1 Wednesday, 25 April 2012 3 MR KEITH RUPERT MURDOCH (sworn) 4 Questions by MR JAY 5 MR JAY: Your full name please, Mr Murdoch? 6 A. Keith Rupert Murdoch. 7 Q. In front of you, I believe you'll see a witness 8 statement you signed and dated 12 April of this year, 9 with 44 exhibits. There's a declaration of truth on it. 10 Are you content that the Inquiry receives your statement 11 as your formal testimony? 12 A. I am. 13 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Mr Murdoch, as I've said to a number 14 of other witnesses, indeed to many other witnesses, I am 15 very grateful for the obvious care that you have taken 16 in the preparation of your evidence, and the material 17 that you've placed before the Inquiry, and I wanted to 18 record that. 19 A. Thank you, sir. 20 MR JAY: You are the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of 21 News Corporation, a company incorporated in the 22 United States. 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. With total assets of $60 billion and a total annual 25 revenue of $34 billion; is that right? 3 1 A. Yes, approximately, yes. 2 Q. For our purposes, if we can be more parochial, 3 approximately 8 per cent of News Corp's revenues are 4 generated in the United Kingdom, 60 per cent by 5 News International; is that right? 6 A. It is right. 7 Q. Anyone who wants greater detail may look at your witness 8 statement when it's published in due course. 9 Would it be fair to say that you have been following 10 British politics for at least 60 years, Mr Murdoch? 11 A. Yes, I suppose so. With a varying intensity. 12 Q. You say that you welcome this Inquiry. It follows then 13 that rumours that you have not forgiven Mr Cameron for 14 setting it up are untrue; is that right? 15 A. Did I say that? In my witness statement? 16 Q. You have said in your witness statement you welcome this 17 Inquiry. 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. I'm putting to you rumours, which you would say are 20 presumably untrue -- 21 A. I know -- 22 Q. -- that you haven't forgiven him for setting up this 23 Inquiry. Are those rumours untrue? 24 A. Untrue. 25 Q. Why do you say there's a need for this Inquiry, 4 1 Mr Murdoch? 2 A. Well, I think the need is really obvious. There have 3 been some abuses shown. I would say there are many 4 other abuses, but we can all go into that in time. And, 5 you know, the state of media in this country is of 6 absolutely vital interest to all its citizens. 7 Q. Do you -- 8 A. So I think -- frankly I welcomed the opportunity because 9 I wanted to put certain myths to bed. 10 Q. Yes. You used the term "abuses". Is it your perception 11 or understanding that abuses go further than the issue 12 of phone hacking or are they limited to the issue of 13 phone hacking? 14 A. Oh, they go further. 15 Q. Okay. We'll come back to that in due course. 16 May I ask you about your business philosophy, which 17 you cover in your statement, and can I see if we can 18 crystallise out of what you say three main points. 19 First, you have an intuitive instinct for acquiring 20 businesses which you believe will be successful; 21 secondly, and perhaps more importantly, you have 22 a long-term perspective; and thirdly, you have a deep 23 flair for and understanding of the possibilities of 24 technology. 25 Mr Murdoch, do I have that right? 5 1 A. Can I make very slight amendments? 2 Q. Certainly. 3 A. I would say that my -- all my interests, whether 4 intuitive or otherwise, have been confined to the media, 5 not just any business. Long-term, I think you're 6 absolutely right. I have -- I think just about 7 everything I've done in terms of major moves by the 8 company, particularly one we're doing at the moment, is 9 very long-term in view. And, you know, sometimes I've 10 been right and sometimes I've been wrong, at great cost. 11 Q. May I ask you briefly about your political philosophy? 12 Would it be fair to say that you always have been 13 a great admirer of Baroness Thatcher and what she stands 14 for? 15 A. Yes, I was -- I became that after she was elected. And 16 I remain a great admirer. 17 Q. The Sun supported her in the 1979 election, so 18 presumably your support for Mrs Thatcher crystallised in 19 your mind before that election. Would that be right? 20 A. Well, I think all newspapers were much the same. We'd 21 just come through the most terrible winter of 22 discontent, the strikes, disruptions to the whole 23 society. And I think we all wanted a change. 24 Q. Can I put one quote to you. It's indeed from you. An 25 interview by Mr William Shawcross in Time magazine, 6 1 25 October 1999. We needn't turn it up. This is you 2 speaking: 3 "What does libertarian mean? As much individual 4 responsibility as possible, as little government as 5 possible, as few rules as possible. But I'm not saying 6 it should be taken to the absolute limit." 7 So is the gist of that: few rules, but not no rules? 8 A. Oh, clearly there are necessary rules in a working 9 society, but they can be overdone. 10 Q. Some recent tweets of yours betray a hostile approach to 11 right wingers and toffs. Who were you referring to? 12 A. That was rather a load -- don't take my tweets too 13 seriously. I think I was really saying that the 14 extremists on both sides were piling in on me. 15 Q. You referred to myths about you, Mr Murdoch. Is it your 16 feeling that there is a lot of mythology around and 17 about you, which really needs to be debunked? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. Okay. We'll see how we get on over the course of today. 20 Can I say what the plan is: we're going to focus on the 21 political issues first, and the approach will be broadly 22 speaking chronological, otherwise we'll lose track of 23 where we are. Then I will go to the issue of phone 24 hacking, and then we'll look at some broader questions. 25 Are you content with that? 7 1 A. Yes indeed. 2 Q. Thank you. The acquisition of the Times and 3 Sunday Times, which is a separate vignette in the case 4 but which I do need to cover and your witness statement 5 addresses, you bid for those papers and five lesser 6 titles at the end of 1980, didn't you, Mr Murdoch? 7 A. Yes. I thought there were three lesser titles, but 8 perhaps I've forgotten. 9 Q. We won't argue about how many. At that stage, you 10 having acquired the News of the World in 1968 and the 11 Sun in 1969, you had slightly over 30 per cent of the UK 12 newspaper market; is that correct? 13 A. Well, the Sun must have been a more sudden success than 14 I thought, from memory, to have reached 30 per cent 15 within ten years, but I'll take your figure. 16 Q. Okay. The deadline for the purchase, if it was going to 17 take place, was March 1981, and by way of background, 18 the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Mr John 19 Biffen, was obliged by statute to refer the case to the 20 Monopolies and Mergers Commission unless in his opinion 21 each title was not economic as a going concern and the 22 case was one of urgency. That's the background position 23 on the law. 24 Can I invite you, please, now to look at the 25 first -- 8 1 A. I think we put in exhibits to prove that he said that. 2 Q. Yes. That's what -- 3 A. And indeed that Thomsons made that very strong. 4 Q. The Fair Trading Act says that. It's whether the Times 5 and the Sunday Times were not economic as going concerns 6 which may be an issue, but can we look, please, at 7 a document evidencing a lunch at Chequers with Baroness 8 Thatcher on 5 January 1981. It's your exhibit KRM14, 9 which may well be tab 15 in that bundle. 10 You'll see that Mr Ingham, who is Mrs Thatcher's 11 press secretary, noted this, it's our number 01626, 12 addressed to the Prime Minister: 13 "Attached is a record of the salient points of your 14 lunch yesterday with Rupert Murdoch. In line with your 15 wishes, the attached has not gone outside Number 10 and 16 is, of course, to be treated commercial -- in 17 confidence." 18 This is a document which didn't enter the public 19 domain until March of this year, Mr Murdoch. Do you 20 understand that? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. According to The History of the Times, The Murdoch 23 Years, published by Harper Collins in 2005, page 28, you 24 previously had had no recollection whatsoever of this 25 lunch; is that right? 9 1 A. That's correct. I still don't, to be honest. But 2 I totally accept Mr Ingham's minutes, detailed minutes, 3 which sound to me to be correct. 4 Q. Well, it was quite a -- 5 A. I think I'd asked Mrs Thatcher could I see her and she 6 said, "Well, why don't you come to lunch on Sunday?" 7 Q. Yes. According to Mr Ingham's note, this is our 8 page 01627, it was quite an intimate occasion. If one 9 looks at the few numbers of people there, there was 10 obviously the Prime Minister, Mr Thatcher, Mr Ingham and 11 you, and the meeting was at your request. Do you see 12 that? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. I hope you don't mind if I tease you about this, that 15 when you told a Select Committee on 19 July last year 16 that you wished politicians would leave you alone, you 17 weren't, of course, referring to this meeting, were you? 18 A. No. 19 Q. What we see -- 20 A. I think this meeting was to inform the chief executive 21 of a company of the likelihood of a change of ownership 22 of a great iconic asset. I thought it was quite 23 appropriate. 24 Q. Of course, Mrs Thatcher knew that was probable, or 25 I suppose one outcome was that Lord Thomson might have 10 1 closed these two great titles if she couldn't sell them, 2 but there seemed to be two purposes behind the lunch. 3 One was to brief Mrs Thatcher or give her your thoughts 4 about the -- what is described here as the "embryonic 5 and developing Reagan administration". Do you see that 6 in paragraph 2? 7 A. Yes, I think it shows that at least the conversation for 8 some time was taken up by me gossiping about Australian 9 and American politics, yes. 10 Q. The three of you, if I can put it in this way, President 11 Elect Reagan, Baroness Thatcher and you were all of 12 course on the same page politically, weren't you? 13 A. I guess that's fair. Yes, this was just before his 14 inauguration. 15 Q. Indeed it was. Was it part of the purpose of this 16 meeting, if one can talk almost psychologically, to 17 demonstrate to Mrs Thatcher how very much you were "one 18 of us"? "One of us" is Baroness Thatcher's term, but 19 was that part of your purpose? 20 A. No. 21 Q. Of course you appreciated the importance of 22 a face-to-face meeting. That's why you requested it; is 23 that right? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. And as Mr Ingham says, if you -- 11 1 A. The purpose was not to tell her about Mr Reagan. 2 Q. Pardon me? 3 A. The purpose was not to tell her about President Reagan. 4 Q. She knew all of this anyway. 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. Paragraph 4: 7 "The main purpose of Mr Murdoch's visit was to brief 8 the Prime Minister on his bid [that's your bid] for 9 Times Newspapers." 10 And then you explained to her what your bid amounted 11 to in financial terms, and then you treated her to some 12 speculations about who else had bid, is that fair? 13 A. Yes, that was pure speculation. I don't think Thomson 14 told me of anyone -- some had announced bids, like 15 Captain Maxwell who was always bidding for things. 16 Q. Why was it important to you that Mrs Thatcher understand 17 the nature and quality of your bid? 18 A. Well, as I said, this was the movement of a great 19 institution which was under threat of closure, and 20 I thought it was perfectly right that she should know 21 what was at stake. 22 Q. She knew that anyway, Mr Murdoch. What you were seeking 23 to demonstrate -- 24 A. No, I don't think she did know that there would be great 25 problems with the unions or there would be great -- or 12 1 there could be -- the sort of extent of the costs and 2 the risks. I'm not sure she was interested. 3 Q. Were you seeking to demonstrate to her that you were the 4 right man to acquire these great papers because you had 5 the qualities and charisma to take the papers forward 6 and, equally importantly, you had the will to crush the 7 unions? 8 A. No, I didn't have the will to crush the unions. I might 9 have had the desire, but that took several years. 10 Q. Right. If we substitute "desire" for "will", are we in 11 agreement? 12 A. Yes, I don't think it was apposite at this meeting 13 particularly, but yes. We could get into the whole 14 question of Wapping later. 15 Q. If you look at paragraph 10, Mr Murdoch, 01629, you 16 explained to Mr Thatcher that some 50 million of 17 News Group's resources could be at risk and that such an 18 amount "could finish us". Do you remember saying that? 19 A. I don't remember saying that, but I probably did. It 20 was a gross underestimate. 21 Q. And you talked about the financial position of the 22 Times, but you didn't mention, did you, the financial 23 position of the Sunday Times? 24 A. I said Times Newspapers. 25 Q. So you meant both? Pardon me. 13 1 Was it your view that the Sunday Times was not 2 economic as a going concern? 3 A. I didn't know. I thought that it certainly had a great 4 position on Sunday, but its economics and its staff and 5 everything were all intertwined together with the Times, 6 which resulted in a big net loss. 7 Q. If you look at the Sunday Times separately, SG Warburg 8 had advised, as you knew, that in 1982 and onwards, the 9 paper would make a profit. You knew that, didn't you? 10 A. I didn't see that Warburg -- I don't remember seeing it. 11 But did it contribute a profit to the pool of Times 12 Newspapers? Yes. 13 Q. Okay. And finally on this note, paragraph 12, 14 page 01630: 15 "The Prime Minister thanked Mr Murdoch for keeping 16 her posted on his operations. She did no more than wish 17 him well in his bid, noting the need for much improved 18 arrangements in Fleet Street affecting manning and the 19 introduction of new technology." 20 So you would wish to point out that no express 21 favours were offered to you by Mrs Thatcher; is that 22 right? 23 A. And none asked. I think if I'd asked for anything, 24 Mr Ingham's very full note certainly would have recorded 25 that. 14 1 Q. But you wouldn't have been so undeft and cack-handed to 2 have asked directly, would you, Mr Murdoch? 3 A. I hope not. I've never asked a Prime Minister for 4 anything. 5 Q. But it operates at a far more sophisticated level, 6 doesn't it? You see her, you seek to demonstrate to 7 her -- she probably knew it anyway -- that you were 8 precisely on the same page politically as her, that you 9 were "one of us", and the understanding was that to the 10 extent to which she might help, she would. Is that not 11 fair? 12 A. No, I didn't expect any help from her. Nor did I ask 13 for any. 14 Q. Were you concerned at this stage that you might not 15 acquire the company? 16 A. Oh yes. It was quite easy I could have been outbid. 17 Q. Or there could have been a referral to the Monopolies 18 and Mergers Commission which would have created 19 uncertainty? 20 A. That didn't worry me in the least. As I think my 21 statement shows and as the back-up material, which 22 I hope will be put on the web along with this. 23 Q. Yes, it all will, Mr Murdoch. But you thanked 24 Mrs Thatcher for her lunch on 15 January -- 25 A. Yes, I was a little slow in writing to thank her, yes. 15 1 Q. And then another document shows that Thomson's analysis 2 was that you were the favourite, their internal analysis 3 of the respective bids, because of your qualities as 4 a manager, because of your youth and vigour and various 5 other factors. Do you recall that? It's in this 6 bundle. 7 A. I've seen that letter from Sir Denis Hamilton, yes. 8 Q. The next stage, undertakings were offered by you. Can 9 I ask you, please, to look at those. They are, I think, 10 at tab 7 of the bundle in front of you. It's KRM6. 11 A. Excuse me. Yes. 12 Q. Do you have those? In particular, page 01467, which is 13 the fourth undertaking headed "Maintenance of editorial 14 independence", do you have that? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. You undertook to bind yourself to preserve the separate 17 identities of the Times and the Sunday Times and to 18 maintain the independence and authority of their editors 19 in the appointment and control of their staff over the 20 political policy of the separate newspapers, and then in 21 all respects to maintain the titles as editorially 22 independent newspapers of high quality. Do you accept, 23 Mr Murdoch, that the very fact -- 24 A. But that was, if I may interrupt you, to continue 25 Lord Thomson's arrangement which exactly he made when he 16 1 took -- put the two together. I did undertake to expand 2 the number of independent directors from four to six. 3 Q. Yes, you did. Is the very fact that undertakings are 4 offered itself an indication of the power proprietors 5 are capable of exercising over their editors? 