two contravene the law. because of this fear, I think that is quite damaging to 16 16 A. Indeed. democratic life. 17 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: The third may not, depending upon LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes. 17 18 precisely how it's done. 18 MR JAY: Thank you. Still on page 01158, you identify what 19 A. It may not, but intimidation is a bad atmosphere in 19 could be done to make it easier for the public to assess 20 20 a democratic society. media claims without detriment to press freedom. What 21 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: That's a slightly different point, 21 you're looking at, Professor O'Neill, is a regulator of 22 22 because what I'm trying to focus on is not merely the media process as opposed to media content, since the 23 23 criminal law or the civil law. One can look, in later would constitute censorship, which worked to an 24 24 relation to the criminal law, at the adequacy and improved press code, would have a statutory basis, would

ability, in its pursuit, of those who are in authority

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A. I think it is extremely difficult for the ordinary

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be independent from government and corporate interests.

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The importance of a statutory basis, though, and the strength of the contrary argument that a statutory basis is, in itself, offensive, since it in some way does amount to government intruding in a sacrosanct area -can I ask you to address those points?

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A. I haven't actually seen any argument -- or certainly none that I found convincing -- to suggest that a code does intrude in a sacrosanct area. I have tried to think of them, but it is usually a matter of assertion on the assumption that a code will allow government to interfere with the expression of content. I think if government can interfere with the expression of content, that is indeed disastrous. That is censorship. That is what has to be avoided.

But regulation of process is another matter, and the regulation of process is something that, it seems to me, the advocates of the status quo, with its rather weak and disjointed code, already accept. They have no argument against certain forms of regulation of process. For example, they think that the advertising standards issues are perfectly acceptable restrictions on media freedom. If you have ever looked at product placement television in the United States, you will know what sorts of results you get when you don't have those restrictions.

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1 is that we're in a period of media convergence which is

2 making regulation of all sorts quite difficult, and

3 because the so-called new media seemingly can, in

4 practice, however you legislate, duck under any code,

5 I'm particularly concerned about the possibility --6 indeed, the prevalence -- of anonymous publication,

7 traditionally, of course, the domain of the poison pen

8 and the hidden slanderer.

> So I hesitate to be too definite at this point because I don't really entirely see how one proceeds on this issue, but the issue seems to me to be the one of feasibilities more than it is one of desirability. The arguments about what restrictions would be unacceptable or acceptable seem to me not too difficult, but the arguments about how you regulate the blogger who is, in fact, inventing a lot of his or her material seem to me extraordinarily difficult, and that's my reason for hesitation.

I know you've heard other witnesses who have probably been able to say more about the implications of convergence, but I regard that as the most difficult single thing that faces this Inquiry, that if there is a different code, then perhaps all the practices that are damaging and intimidating to citizens will, as it were, be driven out of visibility, but the content will

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1 So I don't think it's actually controversial;

I think it's just a matter of assertion that you cannot

3 have a code that does not intrude into what you called

4 a sacred space. You certainly can, in my view.

5 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Which raises a slightly different

question as well, which is whether a code which has any

7 form of statutory backing or underpinning really allows

8 Parliament -- or is likely to allow Parliament -- to get

into the sacred space in a way that would be

10 unacceptable.

A. I think that Parliament would have to keep itself out of that space, which it's perfectly able to do, and that's why I suggested, under clause (d) no power to require the publication or non-publication of certain specified content should form part of the code. No power to censor. That could be made explicit.

17 MR JAY: Thank you. At the bottom of this page, you deal 18 with two big questions. The first big question is

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whether regulation should be voluntary or obligatory.

You say that the question is not an easy one to answer.

21 It's not clear, if I may say so, whether you favour the

22 voluntary solution or whether you're merely respecting

23 the strength of the argument that there should be

24 voluntary participation.

25 A. I think that the reason I'm quite hesitant at this point

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1 still be published and will be repeated.

2 There are measures you can imagine that will deal

3 with this, and one of them is for the code to take

4 a dimmer view of the publication of content where its

5 source is anonymised tips or the sorts of things you get

6 in the vox pops.