6 A. Yes, I think sometimes it's overestimated, but certainly 7 they have power. Let's face it, if an editor is sending 8 a newspaper broke, it is the responsibility of the 9 proprietor to step in for the sake of the journalists, 10 for the sake of everybody. And particularly his 11 responsibility to his many thousands of shareholders. 12 That didn't apply to the Thomsons, which were private. 13 Q. The next stage is on 26 January, Thomsons wrote to the 14 Secretary of State pointing this out. I'll just read it 15 out, it's page 01589: 16 "We cannot, however, emphasise too strongly that if 17 there is a reference to the Commission [that's the 18 Monopolies and Mergers Commission] of the 19 News International proposal, that proposal automatically 20 lapses because its conditions cannot be met." 21 Was that your understanding? 22 A. That they wrote that? 23 Q. Yes. 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. So if there were a reference, you would then, if the MMC 17 1 allowed the bid to proceed, have to renegotiate the 2 price; was that the position, to your knowledge? 3 A. I saw Mr Biffen, I think the record will show, and told 4 him that I didn't mind in the least any reference, but 5 if it went on a long time, I reserved the right -- and 6 the paper bled a lot more money, I reserved the right to 7 renegotiate the price. 8 Q. Yes. That's a fair summary, but it's right that the 9 relevant -- 10 A. I think the cabinet minister's minutes, which we have 11 submitted, show that. 12 Q. We're taking it in stages, Mr Murdoch. 13 A. I'm sorry. 14 Q. We're going to cover this. The minute of the meeting 15 with the Secretary of State on 26 January is at tab 66 16 of this bundle. Sorry, it's being placed in front of 17 you. It's in a separate file. 18 A. Thank you. 19 Q. This is an important document. I don't think it's yet 20 on the Lextranet system, so it can't be displayed. 21 I may be right about that. But you were accompanied by 22 Mr Searby, who was your Australian Queen's Counsel, 23 I think? 24 A. He was also at the time, I think, chairman of the 25 company, my lifelong friend. 18 1 Q. Yes. You told Mr Biffen, and I'm sure this is a point 2 you wish to bring out, paragraph 2 of this minute: 3 "Mr Murdoch said that the report that his bid would 4 lapse if it was referred to the MMC was totally 5 misleading. He claimed that when he said that he was 6 merely responding to the Thomson deadline. He still 7 assumed it would be difficult for Thomsons to negotiate 8 extended deadlines with the union, however if they 9 managed to do this, he was prepared to co-operate with 10 an MMC negotiation. At the same time, he did point out 11 that a reference would create problems, both for 12 himself, as it would delay his own negotiations with the 13 unions, and for Thomsons, as the uncertainty would cause 14 loss of advertising revenue, which would make their 15 overall losses even greater." 16 So the fair interpretation of that is that you 17 weren't placing any obstacle in the way of a reference 18 to the MMC, but you were pointing out the commercial 19 disadvantages of such a reference; would you agree? 20 A. If that note is right, then you're correct, yes, Mr Jay. 21 Q. The Secretary of State's position at this meeting was 22 that he was minded to refer to the MMC really for 23 political reasons, if I can be forgiven for putting it 24 in those terms. He felt that such an act would defuse 25 any criticism of the bid. Did he communicate that to 19 1 you? 2 A. I don't remember. 3 Q. But you assured Mr Biffen that you would not withdraw 4 the bid if Thomsons agreed to extend their deadlines. 5 That was on the hypothesis of a referral to the MMC? 6 A. That is correct. 7 Q. Mr Biffen's position at that stage -- and we don't know 8 what time of the day it was on 26 January -- was that he 9 was minded to refer, and of course we cannot know what 10 conversation, if any, he had with Mrs Thatcher between 11 that point in time and the cabinet meeting which took 12 place later that afternoon. 13 We're now back to KRM16, which I think is tab 17 of 14 the first file. 15 A. 17? 16 Q. Some of the handwriting is quite small. I'm going to do 17 my best to paraphrase this fairly. The first page is 18 01637. The advice from the Attorney General was that 19 the general rule under the Fair Trading Act was there 20 must be a reference unless both exceptions applied, 21 namely each paper was not a going concern and the matter 22 was urgent. 23 If you look at page 01638, where the typeface gets 24 smaller, the discussions at cabinet were on the basis 25 that the Times was not economic as a going concern, but 20 1 in relation to the Sunday Times the position was less 2 clearcut. 3 And then there's a summary, Mr Biffen summarised the 4 effect of the meeting we've just seen which took place 5 earlier that day. We can see why it was decided -- 6 A. Was it with me? 7 Q. With you? 8 A. Mr Biffen's discussion with me? 9 Q. Yes. Mr Biffen has accurately summarised here tab 66, 10 which is the discussion he had with you. 11 The real reason why they decided not to refer, apart 12 from, I'm sure, assessing in good faith that both 13 conditions were met, if you look on the right-hand side, 14 it is difficult to read: 15 "In discussion it was suggested that if the 16 Secretary of State for Trade were to refer the bid to 17 the MMC it was unlikely that the Thomson organisation 18 would in practice refuse to extend their deadline. In 19 the circumstances, there seemed, however, little 20 advantage to be gained from a reference, and 21 considerable risks and costs in making it. 22 "The Thomson organisation has taken the view that no 23 suitable alternative purchaser has made a bid. Those 24 who are now pressing for a reference were mainly 25 concerned that this would enable greater authority to be 21 1 put behind the undertakings on the independence of the 2 papers and their editorial freedom, which Mr Murdoch had 3 already given. Their concern on this count should be 4 met if the Secretary of State for Trade were able to 5 assure them that if he were to give his consent without 6 a reference, he could entrench these undertakings in his 7 consent." 8 So one view might be that the cabinet decision was 9 predicated on the basis that there was no commercial 10 advantage in referring to the MMC. Indeed, there was 11 every commercial disadvantage in making the reference 12 since it would increase uncertainty and it may cause 13 Thomson to withdraw the bid altogether, or refuse to 14 accept your offer altogether. Was that part of your 15 assessment? 16 A. It certainly is now that you've shown me all this, yes. 17 Yes. 18 Q. Would it be fair to say that what you were doing here, 19 first of all with Mrs Thatcher, you were impressing on 20 her your qualities vis-a-vis the acquisition of these 21 papers. Mr Biffen, on 26 January, although you didn't 22 put a gun to his head and say, "If you refer, I back 23 out", you far more subtly suggested to him that there 24 were real commercial disadvantages if he did refer. You 25 got that message across to Mr Biffen, and unsurprisingly 22 1 in cabinet, that line was taken. Would you agree with 2 that, Mr Murdoch? 3 A. Not really. That seems to be a fair reading from it, 4 but frankly it was Thomsons who put the gun to the head 5 of Mr Biffen. It is very clear from the correspondence 6 that we've seen. 7 Q. Okay. 8 A. Everyone must look at that damage to Thomsons, that 9 they'd had a 12-month strike from the unions and lost 10 it, during which time they had paid the journalists 11 fully, and as soon as the printers came back, the 12 journalists went out for three months, and so they 13 became very, very embittered. 14 Q. There was a debate in the House of Commons on 15 27 January, which was the following day. 16 Unsurprisingly, there was a great deal of concern 17 expressed eloquently in particular by Mr John Smith, the 18 late Mr Smith, who was the shadow DTI minister. They 19 were making the point quite strongly that if you looked 20 at the Sunday Times by itself, it was a going concern 21 and it was quite artificial, as Mr Biffen was doing, 22 just to look at the 11 months of 1980 and refuse to look 23 at likely future performance in 1982 and 1983 and 24 following. Do you understand that? 25 A. I understand what you're saying, yes. 23 1 Q. Presumably you, Mr Murdoch, who would be interested in 2 the long-term perspective, were doing that very 3 calculation. In other words, you were looking carefully 4 at what the predictions were for future years, and you 5 weren't looking just at the 11 months of 1980. Is that 6 right? 7 A. No, I thought the Sunday Times was a very, very fine 8 newspaper. I was a great admirer of the Sunday Times. 9 I didn't know the internal accounting of Thomsons. 10 Q. But when Mr Biffen said to Parliament, "I do not believe 11 that I was entitled to take a view on future prospects 12 upon existing experience" -- pardon me, that was in 13 a separate letter to Mr Smith -- if you'd heard that, 14 you would have laughed inwardly, wouldn't you, 15 Mr Murdoch, because that's exactly how you -- you 16 operate exactly the other way around? You do take 17 a view of future prospects, because that's what a shrewd 18 businessman does, would you not agree? 19 A. Yes, but I was looking at Times Newspapers together. 20 Q. Commercially that would be right, but legally, of 21 course, one had to look at them separately, wouldn't 22 you? 23 A. No, it was one company. 24 Q. Mr Biffen made it clear to Parliament that he was 25 looking at each of them separately. I mean, that's 24 1 clear from the left-hand column on page 01602, although 2 it's not necessary to turn it up, but I can see your 3 position, that whatever the legal analysis, you would 4 look at them as one unit; is that right? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. Mr Aitken in the debate said something about you, which 7 I think I should put. If you look at page 01606, on the 8 right-hand side -- are you with me, Mr Murdoch? 9 A. Excuse me, Mr Jay. 1606? Yes. 10 Q. 01606. 11 A. I have it. 12 Q. On the right-hand side. He said this right in the 13 middle of the right-hand column: 14 "That is no isolated example. One could give 15 numerous examples of resignations by reporters, of the 16 Australian Press Council upholding allegations of bias 17 by Murdoch papers in their political reporting and of 18 Mr Murdoch openly pushing his commercial interests by 19 using his newspaper powers. I read the Australian 20 papers every day for the best part of three years when 21 I was writing a book on Australia ..." 22 A. I'm sorry, Mr Jay. 23 Q. You're not with me? 24 A. 1606? 25 Q. 01606? 25 1 A. Who were we quoting, Mr Aitken? 2 Q. Mr Aitken. 3 A. Oh well. 4 Q. He said he was profoundly unhappy, but was he accurate, 5 at least as regards the facts he states here? 6 A. Certainly not. 7 Q. So there weren't resignations of reporters, were there? 8 A. Oh no, we certainly had some upheaval because in 1975, 9 I believe, the Queen, through the Governor General, 10 dismissed the Australian government, and we took the 11 attitude in the Australian newspaper very strongly and 12 legally that he was within his rights. And that caused 13 a lot of upset there. The more radical journalists 14 thought it was outrageous that the Queen or the Governor 15 General should do that, whereas in fact -- I won't go 16 into all the rights and wrongs, the government had lost 17 its majority in the Senate and couldn't get supplies 18 through so had no money to operate. 19 Q. What about the Australian Press Council upholding 20 allegations of bias by Murdoch papers in their political 21 reporting? Was that at least factually right? 22 A. No. 23 Q. And of you openly pushing your commercial interests by 24 using your newspaper powers; is that right? 25 A. No. I take a particularly strong pride in the fact that 26 1 we have never pushed our commercial interests in our 2 newspapers. 3 Q. Some points arising out of Sir Harold Evans' book "Good 4 Times, Bad Times". To the extent to which you need to 5 look at the page, we can provide you with the relevant 6 extracts. In the bundle we have, it is tab 5. His 7 analysis of you at xvii, this is the preface to the July 8 2011 edition which was written shortly after the Select 9 Committee attendance on 19 July. The last paragraph: 10 "How much Rupert Murdoch knew ..." 11 That's -- 12 A. I'm sorry. Can you set me the context of that again? 13 This is from Mr Evans' book? 14 Q. Yes. 15 A. But you then switched to the Select Committee? 16 Q. I'm just saying he wrote this preface very shortly after 17 19 July last year, which is when you gave evidence to 18 the Select Committee. Do you follow me? 19 A. No. That I wrote what Mr -- from Mr Evans' book? 20 Q. No, no. This is Sir Harold Evans writing an updated 21 preface, if you like, to his book. 22 A. Oh. I had not read that before. 23 Q. It's his contemporary reflections, if you like, on what 24 happened before the Select Committee, but he's speaking 25 about phone hacking and he's saying: 27 1 "How much Rupert Murdoch knew and when he knew it 2 may not be pinned down because he exercises what the 3 sociologist Max Weber defined as 'charismatic authority' 4 where policy derives from how the leader is perceived by 5 others rather than by instructions or traditions." 6 Do you feel he has a point there? 7 A. No, I was going to say when you laid out my three 8 principles of government, I meant to add that we have a 9 very large company and I do run that company with 10 a great deal of decentralisation. I don't think I have 11 any aura. 12 Q. But this issue of aura, charisma, it's Sir Harold Evans' 13 view, you know it's Mr Andrew Neil's view, it's the Sun 14 King analogy, page 214 of your disclosure, indeed a lot 15 of people have come up with the same -- 16 A. That's two you've just mentioned. 17 Q. Okay, we have two so far, but we'll find some more as we 18 proceed. But it's a common theme. Do you think it has 19 any validity at all as to -- it may not be a bad thing 20 at all. It may be part of your success that this is how 21 you operate, but do you feel it's right or wrong? 22 A. No, I do try very hard to set an example of ethical 23 behaviour and make it quite clear that I expect it. One 24 can describe that in a number of ways. But do I do it 25 via an aura or charisma? I don't think so. 28 1 Q. Okay. 2 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Can we try it this way, Mr Murdoch? 3 A. Yes, sir. 4 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: That you have been on the stage, on 5 the world stage of the press for many, many years. You 6 have seen many editors come and go. Your press 7 interests have extended. It wouldn't be at all 8 surprising, would it, if those who worked for you 9 recognised that you had an appreciation of events that 10 it would be important for them to understand and that 11 they should therefore take a different line only with 12 caution, because of their respect for your views? 13 A. Well, I would hope so. I think that we have not had 14 that many -- our editors have generally been very 15 long-serving. I invite you to have all the living ones 16 up here. 17 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I wasn't seeking to suggest you'd had 18 a big turnover. I was seeking to suggest that in 40 19 years or 50 years, over the many, many papers that 20 you've been responsible for and that you've owned, you 21 have seen many, many editors. 22 A. Yes. 23 MR JAY: At page 144 of Sir Harold Evans' book, where he's 24 quoting from the Thomson-Warburg assessment of your bid, 25 the pros and cons of the seven finalists, as they were 29 1 described, are set out, but your qualities are set out, 2 but reservations -- 3 A. Page xvii? 4 Q. Page 144. 5 A. Oh. 6 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: It's actually the next page. No, no, 7 you're fingers are -- now it's that page. 8 A. This page, thank you. 9 MR JAY: In the smaller print, paragraph 1. 10 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I'm sorry, mine are on both sides, 11 yours aren't. 12 A. Thank you, sir. 13 MR JAY: I'm working from the book itself: 14 "Reservations: Mr Murdoch's arrival in England has 15 had some deteriorating effect on the standards of the 16 daily tabloid press ..." 17 Do you feel that that's a fair observation? 18 A. No, absolutely not. 19 Q. Well, without attributing cause and effect, do you think 20 that between 1968 and 1981 the standards of the tabloid 21 press had deteriorated? 22 A. No. 23 Q. So this is completely wrong, is it? 24 A. Well, it's a matter of opinion, but I think it's wrong. 25 Q. Do you think the standards had improved? 30 1 A. Yes, I think we expanded to a new young public. 2 I thought the opportunity for the Sun was to go against 3 the Mirror, whose leader had said he wanted to get rid 4 of the elves, which is sort of putting down his working 5 class readership, and we thought there was a real 6 opportunity here. 7 Q. We're looking at standards here. Is it your view, 8 Mr Murdoch, that the standards of the tabloid press, if 9 one were to take the period 1968 to date, have steadily 10 improved? 11 A. Well, I think the Sun has never been a better paper than 12 it is today. I couldn't say the same for my 13 competitors, but we won't go into that. 14 Q. The other reservation expressed here, "... he 15 undoubtedly has been deeply and often involved in the 16 editorial function", of course, we're looking here at 17 the period 1968 to 1981. We're not looking at recent 18 history, but would that be a fair observation? 19 A. Well, 1968, when I came here, I didn't really have 20 enough to do with the News of the World. That was my 21 fault. The Sun, the starting of the Sun, again, but 22 gradually, yes. And then in 1974, or I think it was the 23 end of 1973, we were all so, all of us, carried away by 24 the success of the Sun, we said, "Let's try in America", 25 where we did very badly. But we certainly took our eye 31 1 off. It was not a continuous thing throughout that 2 period. 3 Q. But surely your main objective was to -- 4 A. I've even forgotten who -- well, I think it was 5 basically Sir Larry Lamb who was editor through that 6 period, and he was a very, very brilliant journalist. 7 Q. Wasn't it your main objective, Mr Murdoch, to improve 8 the commercial appeal of these papers, the Sun and the 9 News of the World, and you weren't really concerned with 10 the ethical side of its product? Would that be a fair 11 observation? 12 A. No. It was always to tell the truth, certainly to 13 interest the public, to get their attention, but always 14 to tell the truth. 15 Q. So the touchstones are: truthfulness and write that 16 which is interesting to the public. Is that it? 17 A. Yes. I have great respect for the British public, and 18 I try to carry that through it. 19 Q. So the public, or put another way the market, they're 20 the best arbiters of what should be in and outside 21 newspapers? Is that fair? 22 A. Yes, I think so, absolutely. 23 Q. Okay. I'm sure Sir Harold Evans would want me, if he 24 were metaphorically standing behind me, to put many 25 points arising out of this book, but there just isn't 32 1 time, but there's one point I should put because it's 2 relevant to the terms of reference. Just bear with me, 3 Mr Murdoch. 4 A. I'm afraid -- 5 Q. It's page 534. 6 A. -- I've never read the book, I'm sorry. 7 Q. If you look at the last six lines -- 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. -- he says this: 10 "In my year as editor of the Times, Murdoch broke 11 all these guarantees. He put his point of view very 12 simply to the home editor of the Times, Fred Emery, when 13 he summoned him from holiday on 4 March to his office 14 shortly before asking for my resignation." 15 This is 4 March 1983. You apparently said this: 16 "I give instruction to my editors all round the 17 world, why shouldn't I in London?" 18 Do you remember saying that? 19 A. No, I don't. I do remember meeting Mr Emery and I don't 20 know what he told Mr Evans, but I know what he told me, 21 which was, "You are facing an insurrection in the staff 22 against Mr Evans". 23 Q. So the anonymous editor, in terms of your witness 24 statement, because you don't identify him when you say 25 you had to in effect remove him -- 33 1 A. It was no doubt Mr Evans. 2 Q. Pardon me? 3 A. He was saying "you are facing an insurrection" on the 4 Times, a staff insurrection. 5 Q. Mr Murdoch, in your witness statement you don't identify 6 the editor but you refer to an anonymous editor who had 7 to be let go because there was in effect a staff 8 insurrection. Were you intending to refer to Sir Harold 9 Evans? 10 A. I was indeed. I'm sorry for that omission. 11 Q. It's not an omission, it's just you didn't give his name 12 in the witness statement for fear perhaps of 13 embarrassment. 14 A. He was the only editor of the Times that we have ever 15 asked to leave. 16 Q. Was that really the reason, though, for, as it were, 17 getting rid of him? He had, after all, been 18 a brilliantly successful editor of the Sunday Times for 19 over a decade, hadn't he, and had shown his worth? 20 A. Yes, I would say so. He had great assistants who he 21 didn't get on with. I think there was Mr Bruce Page who 22 ran the Insight team and did all the great work on 23 thalidomide and so on but never really got the credit 24 for it, but never mind. The Sunday Times was fine and 25 between Sir Denis Hamilton and Sir Harry Evans, they 34 1 turned out a great paper. 2 Q. According to Mr Emery, you also said this in relation to 3 the undertakings you gave to the Secretary of State: 4 "They're not worth the paper they're written on." 5 Did you say that? 6 A. No. 7 Q. Did you think that? 8 A. No. 9 Q. So this is completely -- 10 A. Certainly not. It was an Act of Parliament. 11 Q. Well, Sir Harold Evans was replaced by Mr Charles 12 Douglas-Home, who was the nephew of the prime minister 13 in the -- 14 A. He was the long-serving deputy editor. 15 Q. And the paper was safely returned to the Tory fold, 16 wasn't it? 17 A. I think you're putting that as though that was the 18 motive, which wasn't. 19 Q. Okay. 20 A. I only remember ever talking to Mr Evans about policy 21 once, when he came to me, shut the door behind him and 22 said, "Look, tell me what you want to say -- what do you 23 want me to say, and it needn't leave this room, but 24 I will do it", and I said to him, "Harry, that is not my 25 job. All I would say to you", and this is the nearest 35 1 thing I ever came to an instruction, was "please be 2 consistent. Don't change sides day by day". I'm not 3 talking political sides, but on issues. 4 Q. According to Roy Greenslade's book "Press Gang", 5 Mr Douglas-Home told Mr Greenslade that you were one of 6 the main powers behind the Thatcher throne. Do you feel 7 that's right or not? 8 A. Doesn't sound like Mr Douglas-Home to me, he was 9 a pretty modest individual, but I don't know. 10 Q. But were you one of the main powers behind -- 11 A. Whether I was? 12 Q. Yes. 13 A. No. 14 Q. Lance Price's book "Where Power Lies" page 254 -- 15 A. We were probably -- not the Times. The Sun. If you 16 want to judge my thinking, look at the Sun. 17 Q. I think the point was you personally, not the Sun, the 18 Sunday Times or the Times. You personally were one of 19 the main powers behind the Thatcher throne. Do you 20 think that's right? 21 A. No. 22 Q. Did you consult with her regularly on every important 23 matter of policy? 24 A. Certainly not. 25 Q. On the issue of editorial control, you've given us some 36 1 insight of a meeting you had with Mr Evans when he was 2 editor. You were interviewed in the context of the 3 House of Lords' first report on communications, where 4 they set out at appendix 4 a summary of an interview 5 which took place in September 2007. I just put one 6 point to you, which is -- or maybe two. Paragraph 49 of 7 the appendix -- 8 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Where is that? 9 MR JAY: Just bear with me. Tab 18, I think. 10 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Thank you. 11 A. 49? 12 MR JAY: Yes. 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. "Mr Murdoch did not disguise the fact that he is hands 15 on both economically and editorially. He says that 'the 16 law' prevents him from instructing the editors of the 17 Times and the Sunday Times. The independent board is 18 there to make sure he cannot interfere and he never says 19 'do this or that' although he often asks 'what are you 20 doing'. He explained that he 'nominates' the editors of 21 these two papers but that the nominations are subject to 22 approval of the independent board. His first 23 appointment of an Editor of the Times split the board 24 but was not rejected. 25 "50. He distinguishes between the Times and the 37 1 Sunday Times and the Sun and the News of the World (and 2 makes the same distinction between the New York Post and 3 the Wall Street Journal). For the Sun and News of the 4 World he explained that he is a 'traditional 5 proprietor'. He exercises editorial control on major 6 issues -- like which party to back in a general election 7 or policy on Europe." 8 Now, have your interlocutors faithfully recorded 9 what you told them? 10 A. Yes. I had -- I never gave instructions to the editor 11 of the Times or the Sunday Times. I didn't say, "What 12 are you doing? What are you saying?" Sometimes when 13 I was available on a Saturday, I would call and say, 14 "What's the news today?" It was idle curiosity, 15 perhaps. Other times I'd ring on a Tuesday, from 16 New York, when the Sunday Times would came in, and 17 I would say, "That was a damn fine newspaper you had 18 this week." I probably wouldn't have read the 19 editorial. 20 Q. I think the big point, Mr Murdoch, is the last sentence 21 of 51 [sic], in relation to the Sun and the News of the 22 World as it then was: 23 "He exercises editorial control on major issues -- 24 like which party to back in a general election or policy 25 on Europe." 38 1 Do they have it right? 2 A. Page 51? 3 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Paragraph 50, actually. 4 A. 50, I'm sorry. 5 MR JAY: No, it's my mistake. Last sentence of 50. 6 A. It's not over the Times and the Sunday Times? 7 Q. No, no, no, Sun and the News of the World. 8 A. Yes. Well, I never much interfere with the News of the 9 World, I'm sorry to say, but -- yes. 10 Q. These are political issues, they're not sort of 11 managerial issues, but you would agree with this 12 sentence, would you? 13 A. Yes, I'm interested, I'm a curious person who is 14 interested in the great issues of the day, and I'm not 15 good at holding my tongue. 16 Q. But you did say you're sorry to say that you didn't 17 intervene in relation to the News of the World. Why did 18 you say that? 19 A. I'm not disowning it or saying it wasn't my 20 responsibility to, but I was always closer to the Sun. 21 It was a daily paper, there was something more urgent 22 about it. 23 Q. Did you have any role, Mr Murdoch, in relation to the 24 publication of the Hitler diaries in 1983? 25 A. I'm sorry to say yes. 39 1 Q. Is it fair to say that Lord Dacre -- that's the 2 historian Hugh Trevor-Roper before he was ennobled, not 3 Paul Dacre -- that Lord Dacre was beginning to express 4 doubts about the authenticity of the diaries and you 5 overruled him? 6 A. No, that is a very small part of the story. When the 7 editor told me very excitedly that they'd bought the -- 8 these rights, British rights to these documents from 9 a very, very reputable German publisher, Bertelsmann, he 10 got Lord Dacre to go to Switzerland to examine those 11 diaries and Lord Dacre, after some hours with them, 12 declared he thought they were genuine. 13 Later, when it got closer to the time of 14 publication, very close to the time of publication, 15 I think people were debating it, Lord Dacre then did 16 show doubts. And I think a majority of us felt we 17 should go ahead, and I take full responsibility for it. 18 It was a major mistake I made, one I'll have to live 19 with for the rest of my life. 20 Q. Okay. 21 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Mr Murdoch, this is a bit of 22 a marathon rather than a sprint, so I think we'll take 23 a break for a few minutes now, just to give the 24 shorthand writer a break and you a break. 25 A. Thank you, sir. 40 1 (11.09 am) 2 (A short break) 3 (11.19 am) 4 MR JAY: We're still on the theme of influence over editors. 5 Rebekah Wade, as she then was, told the House of Lords 6 committee in relation to you: 7 "I think it would be fair to say that before any 8 appointment, he knew me pretty well. He would be aware 9 of my views, both social views, cultural views and 10 political views." 11 From your perspective, do you feel that you did know 12 Rebekah Wade's social views, cultural views and 13 political views before you appointed her? 14 A. I certainly knew a lot of them, yes. 15 Q. Okay. You've drawn attention to a piece in the 16 New Statesman by Alice Miles, who worked for the Times, 17 I think, for ten years. She makes the point that you 18 had no influence at the time over editorial policy. So 19 we note her view. She does say this, though: 20 "You have only to look at online forums today to see 21 that the tabloid pursuit of gossip, scandal and cheap 22 titillation reflects rather than drives people's 23 naturally grubby or lowbrow instincts." 24 Do you agree with her or not? 25 A. No, I think that's a rather elitist view. But no, 41 1 I have to say that so much of that material is provided 2 by paid public relations agents working for those people 3 that it's our job also to look behind what we're being 4 told. 5 Q. So you say, well, you're fed a load of material by paid 6 publicists. In order to rectify the balance, as it 7 were, it is not inappropriate to use intrusive means to 8 pry into the lives of celebrities; is that fair? 9 A. I didn't say that. 10 Q. No. 11 A. I think it's perfectly fair -- I don't believe in using 12 hacking, I don't believe in using private detectives or 13 whatever, I think that's just a lazy way of reporters 14 not doing their job, but I think it is fair, when people 15 are held up as great -- or had themselves held up as 16 iconic figures or great actors, that they be looked at. 17 And sometimes -- we've just seen an example of it 18 with Mr Simon Cowell, he wanted to have it all 19 himself -- but no, I think people -- you know, a lot of 20 these people are very big in the lives of ordinary 21 people, big television stars, film stars, and of course 22 I must include politicians. 23 If we're getting into the issue of privacy, I think 24 people in public positions have public responsibilities, 25 and I'll even include press proprietors in that. 42 1 I don't think they're entitled to the same privacy as 2 the ordinary men in the street. If we're going to have 3 a transparent society, a transparent democracy, let's 4 have everything out in the open. 5 Q. Do you agree with the opinion which underlines the 6 secondary part of Alice Miles' proposition, that the 7 tabloids do pursue gossip, scandal and cheap 8 titillation? 9 A. I think that's an overstatement, but ... (shakes head). 10 Um ... no. Not -- look, there is some of it, but we're 11 not perfect. I'm not saying we are or that our 12 competitors are, but we're nothing to what you see on 13 the Internet every day, which I might say has an 14 ever-growing following. 15 Q. I may come back to that point in due course, Mr Murdoch. 16 A. It's a bigger subject for later. 17 Q. Yes. Just a few points in the 1980s, we need to bring 18 ourselves up to the 1990s -- 19 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Just before you leave the topic of 20 privacy, you don't see a distinction, Mr Murdoch, 21 between, for example, politicians and, one might say, 22 newspaper proprietors -- and one might even include 23 judges, I'd have to think about that -- in those who 24 hold themselves out or are held out as exercising 25 positions of influence, and on the other hand somebody 43 1 who is famous because they are a good actor or because 2 they are a film star or because they've written a book? 3 You don't see any distinction between the two? They 4 don't hold themselves out as influences on the public, 5 it's just that they're rather good at what they do. 6 A. I think people who hold great responsibility -- I mean, 7 I really welcome -- welcomed, I was jealous of the Daily 8 Telegraph buying all the personal expense accounts of -- 9 admittedly through second and third parties, but of the 10 Members of Parliament. I think the Sunday Times 11 followed later with members of the House of Lords. And 12 I thought that was a great public service. I have to 13 say that I'm disappointed the editor of the Times didn't 14 buy them when they were offered to him first, but -- and 15 obviously the Director of Public Prosecutions has 16 decided that was in the public interest and not 17 something to prosecute. 