7 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: The code could do that, but it

8 doesn't actually deal with the rather wider problem of

bloggers who may have a powerful megaphone themselves

10 because of the extent to which their material is

11 available on the Internet, but also who don't come

12 within the jurisdiction because they have placed

13 their --

14 A. Yes.

15 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: -- servers in America somewhere and

16 they don't live here. Then you have this rather

17 difficult area or space with the broadcasters, with all

18 the statutory regimes surrounding Ofcom and their

19 requirement for impartiality on the one end, and then

20 the bloggers on the other end, and you have the press in

21 the middle -- and it doesn't matter whether the press is 22

the published press or the digital press. There are 23 a number of distinctions which we've discussed at

24 various stages in the Inquiry. One could be those who

25 are in the business of publishing news, which might

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| 1 | catch some bloggers who are obtaining revenue from their | 1 | enables the public to judge what is said. There may be |
| 2 | website, or you could restrict it more and seek to catch | 2 | cases where one has to hold back on the source of |
| 3 | those who are in what might be described as the general | 3 | certain information, but good public interest journalism |
| 4 | news business, where they are collecting facts and not | 4 | seeks to make the sources and the evidence as available |
| 5 | merely presenting individual comment, which is the | 5 | to the public as is feasible, given certain other |
| 6 | blogger, but researched facts and opinion on the basis | 6 | constraints. |
| 7 | that it has been, if not peer-reviewed as science might | 7 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Quite apart from the dynamic of the |
| 8 | be, at least subject to certain criteria which the | 8 | Internet and all those problems, the other trick that |
| 9 | citizen can accept as valid and worthwhile. | 9 | has to be grappled with or concern that has to be |
| 10 | A. Is your example something like Reuters here, who have | 10 | grappled with is the distinction between that type of |
| 11 | something like very high standards in the collection of | 11 | journalism and the journalism that depends upon |
| 12 | facts but aren't themselves a newspaper? | 12 | inappropriate invasion of privacy, which is simply for |
| 13 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Correct. | 13 | the purposes of entertainment without any public |
| 14 | A. Yes. | 14 | interest basis to it at all. |
| 15 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Correct, and there may be others, | 15 | A. I would we have perhaps slightly skipped to public |
| 16 | because it's quite important not to tie whatever happens | 16 | interest journalism. I think that genuine public |
| 17 | in the Inquiry down to print media, because ten years | 17 | interest journalism has to meet two standards. First, |
| 18 | ago one couldn't have visualised what it would be like | 18 | it actually does have to aim at the accurate reporting |
| 19 | now, and I wouldn't care to start to imagine what the | 19 | of something that is the case. It has to be aimed at |
| 20 | position might be in ten years' time from today. | 20 | truth. So it has to, as it were, accept the disciplines |
| 21 | A. My assumption is that the open access revolution will | 21 | of truth-seeking. If we think of the famous examples of |
| 22 | slide through all forms of publishing, creating | 22 | investigative journalism, the sorts that people learn |
| 23 | commercial havoc, and that all those social and business | 23 | about when they're becoming journalists, that was done. |
| 24 | practices that underpin things like attribution or | 24 | Secondly, it has to be a matter of public interest |
| 25 | fact-checking or going to sources are going to be | 25 | that this information be made available, so that if |
| | Page 65 | | Page 67 |
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| 1 | changed. They won't necessarily always be worse, but | 1 | you I think the journalists who discovered about the |
| 2 | they're going to change a great deal and that is why | 2 | Watergate scandal are a good example of this. It was |
| 3 | I find it particularly hard to comment on the limits | 3 | absolutely vital that people understand that from the |
| 4 | here. | 4 | White House itself the law was being broken and it had |
| 5 | I take it that your terms of reference lead you to | 5 | to be both accurate and in the public interest. |
| 6 | look mainly at the press | 6 | So I don't have any difficulty in knowing what's |
| 7 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Absolutely. | 7 | genuine public interest journalism. I have some |
| 8 | A but they are no longer a discrete set of | 8 | difficulty in answering the question: how, in practice, |
| 9 | institutions. | 9 | do we prevent things that are neither in the public |
| 10 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'm sure you would agree with me that | 10 | interest nor a matter of truth-seeking masquerading as |
| 11 | we must do absolutely everything we can to facilitate | 11 | public interest journalism? And I'm looking forward to |
| 12 | and encourage the practice of true journalism that | 12 | the debate on the Select Committee of the House of Lords |
| 13 | is, reporters going out there, researching the facts, | 13 | report on investigative journalism next week. I have to |
| 14 | providing for the public the opportunity for the public | 14 | refine my thoughts a bit before that. |
| 15 | to hold power to account I think that might be | 15 | LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Well, I'm also having some difficulty |
| 16 | a better expression of it than themselves holding power | 16 | in answering the question, and that, it seems to me, is |
| 17 | to account and then putting that out in the public | 17 | one of the very big questions that I must answer. |
| 18 | domain, which seems to me to be a very different | 18 | A. Some of it seems to me less difficult than it might be, |
| 19 | activity to those who simply pick up tittle-tattle or | 19 | in that if the journalism fails on either of the two |
| 20 | gossip and then throw it out in a blog with some | 20 | criteria that's to say, it wasn't truth-seeking |
| 21 | comment, all of which is unattributable, and none of | 21 | anyhow, or it wasn't a matter of public interest |
| 22 | which can be pinned down or necessarily verified. | 22 | anyhow then it's not public interest journalism, it's |
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| 23 | A. I very much agree, and I think that the contrary to | 23 | not investigative journalism, it doesn't deserve special |
| | | 23 24 | protection. But in order to get to a position where |
| 23 | A. I very much agree, and I think that the contrary to | | |
| 23 24 | A. I very much agree, and I think that the contrary to some of what one has read in the last year about public | 24 | protection. But in order to get to a position where |