18 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I think the Telegraph would argue 19 that it wasn't illegal, but that's a slightly different 20 point. The question I'm asking -- 21 A. They would indeed. 22 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: The question I'm asking you is 23 whether there is a distinction, because you raised it -- 24 A. They were gained illegally but not by them. I mean, 25 there were -- okay. 44 1 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: No, whether there is a distinction 2 between those who hold themselves out as being a public 3 figure, like politicians or like newspaper proprietors, 4 or affect the public, and those who don't come into that 5 category, like people who've achieved fame, if you like, 6 made money, if you like, because they are very good at 7 what they do, whether it be acting or inventing 8 something or in films or writing. They don't hold 9 themselves out as having any public influence. If you 10 do, I accept that's different -- 11 A. Yes, there is a difference. It's a difficult subject. 12 But I do think that politicians do hold themselves out 13 as public figures and they're certainly people of great 14 responsibility and sometimes it's right to look behind 15 the facade. I think they have to be prepared for that. 16 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I don't think I disagree with that, 17 because it may be we'll come back to it. Okay. 18 MR JAY: Mr Murdoch, the 1980s, one frankly wouldn't, given 19 your perspective on the world, expect you to have 20 supported Neil Kinnock's Labour Party. Do you regret 21 any of the Sun's constant attacks on him? 22 A. I don't remember them. I remember the famous front page 23 on the day of the election, which I thought was 24 absolutely brilliant. Our problem with the Labour Party 25 then -- I mean, I think we would have supported the 45 1 Labour Party in that election if it had a different 2 policy, but you remember the famous clause 4, which was 3 the socialisation of everything in the country, 4 nationalisation, all the means of production, et cetera, 5 et cetera. We were certainly against that, and if there 6 were personal attacks on Mr Kinnock I would apologise 7 for that, I don't remember them, but he was the 8 personification of the leadership of the Labour Party 9 and it was fair to attack his policies, and even 10 sometimes the way he expressed himself. 11 Q. Clause 4 had been part of the Labour Party's 12 constitution, I think, since its inception. That would 13 be a reason for never supporting the Labour Party, yet 14 the Sun did until 1979, didn't it? 15 A. That could mean -- yes. There was the failure of the 16 Heath government, there was the support of Mr Harold 17 Wilson. I don't remember whether Mr Callaghan ever 18 stood for election. 19 Q. 1976 he was Prime Minister. 20 A. Hm? He was -- yes, okay. 21 Q. Holding though -- 22 A. We had very good relations with him and with Mr Wilson. 23 There was no thought of pursuing clause 4 with them. Or 24 by them. 25 Q. Mr Murdoch, can I take you to polling day on 11 June 46 1 1987, a dinner you attended at Clifton in the evening, 2 which is reported by Mr Woodrow Wyatt. He says this: 3 "Rupert turned up and sat near to us at one stage. 4 When Ken Livingstone appeared on the screen and put the 5 Labour defeat to the dreadful lies and smears of the 6 media, Rupert cried out, 'That's me', and was 7 delighted." 8 Is that true? 9 A. I remember that party, I mean that I was very late for 10 it, and if I said that, then I'm afraid that was the 11 influence of alcohol. 12 Q. It didn't reflect any part of your thinking then, 13 Mr Murdoch; is that right? 14 A. It was a joke. 15 Q. An external observer might observe that Mrs Thatcher 16 might have won anyway, but let's not go into that. 17 Can I deal with one point -- 18 A. I wasn't planning victory. It was just a stupid, 19 light-hearted remark. 20 Q. Okay. Can I deal with one point which arises out of the 21 merger of Sky Television and BSB, which took place on 22 4 November 1990. On 1 November 1990, the Broadcasting 23 Act of that year was passed. Do you recall that, 24 Mr Murdoch? 25 A. Yes, I accept it. 47 1 Q. It preserved the exemptions, if I can be forgiven for 2 simplifying it grossly, in relation to the provision of 3 non-domestic satellite services, and of course Sky, 4 which was your company, was operating out of Luxembourg, 5 wasn't it? 6 A. Yes. Well, we were broadcasting on a Luxembourg-owned 7 satellite. 8 Q. That's right, so it was non-domestic for these purposes 9 and the Act preserved the status quo, although there was 10 plenty of opposition to it from the Labour Party, do you 11 follow me? 12 A. I take your word for it. I don't remember it. 13 Q. Do you remember a discussion on 31 March 1990 with 14 Mr Wyatt? Maybe I should -- 15 A. No. I think he might have been Lord Wyatt by then, but 16 no, I don't. 17 Q. It's in his diaries -- 18 A. I went to a few dinner parties he gave, which he always 19 had interesting people at. 20 Q. This was at your flat, apparently. It was a Saturday, 21 31 March. It's page 262 of volume -- pardon me, I have 22 to be sure which volume it is. I think it's volume 2, 23 which in the bundle is going to be tab 15. It was the 24 day of the anti-poll tax riots in Trafalgar Square. 25 That may enable you to locate it in time. 48 1 A. I know what you're referring to. I remember the poll 2 tax and the controversy. 3 Q. Really, if I can invite you to look at page 265, you see 4 the extract about halfway through that page: 5 "I told him" -- the "I" here is Lord Wyatt, the 6 "him" is you -- "I was fairly confident that he would be 7 all right when the Bill ..." that's the Broadcasting 8 Bill -- 9 A. Where are you? I'm sorry. 10 Q. Are you with me? 11 A. I'm not on the exact quote. 12 Q. It's page 265 of volume 2. 13 A. Oh, 265. 14 Q. 265. 15 A. Yes? 16 Q. "I told him I was fairly confident that he would be all 17 right when the Bill came to the Lords [this is the 18 Broadcasting Bill] because it is now backed by the 19 government. Margaret is very keen on preserving your 20 position [that's the exemption I referred to]. She 21 knows how much she depends on your support. Likewise 22 you depend on hers in this matter." 23 Did Lord Wyatt say that, or something like that? 24 A. I have no memory of that, and if I'm right, he was 25 writing this many years afterwards and I wouldn't put 49 1 too much weight on Lord Wyatt's fantasies. 2 Q. Rightly or wrongly he was dictating these memoirs -- 3 A. He liked to give the impression that he was close to 4 Mrs Thatcher. I don't really believe that Mrs Thatcher 5 had that much time on her hands, but never mind. 6 Q. But it's really the point he's making that Mrs Thatcher 7 depended on your support and you depended on her 8 support, this is her support in the commercial arena, 9 because of your interests in what was then just Sky 10 Television plc, but was to become, the following year -- 11 or sorry, later this year, the merger of the two 12 companies. Do you see that? 13 A. I see what he's saying. I don't agree with it. 14 Q. Okay. I will move on, if I may, to 1990, the November 15 of that year. 16 A. You know, Mrs Thatcher had much more than me supporting 17 her in the press. Other big newspapers. And editorials 18 don't get read by that much -- many people. It's -- but 19 there was the Daily Telegraph there, which even then was 20 the mouthpiece of the Tory Party, and the Daily Mail. 21 There were a lot of different opinions being put, but 22 I was not the only one supporting her. 23 Q. Although your company consistently had about 36 per cent 24 of the newspaper market, didn't it? You were the 25 biggest player in 1990, you're the biggest player now, 50 1 aren't you? 2 A. If you're talking about newspapers alone, yes. Well, 3 put it this way: I go to election every year, Mr Jay -- 4 every day. People can stop buying my newspapers any 5 time. Often do, I'm afraid. And it is only natural for 6 politicians to reach out to editors and sometimes 7 proprietors, if they're available, to explain what 8 they're doing and hoping that it makes an impression and 9 it gets through, but I was only one of several. And 10 today I am only one of several, as I think we've seen 11 demonstrated the last few days. 12 Q. The Sunday Times in November 1990 endorsed Mr Heseltine 13 against Mrs Thatcher, do you remember that? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Mr Andrew Neil in his book makes it clear that that was 16 his, that's to say Andrew Neil's decision and not your 17 decision, do you follow me? 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. Out of fairness to you, he says this: 20 "He [that's you] kept to the letter of his promises 21 to Parliament of editorial independence when he bought 22 Times Newspapers in 1981." 23 But do you agree that your four other titles 24 supported Mrs Thatcher? 25 A. Well, I think the Sun and the News of the World did. 51 1 I don't remember where the Times was. But I certainly 2 don't remember the Times coming out for Mr Heseltine or 3 anyone else, but I don't know. 4 Q. Okay. Mr Neil, having been very fair to you in his 5 book, makes it clear that it was -- 6 A. In parts of his book. 7 Q. Yes, he's less fair in other parts, but the point I'm 8 making is that it may go to the credibility of what he 9 says that he's not consistently hostile to you. He 10 reports there a telephone conversation he had with you 11 in November 1990 over the Thatcher/Heseltine issue, 12 where you said this: 13 "It's your decision [in other words Mr Neil's 14 decision] but the paper will be seen to have turned tail 15 when the going got rough. Heseltine would be 16 disastrous." 17 And then this is the most important part: 18 "We owe Thatcher a lot as a company. Don't go 19 overboard in your attacks on her." 20 Do you think you said that? 21 A. I don't think so. I certainly have no memory of it. 22 Q. "We owe Thatcher a lot as a company" -- 23 A. My memory of that is that the first I knew of it was 24 when I read it in the paper. I don't remember any 25 preliminary discussion with Mr Neil about that, his 52 1 editorial. 2 Q. There's a difference between Mr Neil making the 3 decision, which he did, and you having a discussion with 4 him about it, which would not be improper -- 5 A. No, but I don't think I had one. 6 Q. Okay. So on this point you part company with Mr Neil; 7 is that right? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. In 1992, the famous headline, "It's the Sun wot won it", 10 did you appreciate that headline? 11 A. No. 12 Q. Did you -- 13 A. I understand that Mr MacKenzie said I gave him 14 a terrible bollocking. 15 Q. Yes. 16 A. I don't remember it. I thought it was a little 17 overenthusiastic, but my son, who is here today and was 18 apparently beside me, said I did indeed give him a hell 19 of a bollocking. 20 Q. That's very frank, Mr Murdoch, but the point may be 21 this, that you would not want it to appear that 22 newspapers did have this influence over voters, because 23 that might be said to be anti-democratic. Would you 24 agree with that? 25 A. I think saying anti-democratic is too strong a word, but 53 1 I just thought it was tasteless and wrong for us. It 2 was wrong in fact. We don't have that sort of power. 3 I think if you -- well, you can't do it now, but if you 4 go after an election and you see a newspaper that's 5 taken a very strong line, particularly the Sun, and ask 6 their readers how did they vote, there would be no 7 unanimity. It may be 60/40 one way. Whatever. I think 8 some papers you can recognise as having very strong 9 Conservative roots and some very strong Labour roots, 10 but you can't say that of the Sun. I think we're 11 perhaps the only independent newspaper in the business. 12 Q. I just want to explore with you a little bit the factors 13 which might go into the decision of the Sun to support 14 certain parties. If one looks at the 1992 election, 15 that was Mr Kinnock's last election, the Labour Party 16 manifesto included a commitment to: 17 "Establish an urgent inquiry by the Monopolies and 18 Mergers Commission into the concentration of media 19 ownership." 20 So, in other words, they were out to get you. Do 21 you follow me? 22 A. Sounds like that. 23 Q. So it's self-evident that had the Labour Party won that 24 election, that would have been heavily disadvantageous 25 to the commercial interests of your company, wouldn't 54 1 it? 2 A. That's what they say afterwards, yes. That was 3 obviously their intent, or would have been their intent, 4 if they'd carried through. I doubt it, but ... 5 Q. So the support the Sun gave to the Tory Party, not that 6 it was the strongest support, because you, to put it 7 bluntly, weren't that appreciative of Sir John Major -- 8 A. Or his government. Well, we were reading in all the 9 papers of cabinet divisions. 10 Q. But part of the reason for supporting the Conservative 11 Party in that election, apart from macro-economic 12 considerations, was that a Labour victory would have 13 been disastrous to your commercial interests in this 14 country, wouldn't it? 15 A. No. If you're -- I didn't know Mr Kinnock had those 16 plans to move against us afterwards. If he ever did, 17 really. You know, people say things in defeat which 18 come to them suddenly, but it was certainly not part of 19 his policy before the election. 20 Q. Well, it was part of his manifesto, and he was extremely 21 angry after the election. I think it was on 13 April 22 1992, he blamed his defeat on you, to put it bluntly. 23 It's reasonable to suppose that, had he got in, he would 24 have been right after you and your company, wouldn't he? 25 A. Well, I hope not. 55 1 Q. You might hope not, but I'm afraid, Mr Murdoch, it would 2 have happened, wouldn't it, and you well knew it would 3 have happened? 4 A. I don't think so. I don't think politicians always act 5 so irresponsibly as that. 6 Q. I'm not commenting on the merits of the policy, I'm 7 commenting just on the fact of the policy. 8 A. Yes, but I am only commenting on the likelihood of it 9 being followed -- whether it would be followed or not. 10 Q. Is it fair to say -- 11 A. We're dealing in hypotheticals. 12 Q. Is it fair to say that you generally back the winning 13 side? 14 A. No. I'm trying to think when we didn't, but that's 15 certainly true -- the last election in America, both the 16 Wall Street Journal and the New York Post certainly 17 opposed the almost certain victory of President Obama. 18 Q. I'm talking about the United Kingdom -- 19 A. I realise that. We work on the same principles 20 everywhere. 21 Q. Of course, no one is omniscient and you might get it 22 wrong. I'm not saying that you always back the winning 23 side -- 24 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But your point in relation to America 25 is rather different, isn't it, Mr Murdoch, because what 56 1 you're saying is that you recognised that the then 2 Democratic candidate was going to win, but you still 3 were going to say, "We don't think he should". 4 That's -- 5 A. That's how I see it. 6 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes, but that's rather different from 7 your deliberately trying to find the winning candidate. 8 A. I'm just saying I don't try to find the winning 9 candidate. I try to judge the candidates on the issues. 10 MR JAY: Because it is said about you that you like to back 11 the winning side because that is the best way to foment 12 your commercial interests. Would you agree with that or 13 not? 14 A. No, I wouldn't. I never let my commercial interests, 15 whatever they are, enter into any consideration of 16 elections. Give me an instance. 17 Q. Well, we'll have a look at -- very soon, actually -- 18 what happened in the run-up to the 1997 election, but 19 can I just deal with one point? Lord Patten, currently 20 Chairman of the BBC, gave evidence to us in January, and 21 he commented that he felt it was demeaning that so many 22 politicians -- and I think he was largely identifying 23 Conservative politicians -- were close to you and trying 24 to curry favour with you. That's my words, not his. 25 Did you sense that at the time or not? 57 1 A. No, I don't know many politicians. I can't think who 2 he'd be thinking about. 1997? 3 Q. 1992, Mr Murdoch. Lord Patten was Chairman of the 4 Conservative Party in 1992 and he ran that election for 5 them and he was just -- 6 A. Not very well, it would seem. Well, I take that back. 7 He lost it. 8 Q. No, he won it, Mr Murdoch. He won it. 9 A. 1992? 10 Q. Yes. He won. He didn't win by very much, but they won, 11 the Conservative Party. 12 A. Oh, we're back to the Major government? 13 Q. Yes. 14 A. Yes. I had met Mr Major. I don't remember meeting -- 15 I no doubt did, but I don't remember meeting any leading 16 figures at the time. I didn't know Mr Heseltine, 17 I didn't know Mr Portillo. I just don't know. 18 Q. Did you not wonder at any stage -- and we're looking now 19 at 1992 -- why it was that politicians were so keen to 20 win your support? 21 A. Politicians, let's be clear, always seek the support of 22 all newspapers and all media outlets, and I think that 23 is part of democracy. 24 Q. Yes, but with you, Mr Murdoch, it's slightly more 25 pointed than that. First of all, you own the greatest 58 1 share, and have done since the acquisition of the Times 2 papers in 1981, and secondly, the Sun is so important 3 because it's emblematic and there are so many floating 4 voters, and therefore, whereas a Times reader is 5 unlikely to be impacted one way or another by 6 endorsement of a particular political party by the 7 Times, a Sun reader might be, or at least that is the 8 perception. Do you agree with that? 9 A. I think when you add figures like this, in fairness to 10 me, you have to really exclude the Times. Has the Sun 11 got a large audience? Yes, certainly. Do people follow 12 everything we say? Certainly not. We hope that by 13 raising issues and so on we can have influence on things 14 we believe in, but it's not political parties as such. 15 We try to -- our approach to public affairs is to take 16 issues by issues. 17 Q. I think your evidence is this, Mr Murdoch. You are 18 completely oblivious to the commercial benefits to your 19 company of a particular party winning an election; is 20 that really the position? 21 A. Yes, absolutely. 22 Q. So this is an entirely, as it were, I'm not saying 23 idealistic approach, because that would be putting it 24 too high, but in one sense its political and ideological 25 and commercial considerations are wholly subordinated, 59 1 is that fair? 2 A. Absolutely. I have no commercial interests except the 3 newspaper. I love newspapers. 4 Q. But don't you, put another way, owe some duty to your 5 shareholders, at least, to further the best interests of 6 your companies? 7 A. Well, they tell me so. They'd like me to get rid of 8 them all. 9 Q. Okay. Can we look at the rise of Tony Blair, if I can 10 put it in those terms. He was elected Labour leader 11 21 July 1994. On 9 August 1994, according to 12 Mr Mullins' book, "A Walk-On Part", I think you can take 13 it from me, you said publicly that you could imagine 14 backing Mr Blair. Do you remember saying that or at 15 least thinking that? 16 A. I don't remember it, but it's quite possible. 17 Q. Because by that stage you had lost faith with the Major 18 government, hadn't you? 19 A. Yes. We'd had many, many, many years of Tory 20 government. 21 Q. That's right. 22 A. And I think it's good for a democracy to change. 23 Q. And it was pretty obvious, as the years wore on, that 24 the Labour Party was going to win convincingly, wasn't 25 it? 60 1 A. I don't remember that at all. 2 Q. Well, they won by a landslide, I think, of 164 seats on 3 1 May 1997 -- 4 A. That only became apparent very much later. I certainly 5 didn't -- can't say I knew that three years before. 6 Q. No. The precise nature of the landslide, maybe not, but 7 it was obvious to any political observer that Blair was 8 going to win, wasn't it, long before that election? 9 A. It might have been to you. It wasn't to me. A lot of 10 things can happen in politics in three years. 11 Q. I see. Do you remember a private dinner on 15 September 12 1994, arranged by Gus Fischer who was an employee of 13 News International, at a place called Mosimann's? 14 A. No. I made reference to it, but I have frankly no 15 reference -- I don't even know where Mosimann's is. 16 Q. It's described by Mr Neil as a "fancy private restaurant 17 club in a former Belgravia church". Does that help at 18 all? 19 A. No, it doesn't. 20 Q. This is noted in Mr Neil's book. The edition I'm 21 working from -- but I'm afraid there are two editions -- 22 it's page 209, it's tab 10. It might be a different 23 page in your version, might be 169 in your version. Can 24 I ask which version is that? Is that the -- okay. 25 A. 209? 61 1 Q. Yes. It's the bottom of the page, 209. Sir, in your 2 version, it might be page 169, confusingly. 3 This is the bottom of the page: 4 "The dinner went very well. Blair discovered Rupert 5 was not the ogre his party had painted and Rupert found 6 what Blair had to say a refreshing change from the usual 7 Labour nostrums." 8 So far so good? 9 A. I think I've already said I don't remember the dinner, 10 but it sounds quite like a very possible conversation. 11 Q. "Both revelled in being self-styled radicals, impatient 12 with the old Britain." 13 Correct? Certainly as regards you? 14 A. That would describe me, certainly. 15 Q. Yes. 16 "Blair indicated that media ownership rules would 17 not be onerous under Labour ..." 18 Did he say that? 19 A. I have no memory of that. 20 Q. But, as it happens, media ownership rules were not 21 onerous under Labour, so it might be true, mightn't it? 22 A. No. 23 Q. You don't think he said that? 24 A. Well, he might have said it, but I don't think it was 25 true that they were always without being onerous. 62 1 Q. Well, the Labour Party policy at the 1997 election, its 2 policy under government, was certainly not the policy 3 that the Kinnock Labour Party had threatened to 4 implement in 1992, was it? 5 A. No. 6 Q. And then reading on with Mr Neil: 7 "... Rupert that his newspapers were not wedded to 8 the Tories." 9 Might you have said that? 10 A. Oh certainly. 11 Q. And then Mr Neil continues -- 12 A. I wasn't wedded to Labour, either. 13 Q. No, that becomes clear: 14 "The union issue was not resolved: Labour remains 15 committed to giving workers the legal right to 16 collective bargaining if over 50 per cent of any 17 workforce votes for union recognition." 18 That was something that you had in your mind in 19 2004, didn't you, Labour Party policy on unions? 20 A. Probably. It was a very large issue in this country, 21 and how strikes could be called, whether it had to be 22 a majority of all the workers or just the people present 23 and so on. 24 Q. And then according to Mr Neil's source -- of course, we 25 don't know who that is, because I don't think Mr Neil 63 1 was at this little dinner: 2 "'Well, he certainly says all the right things,' 3 remarked Rupert after Blair had departed. 'But we're 4 not letting our pants down just yet'." 5 Might you have said that? 6 A. I might have. I've told you, I don't know the dinner 7 took place, but yes. 8 Q. It's really whether it's the sort of thing you might 9 have said. 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Because there are certain things which I'm sure you 12 wouldn't say. If I put it to you you had said 13 something, you'd know immediately, "Well I couldn't have 14 said that because I would never say that sort of thing". 15 A. A little colourful but it's quite possible I said that. 16 Q. The Hayman Island trip, which I think was in July 1995 17 when Mr Blair flew the best part of 25 hours, I think, 18 to speak at your conference at Hayman Island at your 19 invitation, do you remember that, Mr Murdoch? 20 A. Oh, very vividly. 21 Q. I think Mr Paul Keating, who was the Australian 22 Prime Minister, was also there, wasn't he? 23 A. Yes. And the Leader of the Opposition from Australia, 24 Mr Howard. 25 Q. Yes. 64 1 A. And I think some other interesting speakers, but yes. 2 Q. According to Alastair Campbell's Diaries -- I don't 3 think we need turn them up -- Mr Keating said this: 4 "You can do deals with him without ever saying 5 a deal is done." 6 Do you think that's a fair observation? 7 A. No. 8 Q. Do you understand the point that Mr Keating is making 9 there? 10 A. I understand what you're saying, yes, but that's not 11 true. Mr Keating is given to very extravagant language. 12 I thought you were going to quote something much more 13 extravagant. 14 Q. Well, I was, but I wasn't going to -- 15 A. I'm sorry. 16 Q. It's the -- well, it's not necessary to quote 17 everything. As you say, extravagant language I will 18 edit out on this occasion. But what about this: 19 "But the only thing he cares about is his business 20 and the only language he respects is strength." 21 Is that a fair insight into you? 22 A. Certainly not. 23 Q. And then Mr Keating also said, according to Mr Campbell, 24 that you "like to be associated with winners". This is 25 Mr Keating speaking: 65 1 "If he thinks you're a winner, he'd prefer to be 2 with you than against you." 3 That's spot on, isn't it, Mr Murdoch? 4 A. No. I mean, I think we all like to back a winning 5 racehorse or whatever. Yes, you like to be on the 6 winning side, but no, that was not a motivation. 7 Q. You gave a little speech, apparently, after Mr Blair's 8 speech, and his speech was a roaring success, according 9 to everyone who was there, and we've heard some evidence 10 about it. 11 A. Yes, he had a standing ovation from everybody there. 12 Q. Yes. You said this, apparently: 13 "If our flirtation is ever consummated, Tony, then 14 I suspect we will end up making love like porcupines, 15 very, very carefully." 16 Did you say that? 17 A. I might have. 18 Q. As you point out in your witness statement, the Sun in 19 1995 remained non-committal, didn't it? 20 A. 1995? Yes. 21 Q. Yes. And the endorsement only came late in the day, in 22 March 1997, didn't it? 23 A. I forget the dates, but I'll take your word for it, 24 Mr Jay. 25 Q. Was it part of your strategy, Mr Murdoch, that you, as 66 1 it were, would wait as long as possible to endorse the 2 Labour Party, because that was the best way of 3 extracting commercial advantages from them? 4 A. Certainly not. 5 Q. Were you tracking Labour Party policy on media issues at 6 this point? 7 A. I don't think so. I wasn't even in the country, but no. 8 Q. Weren't you asking your lieutenants who were in the 9 country to do just that, because it would be a keen 10 commercial interest to your companies to know what 11 Labour Party's policy on media issues was likely to be, 12 wouldn't it? 13 A. What could they have done? 14 Q. Pardon me, Mr Murdoch? 15 A. I said what could they have done? I don't think so. 16 Q. Well, they could, if they were minded or of like mind to 17 Mr Kinnock's Labour Party, to have invited the 18 Monopolies and Mergers Commission, or its successor, to 19 undertake an investigation into the issue of cross media 20 ownership and concentration of media ownership into your 21 companies, couldn't they? 22 A. They're welcome. 23 Q. It's obvious that's something you wouldn't want, would 24 you? 25 A. Well, it would be a diversion, but that's fine. 67 1 Q. Weren't you reassured when the 1997 Labour Manifesto did 2 not contain any legislative proposals on media 3 ownership, by which I mean concentration of media 4 ownership and cross media ownership? 5 A. I don't even remember noticing it. 6 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Is that right, Mr Murdoch? I mean, 7 quite apart from whoever you supported, presumably as 8 a businessman with very substantial interests in this 9 country, you would be very interested in what every 10 party was saying in their manifestos that might impact 11 upon the way in which you did business, wouldn't you? 12 A. Yes. Yes, sir. But I wanted to make it quite clear 13 that my commercial interests, such as they are, or 14 whatever you want to describe them, never came into any 15 consideration on where we stood on issues or political 16 parties. 17 MR JAY: Can I refer you to an extract from the 18 Alastair Campbell Diaries, volume 1, page 634, entry for 19 3 February 1997. It's going to be tab 2. 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. Eight lines down -- 22 A. Saturday, February 1? Are we on the right page, 23 page 633? 24 Q. 634, please, Mr Murdoch, we're 3 February. 25 A. Yes. 68 1 Q. The sentence beginning about eight lines down "TB and 2 GB ..."; do you have that one? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. "... went to see Murdoch, Les Hinton and Irwin Stelzer." 5 And Mr Campbell's footnote: "Rupert Murdoch's 6 economic guru". Was he that? 7 A. No. He was a friend and someone I enjoyed talking to. 8 He's a fine economist. 9 Q. Okay. 10 "TB said GB had been fine, sounded more sceptic than 11 usual on the single currency." 12 That's a reference to a speech Mr Brown had given? 13 A. GB is Gordon Brown. 14 Q. Of course. 15 "TB's sense was that Murdoch wanted to back us, but 16 the senior people at the Sun -- probably with Trevor 17 [Kavanagh] in the lead -- were telling him he must be 18 mad." 19 Is that correct? 20 A. I don't remember, it's possible. 21 Q. "TB said that he felt we got a fair crack on some 22 issues, but not on Europe. Murdoch said he hated the 23 idea of the single currency, full stop." 24 Might you have said that? 25 A. Most certainly. I had arguments for ten years with 69 1 Mr Blair about the subject. 2 Q. "But by and large TB felt it went okay. They agreed to 3 differ on a few things, but his sense was Murdoch was 4 reassured on the economy, tax, et cetera, and had lost 5 any kind of respect for Major and the Tories." 6 That's certainly true, isn't it? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. "TB didn't like having to deal with them. He knew they 9 were very right wing and only even thinking of backing 10 us because they wanted to back winners and be in 11 a better position to deal with us if we did win. But he 12 felt there was something unpleasant about newspaper 13 power and influence." 14 I'm not going to ask you to comment on Mr Blair's 15 state of mind, as it were, because that wouldn't be 16 fair, but didn't you sense in these discussions you were 17 having with senior politicians before a General Election 18 that a sort of form of pirouette or negotiation was 19 occurring and they wanted to know how far they had to 20 go -- 21 A. You're making sinister inferences. 22 Q. It's not sinister. 23 A. I want to say, Mr Jay, that I, in ten years of his 24 power, never asked Mr Blair for anything. Nor indeed 25 did I receive any favours. If you want to check that, 70 1 I think you should call him. 2 Q. I don't think that was my question, Mr Murdoch. It was 3 a more subtle question, that -- 4 A. Indeed it was. 5 Q. That the interchange between the sophisticated 6 politician and the sophisticated newspaper proprietor 7 would not be a hard-nosed commercial negotiation, how 8 much to pay for something. It would be at a far higher 9 and more subtle level. It would be each trying to work 10 out how much to give and how much to press for. Do you 11 follow me? 12 A. I'm afraid I don't have much subtlety about me. 13 Q. Don't you, Mr Murdoch? 14 A. No. 15 Q. Okay. But did you at least sense that this sort of 16 encounter with Mr Blair and Mr Brown, so they were the 17 two most powerful people in the then Labour Opposition 18 just before a General Election -- that they were very 19 anxious to sound you out and see what your thinking was? 20 Didn't you at least sense that? 21 A. No, I think they probably wanted to convince me that 22 they were the right people to be leading Britain, and 23 I'm sure they were doing that to every other press 24 proprietor. 25 Q. So you didn't feel that they were sizing you up, trying 71 1 to work out what you were thinking, what was necessary, 2 from their perspective, they had to do to win your 3 support? 4 A. No. I think you must ask them that. 5 Q. Okay. Mr Campbell's diary entry for 10 March 1997, 6 page 664. This is a short one, so you probably don't 7 need to turn it up. 8 A. Page 664? 9 Q. 664. 10 A. Oh. 11 Q. Let me just read it to you. It's probably not necessary 12 to look at it, but you can, of course, if you wish to. 13 A. I'm sorry. Yes. 14 Q. "[TB] spoke to Irwin Stelzer later who said Murdoch was 15 moving towards supporting us again. For commercial 16 reasons, they would probably make clear who they were 17 backing at the start of the campaign." 18 Might you have had that discussion with Mr Stelzer? 