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- 1 more firmly, I think it has to be the case that there is 2 more clarity about the sorts of things that good 3 journalism is expected to be open about, like being open 4 about the sources and interests where it can be done 5 without endangering the sources. 6 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I understand that, but you also have 7 to be rather clearer about what you believe is truly in 8 the public interest. 9 A. Yes. I don't believe in these major matters which 10 require legislative framework, we ever sail with 11 a completely blank view about what is in the public 12 interest. So in the public interest is all the things 13 that enable the public to pursue not merely their 14 individual interests but their common life and the 15 political life of society. 16 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: One of the reasons why I'm very 17 reluctant to embark upon a definition of the public 18 interest, which some have encouraged me to do, is 19 because the public interest is actually a very different 20 concept depending upon the context in which you are 21 considering the question. There isn't one over-arching 22 definition of the public interest which would serve 23 every single circumstance. That's what I presently 24 25 A. I agree with that, although I believe it might be
- 1 A. I agree, and I don't think that one is going to find --2 get much headway by trying to have a fully spelt out 3 definition of the public interest. But we talked about 4 this previously, the three broad categories: that which 5 is in the interests of the public as a whole, that 6 which -- such as good governance and sound currency, the 7 associational interests, which it is of interest to the 8 public that these associations and activities exist, and 9 then the sorts of public interest which are closer to 10 individual rights, all seem to me important. 11 MR JAY: Press ethics now, Professor O'Neill. It's 12 section 6, page 01159. Just two points I'd like to draw 13 out, if I may, because what you say is largely 14 self-explanatory. 15 You refer to the meeting of adequate ethical and 16 epistemic standards in journalistic, editorial and 17 business practice. I'm particularly interested in the 18 last one, business practice. Could you tell us, please, 19 what you had in mind there? 20 A. I didn't pick it up in my examples, but I'm particularly 21 interested in the question of conflicts of interest 22 between a media organisation and what it is reporting. 23 Some media organisations go very light on reporting

certain sorts of content which the public have some

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interest in being aware of. For example, I think there