19 A. No. If he said that, he certainly had no right to. 20 Q. Isn't that the sort of thing that you did discuss with 21 Mr Stelzer? 22 A. No. I want to say -- I don't know how many times I have 23 to state to you, Mr Jay, that I never talk commercial 24 considerations. 25 Q. So Mr Stelzer's got completely the wrong end of the 72 1 stick then, hasn't he? 2 A. Yes. Well -- 3 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: No, he's not actually -- with 4 respect, Mr Murdoch, if one reads it carefully, he's not 5 suggesting quite that. What he's saying is that 6 Mr Stelzer was, as it were, providing feedback, which 7 sounds as though it's accurate, that you were moving 8 towards supporting the Labour Party, and then he's 9 making a slightly separate point, that actually they'd 10 only make clear who they were backing at the start of 11 the campaign. And that might be for commercial reasons 12 connected with wanting to sell copies of your newspaper, 13 neither more nor less. 14 A. That's possible. I thought Mr Jay was putting more 15 sinister motives on it. 16 MR JAY: I'm not sure I was seeking to put a sinister 17 motive. I think one possible interpretation might be 18 the commercial reasons are to do with the long-term 19 interests of your companies in the face of what 20 government policy might be on media ownership. Do you 21 see the point? 22 A. Could you repeat that one? 23 Q. The commercial reasons are a reference to what 24 government, future government policy might be on topics 25 such as media ownership, which would affect the 73 1 commercial interests of News International, wouldn't it? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. In the run-up to the endorsement, the endorsement of the 4 Sun of Labour was on 18 March 1997. This is 5 Mr Neil's -- 6 A. Oh, we're still on page 664? 7 Q. No. 8 A. Oh, a different book? 9 Q. We're on Mr Neil's full disclosure, tab 10. It's the 10 1997 edition preface, which is xxiv. 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. If you look five lines down from the top of xxiv, he 13 says this, and this relates to what happened on 17 March 14 1997 -- 15 A. This is Mr Neil? 16 Q. Yes. 17 "Blair went the final mile for Rupert in an article 18 for the Sun right at the start of the election campaign. 19 He flew the Union flag and wrote in highly Eurosceptical 20 tones. Rupert was delighted." 21 Were you delighted? 22 A. I don't remember, but I would have been. "He flew the 23 Union flag and wrote in highly Eurosceptical tones", 24 yes. 25 Q. And then: 74 1 "He [that's you] saw no reason to delay his 2 endorsement for Labour any longer, especially since all 3 the polls made Blair overwhelming favourite to be the 4 next Prime Minister anyway." 5 And then the following day we have the endorsement. 6 That endorsement was your decision, wasn't it, 7 Mr Murdoch? 8 A. Well, it certainly would have been with my approval. 9 Q. Some would say, looking at this, you had extracted 10 really as much as you could from Mr Blair in terms of 11 policy promises. He'd gone a considerable distance in 12 your direction. You assessed he'd gone as far as he was 13 ever going to go, so you endorsed him. That is right, 14 isn't it? 15 A. I think so. I don't think it all followed in this way 16 so logically, but yes. 17 Q. Mr Neil's assessment -- it's right that I put this to 18 you because it confirms something you said. He adds an 19 additional point, xxv, he says: 20 "I do not believe that there was an explicit deal 21 between Murdoch and Blair in which the Sun gave its 22 support in return for promises that a Labour government 23 would leave Rupert's British media empire alone." 24 So you presumably would strongly agree with that, 25 Mr Murdoch? 75 1 A. Absolutely. 2 Q. But then he says: 3 "But there was an implicit understanding, never 4 openly talked about between the two men, but an 5 understanding nevertheless." 6 Do you have a comment on that? 7 A. That's not true. I think that he -- if it was true, he 8 certainly didn't keep to it, because he appointed Ofcom 9 with wide powers to interfere with us in every way. 10 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: I think we'll have another five 11 minutes. 12 (12.16 pm) 13 (A short break) 14 (12.25 pm) 15 MR JAY: Mr Murdoch, I've been asked by a core participant 16 to put to you a short and straightforward point in 17 relation to a piece Mr Blair wrote in the Times on 18 31 March 1997, which was one month and one day before 19 the election. Are you with me chronologically? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. He said this, and indeed I remember it quite clearly: 22 "Let me state the position clearly so that no one is 23 in any doubt. The essential elements of the trade union 24 legislation of the 1980s will remain." 25 So he is saying that he's not going to dismantle the 76 1 Thatcher reforms, are you with me? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. And he also said: 4 "The changes that we do propose would leave British 5 law the most restrictive on trade unions in the western 6 world." 7 So this must have been music to your ears, mustn't 8 it? 9 A. I don't think I read it, but yes. 10 Q. According to what you've disclosed of your meetings with 11 Leaders of the Opposition, there was dinner with 12 Mr Blair that very evening, 31 March 1997. Do you think 13 you discussed that article and congratulated him for it? 14 A. I doubt it. But it's possible. 15 Q. Labour Party win the election 1 May 1997. Can we move 16 forward to March 1998 and a piece which appeared in 17 La Stampa on 24 March. They claimed that the Italian 18 Prime Minister, who was then Romano Prodi, had taken 19 a call from Mr Blair in which they discussed your 20 multimillion pound offer for Mediaset, which was one of 21 Berlusconi's companies. 22 A. Multi-billion. 23 Q. Did I say million? 24 A. Billion. 25 Q. And Mr Prodi allegedly told Mr Blair that he preferred 77 1 an Italian bidder. Can we try and examine what truth, 2 if any, there is behind that story? Did you speak to 3 Mr Blair on 17 March 1998 and ask him to speak to 4 Mr Prodi to say that he shouldn't interfere? 5 A. No. I may have spoken to him. I had my own access to 6 Mr Prodi. I had been with him already and talked about 7 it, but Mr Berlusconi had not only offered -- come to me 8 with his company, he wanted to get rid of it, and we'd 9 had negotiations, and I asked him what was his view, and 10 he said, "Well, I wish there was an Italian bidder, 11 I would have preferred that", but it was a friendly 12 conversation. I don't say he agreed to anything. But 13 I knew him slightly and I had my own access. I didn't 14 need Mr Blair to be calling him. I may well have spoken 15 to Mr Blair separately and said, "How do you think 16 a British industry is going to get on in a country like 17 Italy?" 18 Q. But it stopped there? You didn't ask Mr Blair to phone 19 Mr Prodi up? 20 A. No. 21 Q. You couldn't have said anything which gave Mr Blair that 22 impression, that you wanted him to intervene on your 23 behalf? 24 A. No, I never asked Mr Blair for any favours. 25 Q. To be fair, what happened is that Mr Blair, according to 78 1 Mr Campbell, said that he would think about it, but in 2 the end the phone call came from Prodi to Mr Blair, 3 rather than the other way round. That's page 331 of 4 Mr Campbell's diaries. 5 A. I wasn't privy to -- 6 Q. But you can't comment on that? 7 A. -- any of that. 8 Q. May I ask you, Mr Murdoch, to deal with another piece of 9 evidence the Inquiry received from Lord Patten, which 10 was along the lines that he, Lord Patten, was writing 11 a book about Hong Kong, because, of course, he was the 12 last governor of Hong Kong, and HarperCollins, one of 13 your companies, is the publisher. Do you remember that? 14 A. Yes, I do indeed. 15 Q. According to Lord Patten, you learned that HarperCollins 16 were going to publish the book. This coincided with his 17 always doomed attempts to extend his empire into China 18 and effectively you pulled the book. Is that right? 19 A. Half right. 20 Q. Which bit is right and which is wrong? 21 A. I did not have any influence or interest in China, not 22 for lack of wanting or trying, but I had always taken 23 the view that Mr Patten was a bad governor of Hong Kong 24 and had raised very false expectations and when I first 25 heard of this book, I said, "I hope we don't do it", and 79 1 when I heard that it was about to hit the streets, or 2 very close, I did step in and say, "Don't do it", which 3 I wish to say now was one more mistake of mine. It was 4 clearly wrong. 5 Q. Weren't you hoping to acquire commercial interest in 6 China at that point? 7 A. No. Well, it's a huge market, we're always looking for 8 opportunities there, but it's just too difficult. 9 Q. But in December 2001, you were given permission by the 10 Chinese authorities to launch a Cable TV channel in 11 China, weren't you? 12 A. There were endless negotiations and we finally got 13 permission to do this, which turned out to be a Mandarin 14 channel in a small Cantonese-speaking section of China. 15 Not so small, but it was Cantonese. 16 Q. From that foothold, you've done quite well in China, 17 haven't you now? From that small foothold, you've 18 advanced your commercial interests in China -- 19 A. No. 20 Q. Okay. 21 A. We have thrown whatever we had there, which was losing 22 money, I mean a million or two, into a joint venture, 23 which we're in the minority with Shanghai Media. That's 24 about a year or two old. 25 Q. I move forward to the 2001 election here. According to 80 1 Mr Campbell's diaries, volume 3, page 439 -- 2 A. I'm sorry, what year? 3 Q. This is a conversation or rather a diary entry for 4 30 October 2000, volume 3, page 439. 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. The entry reads, at the bottom of the page, very bottom 7 of the page: 8 "TB saw Murdoch and Irwin Stelzer [Mr Campbell is 9 glossing that] [Murdoch adviser]. He had asked them 10 outright whether they were going to back us. Murdoch 11 said the Tories were unelectable and that was that." 12 Is this a faithful account of what happened, 13 Mr Murdoch? 14 A. I have no memory of it at all. I'm sorry, I can't help 15 you. 16 Q. Might you have said that the Tories were unelectable? 17 A. No, I don't think so. I don't think they were. 18 Q. By saying "unelectable", you meant they were bound to 19 lose, I think, which is -- 20 A. If I said that -- you keep putting words into my mouth, 21 Mr Jay. 22 Q. I hope I don't and it's only what Mr Campbell here is 23 reporting you. 24 A. Yes but you're putting other words and I've told you 25 I have no memory of any such conversation. I'm not 81 1 saying it's wrong, it just might be a wrong 2 interpretation of what was said. 3 Q. Okay. It may be that Mr Blair had got to know you quite 4 well by now and did feel able to ask you outright 5 whether you were going to back him. Do you see that? 6 A. I can't believe he was so direct as that. I met 7 Mr Blair, if you look at the record, an average of two, 8 maybe three times sometimes in a whole year. It's not 9 as though, you know, there was a constant approach or 10 daily text messages, as happened with some newspapers. 11 We had no such relationship. They were usually taken up 12 by -- I remember an afternoon at Chequers where we spent 13 the whole afternoon debating the euro. I remember what 14 was said. And he didn't agree with me. I'm glad to see 15 that I've turned out right, but that's another matter. 16 Q. To be fair to you, Mr Murdoch, your great concern was 17 that the United Kingdom might enter the euro. That is 18 right, isn't it? 19 A. My feeling about it, if you want to debate the euro, was 20 that it was a great abdication of power over our own 21 affairs. 22 Q. I'm not sure I do want to debate the euro, but what I do 23 want just to establish, out of fairness to you, is that 24 that was your concern, wasn't it: the United Kingdom 25 might enter the euro? 82 1 A. Yes, it was a purely intellectual point of view. 2 Q. The March 2003 Gulf War, all 175 papers around the world 3 which you owned backed the war, didn't they? 4 A. I don't own 475 -- 5 Q. 175. 6 A. Well, it would include a lot of little suburban papers, 7 free sheets and things, which wouldn't have had a view, 8 but yes, we did support the war, as did most papers, 9 including even the New York Times. 10 Q. Some years after the event, it was discovered that there 11 were three telephone calls between you and Mr Blair in 12 March 2003 where the issue of the Gulf War must have 13 been discussed. Do you follow me, Mr Murdoch? 14 A. Well, it must have been on his mind at that time, it was 15 such a big issue. I don't remember the calls. The 11th 16 might even have been calling me for my birthday, but no, 17 our position on the war had been declared very strongly 18 in all our newspapers and the Sun well before that date. 19 Q. To be clear, Mr Murdoch, the discussion -- 20 A. So he wouldn't have been calling me for support. 21 Q. The discussion could not have been about whether you 22 were going to support him, because, as you rightly say, 23 that support had already been given, so the discussion 24 must have been about something else. 25 A. Well, I don't think we can just personalise it to 83 1 Mr Blair, but to the war. 2 Q. Mr Rawnsley's version, in a book called "The End of the 3 Party", page 160, was that you -- 4 A. Who is he? 5 Q. He's a political commentator. In a sense, it doesn't 6 matter really what he says, it's really whether you 7 agree with this point, that you and Mr Blair were 8 devising the best strategy for attacking 9 President Chirac. Do you think that's what was 10 discussed during these calls? 11 A. I doubt it very much. 12 Q. Why, Mr Murdoch? 13 A. Hm? 14 Q. Why? 15 A. I don't think Mr Blair would come to me for advice on 16 a matter like that. 17 Q. But why not? Because you had the Sun -- 18 A. Well, why would he? I mean he's surely above talking to 19 a press proprietor about his foreign relations with 20 France. It was well-known that the Sun was pretty rude 21 about the French from time to time. 22 Q. Mm. Well, the articles in the Sun about this time 23 describe President Chirac as "Le French worm and a cheap 24 tart who puts price before principle". Did that have 25 anything to do with you? 84 1 A. No. 2 Q. The 2005 election, Mr Murdoch. This is the last of 3 Blair's victories. 4 Did you make it a condition of support for the 5 Labour Party that the government hold a referendum on 6 the new EU Constitution? 7 A. No, we didn't make any conditions, but we certainly 8 expressed the opinion strongly that the EU Constitution 9 should be put to the people. And I don't think we were 10 alone in that. As it happened, didn't have to be, 11 because it depended on unanimity between all the 12 countries and other countries, at least one, had voted 13 against it, so it was pointless to have a referendum. 14 Q. Yes. In the end, as you rightly say, there wasn't 15 a referendum for the reasons you've given, but what's 16 said in another book by a Mr Richards this time is that 17 Mr Blair held regular talks with Irwin Stelzer, 18 including talks on that issue, and Mr Stelzer would have 19 been communicating your views. Is that right or not? 20 A. No. Mr Stelzer is a distinguished economist. He had 21 his own views. 22 Q. But in no sense was he communicating your views then to 23 the Prime Minister, is that -- 24 A. No. 25 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Well, you don't know whether he was 85 1 or he wasn't. 2 A. He may have been. I don't know. 3 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: That's the point. 4 A. It would have been a coincidence. 5 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: But it would be something that you 6 would talk to him about? 7 A. If I was seeing a lot of him. 8 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: That's the point. You've already 9 spoken very, very highly of him, and therefore it's the 10 sort of thing you might very well discuss with him? 11 A. Yes. Yes, sir. 12 MR JAY: Thank you. 13 A. My only point in answering Mr Jay was that he was not 14 there to carry a message from me. 15 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: (Nods head). I understand. 16 MR JAY: I'm sure Dr Irwin Stelzer with all his intellectual 17 abilities would have his own ideas on this and every 18 other topic, but in one sense he would know your 19 thinking and he would be able to discuss that with 20 Mr Blair, wouldn't he? 21 A. Probably, yes. He was actually closer to Mr Andrew Neil 22 than he was to me. 23 Q. Okay. Mr Blair leaves in 2007. Did you have a view as 24 to who should succeed him? 25 A. I thought the matter was settled. 86 1 Q. According to Mr Blair's biography, "A Journey", 2 page 655, it's just a couple of sentences, I do not 3 think it's necessary to turn it up, Mr Blair's view is: 4 "There was no contest for the leadership. John Reid 5 could have stood, but the Murdoch papers, I fear at 6 Rupert's instigation, just wrote him off." 7 Do you remember doing that? 8 A. No, that's quite untrue. I had met Mr Reid a couple of 9 times and I liked him and admired him. 10 Q. But you didn't write him off? 11 A. I didn't know that he was a contender for the job. Or 12 possible contender. 13 Q. Okay. Your relations with Mr Brown until 30 September 14 2009, which was when the Sun, as it were, dropped him 15 and supported the Conservatives, were quite warm, 16 weren't they? 17 A. My personal relationship with Mr Brown -- 18 Q. Yes. 19 A. -- was always warm, both before he became Prime Minister 20 and after, and I regret that, after the Sun came out on 21 him, that's not so true, although I only hope that that 22 can be repaired. 23 Q. There may have been a number of reasons why your 24 personal relations were good, but one obvious one, 25 perhaps, was your common Presbyterian upbringing; is 87 1 that right? 2 A. Yes. 3 Q. Can we see if we can possibly explode one of the myths 4 you've mentioned? We know that you stayed at Chequers 5 the weekend of 6 and 7 October 2007, or were at least 6 there on one of those days. Do you remember that? 7 A. Was that the pyjama party weekend? 8 Q. No. We're coming to that. That's 14 June 2008, 9 Mr Murdoch. No, this is -- 10 A. I do remember being once, at least, but I think only 11 once, at Chequers as the guest of Mr and Mrs Brown, and 12 there were certainly other people there, because 13 I remember -- the outstanding thing in my memory was it 14 was the first time I met JK Rowling, who was a close 15 friend of -- at least of Mrs Brown. 16 Q. Did you have any discussions with Mr Brown about whether 17 there should be a snap election? 18 A. No. 19 Q. Were you aware of the -- 20 A. Let me say I don't remember any and I'm sure he didn't 21 ask me. No. 22 Q. There is evidence somewhere, I think in Mr Rawnsley's -- 23 A. No, if any politician wanted my opinions on major 24 matters, they only had to read the editorials in the 25 Sun. 88 1 Q. Mr Rawnsley, page 507, says that the decision to call 2 off the snap election was taken before 6 October. If 3 he's right, you couldn't have discussed it with 4 Mr Brown, but maybe we can't really -- 5 A. So who says I did? 6 Q. Others have suggested it, but we've heard your evidence 7 on the topic, Mr Murdoch. I'm not going to press that 8 any further, if you forgive me. 9 Can I move forward with Mr Brown. June 2008, if we 10 can take just one month, the documents demonstrate that 11 you had dinner with Mr Brown on 6 June and your 12 respective wives were present. Would you accept that? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. 14 June was the famous slumber party, where I don't 15 believe you were present. 16 A. I think they were just a bunch of women complaining 17 about their husbands, probably. 18 Q. 15 June, you were Mr Brown's guest at a Downing Street 19 dinner for President Bush, do you remember that? 20 A. Yes. That was a large party. I mean, there was -- 21 Q. Yes, There'd be about 30 or 40 people there, wouldn't 22 there? 23 A. Yes, I'm sure there were other people there from the 24 press. 25 Q. And then on 16 June, Mr Brown attends your annual summer 89 1 party? 2 A. Yes. I think so. Most people did. 3 Q. Were you involved in any way in the timing of the 4 decision to support the Conservative party on 5 30 September 1989 [sic]? 6 A. No, I was not consulted as the exact timing. We 7 certainly had had talks over a period -- my son James 8 and Mrs Brooks and no doubt others -- that we felt this 9 government was making a lot of mistakes and that we'd 10 had a long period of Labour rule and it was time for 11 a change. 12 Q. And you, along with many others, were working out that 13 Mr Brown was likely to lose the next election? 14 A. No. I didn't know. 15 Q. Mr Murdoch, one can't know, because unless one can read 16 the future, there are uncertainties -- 17 A. I thought you were asking me to -- 18 Q. But your best guess, Mr Murdoch, along with many others, 19 best-informed guess, was that Mr Brown was going to 20 lose, wasn't he? 21 A. The election was a long way away. I had no idea. You 22 know, as many people have said, a week is a long time in 23 politics. 24 Q. That was Mr Howard Wilson, I think, who originally said 25 that. May I just deal with one piece of evidence the 90 1 Inquiry received from Mr MacKenzie. Mr MacKenzie told 2 us that Mr Brown spoke to you on the phone, this was on 3 or shortly after 30 September 2009 and he, Mr Brown, is 4 said to have roared at you for 20 minutes. Is that true 5 or not? 6 A. I am afraid that -- I'm very happy to tell you about the 7 conversation, but Mr MacKenzie, who I might have talked 8 to about it over dinner, I occasionally see him -- that 9 was a very colourful exaggeration. Mr Brown did call me 10 and said, "Rupert, do you know what's going on here?" 11 And I said, "What do you mean?" He said, "Well ..." the 12 Sun and what it's doing and how it came out, and I said, 13 "I'm not aware of the -- I was not warned of the exact 14 timing, I'm not aware of what they're saying, I'm 15 a long, long way away, but I'm sorry to tell you, 16 Gordon, we have come to the conclusion that we will 17 support a change of government when and if there's an 18 election." Not "if", but "when there's an election". 19 And he said -- and I must stress no voices were raised, 20 we were talking more quietly than you and I are now -- 21 he said, "Well, your company has declared war on my 22 government and we have no alternative but to make war on 23 your company." And I said, "I'm sorry about that, 24 Gordon, thank you for calling", end of subject. 25 Q. How could Mr Brown have declared war on your company? 91 1 A. I don't know. I don't think he was in a very balanced 2 state of mind. He, frankly -- he could have -- I don't 3 know -- set up more commissions. God knows there's 4 plenty of quangos and commissions around us now. So 5 that was it. 6 He later, when the hacker scandal broke, made 7 a totally outrageous statement, which he had to know was 8 wrong, when he called us a "criminal organisation", and 9 because he said that we had hacked into his personal 10 medical records when he knew very well how the Sun had 11 found out about his son, the condition of his son, which 12 was very sad. A father from the hospital in a similar 13 position had called us, told us and said, "Shouldn't we 14 get some charity or research on this?", and so on, and 15 Mrs Brooks immediately snatched it from the news list 16 and said, "Let me handle this", and she called Mrs Brown 17 and said, "Look, this is going to be out, we should be 18 careful, how would you like it handled?" And I don't 19 know if it was one or several days later, we published 20 the story, and four or five days later, Mr Brown wrote 21 a personal letter to Mrs Brooks thanking her for her 22 sensitivity and the way she handled the story. 23 I believe that letter is in the hands of the police. 24 Q. So, Mr Murdoch, you had no knowledge of and involvement 25 in the events you've just described. You, presumably, 92 1 are communicating to us what Mrs Brooks has told you; is 2 that correct? 3 A. On her handling of the story, and indeed I've since 4 had -- some time ago -- personal contact with Mrs Brown, 5 which was very friendly, and, yes, that part of the 6 story -- and I'm sure there's plenty of evidence that 7 she took it out of the news list and said, "Let me 8 handle that", other people would have been present, and 9 there would be people in the newsroom that would have 10 known, that would have received the call from the 11 hospital. I haven't seen the letter. 12 Q. Okay. 13 A. But I have no doubt you'll have a chance to do that. 14 Q. May I go back -- 15 A. Well, we're jumping several years. 16 Q. It's fine, Mr Murdoch, but can I just go back to this 17 declaration of war? Could it be said that the way 18 Mr Brown might have carried out his threat -- perhaps 19 the way you interpreted it -- was that as and when you 20 would bid for the remaining publicly owned shares in 21 BSkyB, Mr Brown might place obstacles in your way? 22 A. No, we never thought about it. We had taken advice on 23 that. It's something that goes on, I guess, every day, 24 if not every week. Somewhere in the markets of the 25 world, controlling shareholders buy in the outside 93 1 shareholders. It's not a matter for regulation in most 2 countries or any country that I'm aware of. It was 3 turned into a political issue in this country by our 4 newspaper enemies -- or I shouldn't say "enemies". 5 Competitors. But it is possible, of course, for the 6 Minister for Culture to step in, I presume, and refer 7 any market move to Ofcom or the Competition Commission 8 or whatever. But we'd never thought of that. 9 Q. Mm. 10 A. I mean, we thought -- to be quite honest with you -- 11 that we'd be held up for a couple of months in Europe 12 and there was just nothing here; and, in fact, we were 13 waved through in Europe in two weeks. 14 Q. Can I just understand the chronology, Mr Murdoch, that 15 by 30 September 2009, had there been keen internal 16 consideration within News Corp regarding the acquisition 17 of the remaining shares in BSkyB? 18 A. Oh, well, there had certainly been a desire there for 19 a long time. I remember when Mr Carey returned to the 20 company after many years away, the first thing he said 21 to me was, "We should clean up this situation at Sky" -- 22 or BSkyB. It was a -- you know, we started this company 23 and it was a longstanding ambition. With hindsight, 24 I regret that I ever agreed to an IPO, although I admit 25 that they were different times and there were probably 94 1 monetary pressures which encouraged it. 2 Q. I just wonder though, Mr Murdoch, whether it entered 3 into your thinking that Mr Brown had said, "We're going 4 to declare war on your company", that you interpreted 5 that as being, at the very least, the possibility of 6 obstacles being placed in the way of your bid for the 7 remaining shares in BSkyB? 8 A. No, that never occurred to me. 9 Q. Didn't it? 10 A. No. 11 MR JAY: Sir, would that be -- 12 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes, certainly. 13 MR JAY: May I say -- 14 A. Certainly not. 15 MR JAY: I'll say what I had in mind for the rest of -- 16 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes. 17 No, I think Mr Jay was just suggesting we should 18 break. Nothing more. 19 A. Well, I hope we can get through today. 20 MR JAY: Mr Murdoch, I'm concerned about the length of -- 21 A. It's up to you. 22 MR JAY: I'm concerned overall about the length of this 23 evidence and, if we plough through the afternoon, how 24 cogent my questions will be and your answers might be. 25 I know how much I have left. My preference would be to 95 1 go just for about 45 minutes in the afternoon and then 2 complete in about two or three hours in the morning. 3 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Can I suggest that during the course 4 of the next hour you have a word with those who are 5 advising Mr Murdoch and he can have a word with them as 6 well. I'm conscious that I do not want to put excessive 7 pressure on you and I don't want to put excessive 8 pressure on Mr Murdoch either. 9 A. Thank you, sir. 10 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: All right. You can return to that at 11 2 o'clock. Thank you very much. 12 (12.59 pm) 13 (The luncheon adjournment) 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 96 1 2 (2.00 pm) 3 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Yes, Mr Jay. 4 MR JAY: Mr Murdoch, may we move to Mr David Cameron? 5 A. Certainly. 6 Q. When asked in 2006 when you thought of him, you are 7 reported as having said, "Not much". Is that correct? 8 A. I don't remember that. I certainly could give you my 9 recollection of him. I first met him once, maybe even 10 twice, at family picnics at my -- at weekends at my 11 daughter's house in the grounds of Blenheim Castle, 12 where he came with his family, and my -- we were overrun 13 by children, there were no politics, but I was extremely 14 impressed at the kindness and feeling he showed to his 15 children and particularly to his retarded son. I came 16 away talking about him as a good family man. 17 Q. Did you feel that he was lightweight? 18 A. No. Not then, certainly. No. He hasn't had -- I think 19 it's too early to make that judgment. 20 Q. When he was leader of the opposition, we know from one 21 of the documents you've put in that you saw him on 22 a number of occasions. It's our exhibit KRM29. That 23 will be turned up for you. Might be tab 28 in that 24 bundle. It's page 01907. 25 A. Thank you, Mr Jay. 1 1 Q. We can see, Mr Murdoch, that there are a number of 2 meetings with him. In 2006, there were two, a lunch and 3 a breakfast. You were discussing -- 4 A. 2000 and? 5 Q. 2006. Politics and policy. In 2007, it's less clear 6 whether that breakfast took place. In 2008 -- 7 A. It's unclear. I don't have a memory, but go ahead. 8 Q. It's just the general flavour of it. The exact dates 9 probably don't matter for this purpose. 10 2008, breakfast. Rebekah Brooks is quite often 11 there, isn't she? Or sometimes. 12 A. Once, I think it's stated. 13 Q. And then you attended and he attended the wedding of 14 Rebekah Brooks to Charlie Brooks, we can see that. 15 A. Yes, together with Mr Brown and Mr Blair and Mr Cameron, 16 they were all there. 17 Q. If you turn over the page to 01908, there was 18 a breakfast meeting with Mr Cameron on the day the Sun 19 endorsed him. Do you see that? 30 September? 20 A. Was that the day we endorsed him? 21 Q. Yes. 22 A. No, that's not possible. The day we declared for the 23 Tories, I believe, was at the time of the Labour Party 24 Conference, or the end of it, and I was certainly in 25 America. 2 1 Q. I've been working on the basis for the last two days 2 with your son and with you that the right date was 3 30 September 2009. Are you saying that's incorrect? 4 A. I think so. If that was the date of the Labour Party 5 Conference, it's certainly wrong. 6 Q. I'm as sure as I can be that it was 30 September 2009 7 that the Sun came out -- 8 A. Well, for the sake of argument I'll accept you. Oh yes, 9 we came out, yes. 10 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: We'll sort it out eventually, anyway. 11 A. I wasn't here the day we came out for the Tories. 12 MR JAY: You're sure about that in your mind, are you? 13 A. Oh yes. 14 Q. When you refer to "policy" here, Mr Murdoch, did you 15 discuss with Mr Cameron issues such as broadcasting 16 regulation? 17 A. No. Mr Jay, you keep inferring that endorsements were 18 motivated by business motives, and if that had been the 19 case, we would have endorsed the Tory Party in every 20 election. It was always more pro business. I could 21 have been like the Telegraph. I could even have texted 22 him every day. But I didn't. I was interested in 23 issues. 24 Q. But -- 25 A. As it says here, we probably discussed Afghanistan. 3 1 Q. If, Mr Murdoch, part of your thinking involves an 2 assessment of who's going to win the next election, of 3 course you wouldn't always be voting the same -- or 4 wouldn't always be supporting the same party, would you? 5 A. If that had been the case, but I've explained that was 6 not the case. 7 Q. Do you remember discussing with Mr Cameron the issue of 8 BBC licence fees? 9 A. No, not at all. 10 Q. Did you discuss with him the role of Ofcom? 11 A. No. 12 Q. Did you discuss Mr Coulson in the context of his 13 becoming Director of Communications for the Conservative 14 Party and then the Coalition government? 15 A. No. I was just as surprised as anybody else. 16 Q. Were you not interested to know what Mr Cameron's 17 position was on the various matters I've just put to 18 you? 19 A. No. Well -- no. You mentioned Ofcom? 20 Q. BBC licence fees and broadcast regulations -- 21 A. No, I wasn't involved in the BBC licence fee. I'd been 22 through that with previous prime ministers and it didn't 23 matter what they said, they all hated the BBC and they 24 all gave it whatever they wanted. 25 Q. Well, did you just assume with Mr Cameron -- 4 1 A. I did think that the idea of slicing it and giving it to 2 commercial competitors -- I'd never heard of that before 3 and sounds strangely crazy. 