are newspapers that go very light on commenting on

violations of human rights in China. There are other

will be given a completely free ride. So it's very

often -- business practice that is uncommented on is

much more local examples where certain local businesses

possible to get off the deck what I have seen as the 2 most meritricious claims to be doing something that's in 3 the public interest on the grounds that something 4 interests the public. That subjective conception of 5 what is interesting to the public -- the tittle-tattle, 6 I suppose -- seems to me one that could be got off the 7 deck, and again, one would expect that an editor who 8 sanctions activity that he or she might not otherwise 9 sanction because a piece of journalism is important in 10 the public interest will be able to say, "I thought this 11 was a matter of great public interest because it was 12 this sort of thing. That is a matter of public 13 interest." 14 There will be borderline cases and that doesn't 15 bother me, but I do think we need to hold on to 16 a perception of the public good and the public interest 17 or I'm not sure what we should be expecting the media to 18 do at all. 19 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes, I agree. I'm not suggesting 20 that one doesn't have to flesh it out in some way, as 21 long as one isn't seeking to define the term for all 22 purposes for all times, because each fact-sensitive case

will throw up slightly different considerations, and

different results, for reasons which are good and valid.

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broadly similar situations might generate slightly

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6 very often the business practice of the media 7 organisation itself and its connection with certain 8 matters of wider public interest. 9 Q. Thank you. The second point is that you refer to the 10 adoption of more specific ethical quotes suited to 11 particular types of the media. Can I ask you, please, 12 what you had in mind there? 13 A. Well, the media are a broad church, even if we're 14 talking about the mass media. I think there will 15 undoubtedly be different sorts of codes for 16 a publication that is mainly interested in business news 17 and that is mainly interested in sporting news. So 18 although I can see the point of a press code for all 19 print publications, I suspect that certain groups of 20 publications will have an interest in developing their own code more specifically in dealing with certain sorts 22 of things. 23 For example, I cannot imagine that the FT needs to 24 say very much about the sorts of conflict of interest

that arise in covering sport and offers of so-called

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hospitality by sporting organisations.

- 2 Q. Thank you. Section 7 I'm going to pass over because
- 3 that's self-explanatory, but section 8, please, about
- 4 the strength or efficacy of professional ethical codes
- 5 on their own, which is likely to be important in this
 - area.

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- You make it clear that a voluntary industry code is unlikely to achieve enough in the context of journalism.
- 9 Why, in a nutshell, do you say that?
- 10 A. I think we have enormous experience in this country of
- 11 the limitations of self-regulation for powerful
- 12 professions and institutions and in fact, we've more or
- 13 less eliminated self-regulation, I think, even for the
- 14 bar, by the way, but we have certainly eliminated or
- 15 squeezed self-regulation for most other professions I am
- 16 familiar with. If you think about doctors or
- 17 accountants or the like.
- 18 Often this is a matter of considerable regret
 - because everything works very well if self-regulation is
- 20 functioning as people hope that it will, but it goes bad
- 21 when there are temptations, conflicts of interest,
- 22 colleagues whose reputation and livelihood you can save
- 23 by not really applying the code with any rigour.
- 24 So I don't really see a good case for journalism
- 25 being unique in retaining the privilege of

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- case my own profession is not a profession.
- 2 Academics -- there are all sorts of demands before you
 - become a university teacher but they are not a matter of
- 4 getting certified or certificated, whichever the word
- 5 may be. Therapists are another good example. There was
 - a hope, an aspiration, that we should make therapy into
- 7 a regulated profession or set of professions. It
- 8 foundered on the sheer lack of agreement about what this
 - set of practices was.
- 10 So we have, I think, numbers of other examples of 11 things that are at least colloquially thought of as
- 12 professional practice which are, as a matter of fact,
- 13 not regulated in the sense that there is control of 14 entry, and I explicitly said that I thought that
- 15 journalism had reason to remain among those because
- 16 regulation of entry is not an acceptable move there.
- 17 I would, however, note that although regulation of 18 entry is not an acceptable move, these other
- 19 nonregulated professions often face a very large array
- 20 of forms of regulation. So there may not be -- being
- 21 a scientist may not be a regulated profession, but when
- 22 you do scientific research, you will find a great deal
- 23 of regulation.

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- 24 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: So in other words, it isn't good
 - enough to say, "We're not a profession" -- because

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- 1 self-regulation in a society where other professions no
- 2 longer have that privilege and business does not have
- 3 that privilege.
- 4 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Let me see if I can provide you with
- 5 an argument to the contrary which has been advanced in
- 6 the Inquiry: that if you take the professions, each of
- 7 the persons who seek to practice that profession all
- 8 require a licence to do so. Whether it's a doctor,
- 9 a lawyer, a barrister, a solicitor, an optician, all are
- 10 mandated, permitted by the state to do what they do and
- 11 to subject other people to their profession, whereas
- 12 journalists are doing no more than, collectively, each
- 13 pursuing their individual rights of free speech, and
- 14 because that is an inherent right, contra the ability to 15

practice medicine or the law, there is something

- 16 different about it.
- 17 Now, I give it to you and I'd be very interested to
- 18 hear how you would deal with it.
- 19 Have I done it justice, Mr Jay?
- 20 MR JAY: (Nods head)
- 21 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you.
- 22 A. First, I think not all professions are regulated
- 23 professions, if we actually look at the rich panoply of
- 24 professions. I know some will say, "No, no, only the
- 25 regulated ones really count as professions", in which
 - Page 74

- 1 that's the other argument: "We're not professional,
- 2 we're just running a trade." That doesn't wash. It
- 3 doesn't get you through the problem of having to have
- 4 some standards to which all who are involved should
- 5 aspire. Is that --
- 6 A. Yes, I think it's quite a risky argument to say, "We're
- 7 only a trade", because we have no squeamishness about
- 8 regulating trades.
- 9 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'm merely trying to put to you
- 10 a number of the points that have been made during the
- 11 course of the Inquiry.
- 12 A. No, I see the great temptation, and it is linked to the
- 13 fundamental failure to get in mind a determinate
- 14 conception of press freedom which is to be defended, and
- 15 the thought that "We're journalists so we can't be
- 16 regulated" seems to me lame for a number of reasons. If
- 17 they are just a trade, they can be regulated. If they
- 18 are a profession, they can be regulated. If they're
- 19 neither of the above, then what is the claim to
- 20 privilege?
- 21 MR JAY: Your conclusion in relation to an ethical code for
- 22 the media is that it should have statutory backing but
- 23 it should not threaten media freedom and set out
- 24 requirements that are needed to secure communication
- 25 that are adequate for social, cultural and political

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life. One of the arguments which you advance for theneed for a statutory code is that you say:

"Traditionally, ethical codes worked because there were embedded in cultural and social norms that were widely respected and adhered to, making shame and exclusion the principal sanctions for violation."

Well, those attributes, I suppose, are lacking in journalism. It's implicit in what you're saying, I think.

A. I think that until very recently they were not lacking in journalism. I remember reading Mr Andrew Marr's book, "My Trade", in which he describes being a trainee journalist on the Scotsman some years back now, and if he did things badly, a reader would ring up the editor of the Scotsman and he would be carpeted, and that was the old culture.

It is a much more fluid world now, in which it's clear that it is harder to rely purely on the cultural sanctions of -- as it would be in other professions.

Q. Under section 9 of your evidence, you subject the Editors' Code of Practice to a thorough analysis and critique. Some of your points are specific to clauses in the code; others are more general. Can I ask you, please, to explain the more general point, which you characterise as various omissions, exaggerations and

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- a code; we're not talking about the highest possible
- 2 aspirations for all journalism, which I regard as a bit
 - airy fairy.
- 4 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: What you're trying to do is find
- 5 somewhere between the base minimum, which is the
- 6 criminal and the civil law, and the highest possible
- 7 aspirational goal, to provide a level which satisfies
- 8 the requirement of public interest journalism but does
- 9 not inappropriately impact upon the personal rights of
- 10 others. Would that be fair?
- A. Yes, including that and probably quite a bit more. It's
 about the standard or standards that a reader, listener
 or viewer may reasonably expect to inform the
 publication that he or she is reading, or for that
 matter, listening to or watching. And those standards,
 it seems to me, could be clearer for all concerned, and
 something that are just -- could be just a matter of

So I wouldn't go for the aspirational in a press code.

- LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I agree. By using the shorthand
 words "public interest journalism", I was encompassing
- 23 the standard that a reader might reasonably expect to
- 24 receive so as to be informed.

routine practice.

25 A. Yes, I think that's right. And accuracy is important Page 79

1 weaknesses.

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- 2 A. I didn't really think that this was a thorough analysis
- 3 of the code, because of course by this stage in my
- 4 evidence, I thought I was being rather lengthy, but --
- 5 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: You'll encourage me to ask you,
- 6 Professor, that if you don't think this is thorough and
- 7 you'd like to be thorough ...
- 8 A. Lord Leveson, I think I've probably been thorough enough
- 9 for your time and mine, and the code, it seems to me,
- 10 needs rewriting. That is my conclusion. It does have
- gaps. It is -- and it doesn't have -- I don't know
- 12 whether Professor Megone may have said this to you
- because I wasn't able to watch all of his evidence, but
- when I discussed it with him, he -- he knows a lot about
- 15 professional ethics. It's not clear what the animating
- principle of the code is. The code is -- I think he has
- 17 said this -- a series of prohibitions and a few
- requirements, but I think it would be more to the point
- 19 for the code to take a clear view of what journalism is
- 20 for, and I take it -- or the press are for, and I take
- 21 it that it is for communicating with audiences, and that
- 22 was my sort of central picture of what they seek to do,
- and that from what certain things follow about how you
- 24 achieve that purpose and achieve it to an adequate --
- 25 not an outstanding standard. We're talking about
 - Page 78

- 1 where there are truth claims. I would be peeved if the
- 2 football results were misreported, but that doesn't
- 3 happen, interestingly enough. Not much, anyhow. But
- 4 inaccuracy in other domains of life is very often
- 5 tolerated in a way that -- it seems to me halfway
- 6 competent journalism can get certain things right and
- 7 can correct them when it doesn't.
 - Nobody is, after all, asking that journalism should miraculously attain standards of total accuracy on everything reported. They're asking that they should get it broadly right, and that when they get it broadly wrong, they should correct it. Promptly. With equal prominence and so on.
 - But I do wish to say that I think there are standards also for the non-truth-seeking parts of journalism. Those matter as well.
- 17 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: How would you articulate those?
- 18 A. I think that it is partly to do with not exposing either
 - the people about whom you are ostensibly writing, if
 - they are real people, to derision -- although that may
- 21 come closer to the truth-seeking bits -- and not
- 22 demeaning people. Most of the non-truth-seeking content
- 23 is perfectly fine in this respect. So if one is
- 24 thinking about games and puzzles and fiction and drama,
- 25 I think there's generally no problem within the confines Page 80

20 (Pages 77 to 80)

| 1 | of the law, of course, but maybe there could be, for | 1 | A. I think so. That's a standard practice in our walks of |
|--|---|--|--|
| 2 | example, games which have a sadistic or gladiatorial | 2 | life, that you have your declaration of interests on |
| 3 | aspect to them that one would want to ask questions | 3 | a website, but then if you are present at a meeting |
| 4 | about. | 4 | where a particular matter is discussed, depending on the |
| 5 | MR JAY: Professor O'Neill, the six principles of openness | 5 | nature of the thing, you are silent or you withdraw or |
| 6 | that you refer to in relation to a future press code | 6 | you declare it and so on, and I think many of us in |
| 7 | four of those are either entirely self-explanatory or | 7 | public life are utterly familiar with the distinction |
| 8 | you've already developed. Can I just ask you, please, | 8 | between declaring our interests and declaring our |
| 9 | to comment on two of them? Item (iii), openness about | 9 | conflicts of interest, and both are important. |
| 10 | interests. Are you expecting there proprietors, | 10 | MR JAY: The other area, Professor O'Neill, was item 5, |
| 11 | editors, if necessary, to be open about their own | 11 | openness about most sources. |
| 12 | interests in relation to the taxes they pay or do not | 12 | A. Yes. |
| 13 | pay? How do you see that that one operates? | 13 | Q. We can read from the code as currently constituted, |
| 14 | A. I would have thought that was a pretty reasonable | 14 | clause 14 we looked at it this morning. Confidential |
| 15 | requirement. We expect other people in public life with | 15 | sources: |
| 16 | less in the way of influence to be open about the | 16 | "Journalists have a moral obligation to protect |
| 17 | property they own and open about the political issues | 17 | confidential sources of information." |
| 18 | they support, open about other things. I'm not perhaps | 18 | That may or may not be understood to be an absolute |
| 19 | going to Scandinavian levels and suggesting that | 19 | rather than a qualified moral obligation. It's clear, |
| 20 | everybody's tax return be online, which I did find | 20 | however, from your analysis, that in your view there |
| 21 | | 21 | |
| I | rather surprising, but at the same time I think we could | 22 | should be a general rule that sources are disclosed but |
| 22 | have a great deal more openness. | | there may be certain circumstances in which sources are |
| 23 | If I may give my reasons, they have a lot to do with | 23 | kept confidential. Why have it that way around? |
| 24 | what you might call humble rather than grand journalism. | 24 | A. I think the default in favour of openness is actually |
| 25 | For example, in the reporting of local council affairs | 25 | what good journalism does. They try to give the source |
| | Page 81 | | Page 83 |
| | | | |
| 1 | or in the sort of columns on property, it is | 1 | when they can. |
| 1 2 | or in the sort of columns on property, it is acceptable and I have actually discovered one case | 1 2 | when they can. The difficulty about the confidential sources is the |
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1 business to say, "This is a matter of commercial 1 cases where the sources are obscure, the information is 2 2 confidence." There are conventions, of course. unclear, and again, good journalism will indicate this. 3 3 Now, journalism, it seems to me, is in danger of We all know those conventions: "A usually well-informed 4 4 source said that ... Rumours are flying around that ... going too close to the commercial one, which I think is 5 They could not be corroborated." Those phrases, which already questionable, and not to the professional one. 5 6 How it's to be worked out in detail is difficult, but 6 are the mark of quite responsible journalism, it seems 7 7 I think it has a lot to do with the quality of the to me could be used more widely. 8 8 culture that an editor or programme maker sets for what We've all been listening to reporting on Syria, most 9 9 is done and that there are clearly newspapers which do of it not from within Syria, or much of it not from 10 10 within, and we have heard those phrases again and again not permit their journalists to be so liberal with the 11 11 allegation of having a confidential source that the as the qualifiers that mark good journalism by 12 12 readers can no longer judge whether there's any source indicating where the source cannot be named, must be 13 13 at all. protected and so on. But very often, that's not the 14 14 Q. As you rightly pointed out, there are occasions in which situation and I don't think we can take the practices 15 the claim the source is confidential is a mask for the 15 that may be needed and can nevertheless be responsibly 16 fact that the source simply doesn't exist, and the 16 handled when lives are at stake as the reality when 17 17 journalist hides behind it for all purposes. people are actually hiding their friend's commercial 18 A. Yes, and I don't know a way of dealing with that problem 18 interest in a local planning decision. 19 19 other than editorial control. That may be a weaker MR JAY: Your practical proposal in relation to the process 20 system than we like to believe, but that is the only one 20 for improving the code, this is section 10, you say: 21 21 "The first answer might be to secure Parliamentary I can see there. However, a lot of journalism does not 22 need to have any qualms about this because it would be 22 approval for having a statutory code and the appointment 23 23 better for being open about its sources. of a body including but not dominated by media 24 24 Q. The moral problem arises to the extent to which representatives to undertake the subsequent tasks." 25 25 a journalist makes a promise to his or her source that You'd want, presumably, a range of opinion upon that Page 85 Page 87 1 the source will be kept confidential, but if the making 1 body and that may include, might it, representatives 2 2 of such promises was not encouraged or if it were from the world of academia; is that right? 3 3 encouraged, it would be on this basis, that the A. I think those of us who know much about the press are 4 journalist would tell the source, "I'm going to have to 4 mainly in -- in the academic world are mainly professors 5 share what you're telling me with my editor, but that 5 of law and journalism, so might be too close. I don't 6 6 would go no further than my editor", that would or might think it's obvious, and I haven't gone that far, but 7 resolve some the practical issues you refer to, might 7 I do think one needs to get a code that brings together 8 8 the experience of very well-informed, perhaps retired 9 A. I think that that would probably be a fairly effective 9 editors and journalists. You have to have people who 10 discipline, because although there might be editors who 10 know the trade in there, but you also have to have 11 11 would be completely lax about this, I reckon that lying people who are concerned primarily for the public 12 to your editor is probably still regarded as an 12 interest, and in any future code it would seem to me 13 13 unfortunate tactic. I hope. important to get some clarity about the statutory basis 14 14 Q. Thank you. and then the content of the code, and, of course, the 15 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Then it's necessary for the story to 15 additional codes that particular newspapers may wish to 16 be stood up anyway, because otherwise the source could 16 develop for their own staff or the like will separate 17 actually say anything --17 18 A. Yes. 18 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It doesn't have to be a statutory 19 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: -- and although obviously the 19 code, does it? It's sufficient if, on this model, and 20 20 journalist and the editor have to be concerned about the I appreciate that people challenge the model, if 21 21 law of libel, it depends on precisely on what the a statute underpinned an organisation that was itself 22 22 story's about as to whether there is a potential required to develop a code, with criteria as to the type 23 23 defamation or actual defamation that might be thrown up of persons who should be involved with utterly 24 by the story. 24 independent appointment mechanisms? 25 A. Yes, and I think we have a problem. There are lots of 25 A. I think we're quite good in this country at making

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1 independent appointments, and we put actually quite 2 a lot of money into the appointments processes, and 3 I don't see any particular difficulty here, although no 4 doubt the recommendations of any such body would be --5 and rightly -- contested and subject to a lot of public 6 7 I suspect that it's the minimal statutory backing 8 that is the most controversial, because there are 9 clearly interests, mainly perhaps within the media, in 10 retaining the privilege of self-regulation, and I've 11 noticed a lot of misuse of the phrase "independent 12 regulation" for what is actually self-interested 13 regulation. So what we need first to do is to get away 14 from that, and the specific content of the code is, in 15 my view, a subsequent question, one that of course needs 16 answering, but as I've stated, I think such a code 17 should not be too aspirational. 18 MR JAY: Professor O'Neill, thank you very much. Those are 19 all the questions I had for you. 20 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you very much. Is there any 21 aspect of material which we asked you to consider that 22 you feel you've not had the chance to develop? 23 A. Something that I think I should have said more clearly 24 is that complaints procedures are important, but they 25 aren't adequate to secure public goods. Complaints Page 89 1 procedures work in a context where you're considering 2 individual goods and an individual complainant, and 3 I believe that the Press Complaints Commission has been 4 hobbled by the fact that its main form of activity has 5 been as a complaints body. Somebody perhaps can pick up 6 that task, but it's a minor task in the context of 7 securing minimal standards. 8 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's a standards body to which you've 9 been addressing from your points. 10 A. Yes. 11 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you very much. I've said to 12 your professional colleagues that I'm very conscious 13 that asking people to talk on this topic is difficult. 14 They've expressed their views in writing. If, on 15 reflection, there's something that you want to add, 16 please do not hesitate to do so. 17 A. Thank you very much. 18 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you very much indeed for your 19 20 MR JAY: We're reading in the evidence of Professor Waldron 21 and Professor Thompson. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you very much. Right, tomorrow 22 23 morning, 10 o'clock. 24 (4.47 pm) 25 (The hearing adjourned until 10 o'clock the following day) Page 90

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