4 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Mr Murdoch -- 5 A. I don't believe they had that policy, did they? 6 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: -- I'd like to ask you to separate 7 out in your mind the question whether you might be 8 discussing some topic or issue for commercial 9 advantage -- you've told Mr Jay that you never did -- 10 from the separate question: whether in fact these were 11 topics that were worthy of discussion and on which you 12 had a view. So, for example, you've mentioned that you 13 talked about Afghanistan, and it would be perfectly 14 reasonable for you to have a view on that. Lots of 15 people will. And your view may be informed by your 16 worldwide contacts through the businesses that you 17 operate. That's merely your view. But, therefore, your 18 view on, for example, the regulation of television would 19 itself be of value and may be of interest to those who 20 are formulating policy, not because it necessarily would 21 affect News Corp, but because this is a business to 22 which you have devoted your life, therefore it's not 23 surprising you will have strong views and I'm just 24 slightly surprised -- 25 A. I understand. 5 1 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: -- if nobody did ask your view. 2 A. I understand, sir. I just wish to say that I'd long 3 since become disillusioned and it was a waste of time to 4 talk to politicians about the BBC, and that was about 5 all there was to it. And Ofcom, no, I did not speak to 6 him about that. It would have been asking for 7 something, probably, and I didn't do that. 8 MR JAY: May you -- 9 A. I'll just repeat that -- if I may? 10 Q. Of course. 11 A. If I'd been interested in commercial interests, I would 12 have supported the Tory Party in every election, because 13 they were always more pro business -- 14 Q. And less in favour of regulation -- 15 A. -- but maybe against my better interests, but I don't 16 think so. I think it was the interests, as Justice 17 Leveson pointed out, that it was also in my interests to 18 reflect the views or to talk to our readers, and maybe 19 attract more readers. And Afghanistan I felt very 20 strongly about. First, I thought it was right -- this 21 was, I think, beyond us going in there. I felt very 22 strongly, particularly when I came here and saw the 23 photographs of the great young British soldiers who'd 24 either been wounded or killed there, I felt very 25 strongly when the charge was made that they weren't 6 1 being properly protected, and I was dissatisfied with 2 Mr Cameron's answer that they were better protected than 3 any other Europeans. Our argument was that they should 4 be as well protected as the Americans. 5 And although we kept the relationship always with 6 Mr Cameron -- I'm sorry, Mr Brown, you'll note in the 7 letters between he and I, we always finished with best 8 wishes to our families. 9 Q. Yes. In terms then of how your bid for the remaining 10 shares in BSkyB would be treated, you would work from 11 the not unreasonable default position that the 12 Conservative government would be more favourable to the 13 bid than a Labour government, is that fair? 14 A. No, I didn't think it was the business of government. 15 It happens every day when controlling shareholders 16 decide to take in the outstanding shares. 17 Q. I understand -- 18 A. I didn't think there was any legal thing at all. The 19 only thing that was worrying me, I was sitting in 20 America. What was worrying me was that the independent 21 directors were driving up the price to something 22 unrealistic, many, many billions of dollars. I think 23 close to 13 billion. They didn't even settle for that. 24 There was nothing ever settled. That's a lot of money 25 to bring into this country. It's also a lot of money to 7 1 find. 2 Q. You said, Mr Murdoch, that you didn't believe it was the 3 legitimate interest of government, but surely your 4 experience over the years would tell you that 5 governments for political reasons would be interested in 6 bids of this sort, particularly if you're involved in 7 them, and how those bids should be treated. Would you 8 agree with that? 9 A. No. Because it didn't change anything. Ofcom had ruled 10 that we were in charge, that we controlled the company. 11 We weren't saying we were getting rid of control. We 12 were just going to continue with it. We did hope to 13 make it stronger, make it a greater force in Europe, put 14 it together with Sky Deutschland and Sky Italia, where 15 we were having plenty of political difficulties, but 16 that's another story. 17 Q. Yes. But the whole experience of what happened on 18 27 January 1981 -- this is a heated debate in Parliament 19 over your acquisition of the Times and the 20 Sunday Times -- what happened with Today in 1987, what 21 happened with the BSkyB merger in 1990, there was always 22 a political frisson around your bids, mergers and 23 acquisitions -- 24 A. I think -- I welcome that question. 25 Q. -- and therefore in relation to BSkyB it was wholly 8 1 predictable, wasn't it, there would be? 2 A. I welcome that question, Mr Jay, because I want to put 3 it to bed once and for all, that that is a complete 4 myth. 5 Q. Sorry, what's the myth, Mr Murdoch? 6 A. That I used the influence of the Sun or the supposed 7 political power to get favourable treatment. 8 Q. The reason why we have what I've called the political 9 frisson at the very lowest is there's the perception 10 about that you do use your influence impermissibly. 11 Even if you wholly repudiate the factual basis for that, 12 that is what we see constantly, 1981, 1987, 1990, and 13 again in 2010. Don't you agree that that's a recurring 14 theme? 15 A. What, in the Guardian? And maybe the Independent? But 16 not everywhere. And, you know, after a while if these 17 lies are repeated again and again, they sort of catch 18 on, and particularly if we're successful, it sort of -- 19 you know, there are people who are a little resentful 20 and grab onto them. But they just aren't true. 21 Q. Okay. We don't have in this list we've been looking at 22 Mr Cameron flying out to Santorini and your yacht on 23 26 August 2008, which you tell us in your witness 24 statement your wife remembers but not you. You have no 25 recollection of that at all, do you? 9 1 A. No. It's coming back to me vaguely. Actually, 2 I checked it with my daughter, because he was being 3 flown, I believe, by my son-in-law's plane, on his way 4 to holiday in Turkey, and he did stop in Santorini and 5 she says that I in fact met him on her boat. But it 6 doesn't matter. There were a couple of boats together. 7 Q. Here's Mr Cameron taking quite significant steps to meet 8 you, a detour from his private holiday to Turkey. 9 What's your reaction to that sort of scenario? Do you 10 think that that's wholly normal? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. What's your view on it? And why do you say that? 13 A. Well, I think I've explained that politicians go out of 14 their way to impress people in the press, and I don't 15 remember discussing any heavy political things with him 16 at all. There may have been some issues discussed 17 passingly. It was not a long meeting. As I say, 18 I don't really remember the meeting. I think that's 19 part of the democratic process. They -- all politicians 20 of all sides like to have their views known by the 21 editors of newspapers or publishers, hoping that they 22 will be put across, hoping that they will be -- that 23 they will succeed in impressing people. That's the 24 game. 25 Q. Yes, but doesn't the game go somewhat further than that, 10 1 that it's not just providing the politician with a large 2 megaphone, it is also powerful institutions like the Sun 3 endorsing the politician and therefore, so the argument 4 might run, the votes of British people might be 5 affected? Do you see that? 6 A. Of course. I think they certainly would like us to 7 carry their views in a favourable way. I think that's 8 totally normal. And that goes for both parties or all 9 parties. And, you know, we're very lucky in this 10 country that we have ten vibrant national newspapers to 11 keep the national debate going. I mean, I don't -- 12 Mr Cameron might, of course, think stopping in Santorini 13 would impress me. I don't know. But I certainly 14 didn't -- 15 Q. But perhaps he, like you, Mr Murdoch -- 16 A. I didn't -- I don't have any fealty to the Tory Party or 17 to the Labour Party. Unlike Mr Barclay I don't get 18 invited to dinner at 10 Downing Street. 19 Q. It's the importance of the face-to-face meeting, isn't 20 it, Mr Murdoch, importance which you appreciated when 21 you invited yourself to Chequers on 4 January 1981? He 22 was seeking that access to you, wasn't he? 23 A. Let me be quite honest, Mr Jay. I enjoy meeting -- 24 let's call them our leaders. Some impress me more than 25 others. And I meet them around the world. And I could 11 1 tell you one or two who particularly impressed me. 2 Q. I mean, you mentioned the -- 3 A. If one looks at their personalities, their knowledge, 4 their policies, their principles, or one hopes their 5 principles. 6 Q. Can I bring you back to the issue of the democratic 7 process? Do you feel that there's any validity at least 8 in the perception that there is an implied trade-off 9 here? People think, and have been thinking over 30 10 years, that the support you give to politicians, through 11 the endorsements in the Sun in particular, is met with 12 a quid pro quo after they attain power -- 13 A. No, I -- 14 Q. Just wait for the end of this, Mr Murdoch. 15 A. Sorry, I beg your pardon. 16 Q. If that is right, then the democratic process is 17 distorted. I'm not really interested, because we 18 understand your evidence, that there's no empirical 19 basis to this, you say, but do you see at least the 20 perception of that? 21 A. Oh, the perception certainly irritates me, because 22 I think it's a myth. And everything I do every day, 23 I think, proves it to be such. Have a look at -- well, 24 it's not relevant, but how I treat Mayor Bloomberg in 25 New York. Sends him crazy. But we support him every 12 1 time he runs for re-election. 2 Q. Shortly after the Coalition government was set up, you 3 went for tea at Number 10 on 18 May 2010. 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. On that occasion and possibly other occasions you go in 6 through the back door; is that right? 7 A. That -- yes. There are reasons for that. They always 8 seem to -- don't want me to be photographed going out 9 the front door or I don't want to be, but it also 10 happens to be a shortcut to my apartment, so it's quite 11 okay. 12 Q. All right. Why do you think -- 13 A. And the car park is usually parked behind there, there's 14 a car park behind 10 and 11 Downing Street. 15 Q. You deal with this fairly short encounter over tea at 16 paragraph 110 of your witness statement, don't you, 17 Mr Murdoch? 18 A. Do you want it here? I can't tell you everything from 19 memory. 20 Q. Page 03015. 21 A. Oh. 22 Q. Paragraph 110. 23 A. Yes? 24 Q. You say most of the way through that paragraph -- 25 A. Which one? 13 1 Q. 110. 2 A. I'm sorry? Yes. It's about Mrs Thatcher? 3 Q. Yes, that's at the top, but if you go halfway down, the 4 sentence beginning: 5 "I do recall that ..." 6 Do you see that, Mr Murdoch? 7 "... shortly after his election, Mr Cameron invited 8 me in for tea at Number 10 ... he thanked me for the 9 support of our papers [I'm sure he did that]. 10 I congratulated him and told him that I was sure our 11 titles would watch carefully and report whether he kept 12 all of his campaign promises." 13 Is that the extent of it, Mr Murdoch? 14 A. Yes. If I could add that Mr Coulson was present. 15 Q. At that stage, of course, the BSkyB bid was about to be 16 announced. It was announced in June 2010. May I ask 17 you this: was there no link in your mind between your 18 support for Mr Cameron and the BSkyB bid? 19 A. None at all. 20 Q. Were you not fearful that if your guess was wrong and 21 that Mr Brown had won that election, that the BSkyB bid 22 would hit choppier waters? 23 A. No, I never gave it any thought. It was a legal bid. 24 It was a commonplace sort of bid. And I didn't see any 25 problem. 14 1 Q. Were not your advisers in the United Kingdom briefing 2 you constantly as to what was happening here 3 politically, what was likely to happen in the election, 4 all in the context of how the bid would be confronted in 5 June 2010? 6 A. No. The two things were not linked at all. 7 Q. I think the first thing is correct then, Mr Murdoch. 8 You do have advisers here in the United Kingdom briefing 9 you on the current political situation, don't you? 10 A. Well, editors and people I speak to and gossip with. 11 There's no sort of formal advice, but yes. 12 Q. The way it works, a corporation with worldwide 13 interests, the chairman can't possibly have his 14 metaphorical fingers in every pie. You have advisers 15 scattered around the world who are capable of feeding 16 you relevant information about the political situation, 17 the economic situation, everything which might be 18 relevant to your company. That's right, isn't it? 19 A. You talk about them as advisers. I would call them 20 senior executives, but yes. 21 Q. Why was the bid announced one month after the election? 22 A. I don't know. I'd have to go and look at my records. 23 I know that Mr -- at their sort of away weekend of 24 directors, which takes place I think some time around 25 June, Mr Carey had raised the question with the outside 15 1 directors that we would like to find a way to move 2 forward on this, but there wasn't -- I don't think there 3 was ever a formal bid as such. 4 Q. No. What interests me, Mr Murdoch, it's a multi-billion 5 pound acquisition. It needs very careful planning. You 6 need to get all your finances in place. It probably 7 takes years to conceive, in one sense, and then serious 8 consideration is given internally to this bid in 2009. 9 Surely in strategic terms you're also being advised as 10 to when best to announce the bid. Isn't that right? 11 A. I don't think we gave any thought to the timing of it, 12 except that it would be good to talk to all the 13 directors when they were together. 14 Q. So it follows, then, it's pure coincidence it's a month 15 after the General Election; is that right? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. Can I deal with one more topic and then we might break, 18 let's see how we get on, and that's Mr Alex Salmond. 19 Can we just deal with some history. I can do this very 20 shortly. The Scottish Sun was pro-SNP in 1992 but it 21 was anti-SNP in 2007. The headline was: 22 "Vote SNP today and you put Scotland's head in the 23 noose." 24 Do you remember that? 25 A. No. I do know that in 2007 that they did support the 16 1 Labour Party. 2 Q. You did support the Labour Party? 3 A. Am I right about that? 4 Q. Yes, you are. 5 A. And then in 2010, the next election -- was it? 6 Q. Yes. 7 A. When we supported Mr Salmond and his party. 8 Q. After the 2007 election, your relationship with 9 Mr Salmond, one might suggest, improved. If you look at 10 your exhibit KRM28, which is going to be tab 27 -- 11 A. Yes? 12 Q. -- can you see, Mr Murdoch, that between 17 November 13 2000 and 12 October 2007 there was no contact between 14 you and Mr Salmond? 15 A. 17 November 2000? 16 Q. And 12 -- 17 A. There was a telephone call, possibly. 18 Q. Yes. 19 A. And the same as for 12 October 2007, so they were seven 20 years ago apart for two perhaps telephone calls. 21 Q. Yes. I think the point was more: there was absolutely 22 no contact between you and Mr Salmond, but from 23 certainly 30 October 2007, there is -- I won't say 24 frequent contact, but there's far more contact, isn't 25 there, and we can see this is page 01904 -- 17 1 A. Well, you can see here that on 30 October, we opened 2 a large and very modern printing plant in Scotland, and 3 Mr Salmond, along with many other notables, were invited 4 to be present. 5 Q. Then there's a breakfast meeting on 4 April 2008, which 6 must have been either one to one or certainly more 7 intimate where you discussed your family's Scottish 8 roots. Do you see that? 9 A. I forget that, but it's possible. It doesn't say where 10 that was held. 11 Q. No. 12 A. He might have been visiting New York or something. 13 Q. Well, the location isn't given -- 14 A. Breakfast meetings tend to take place much more in 15 New York than here. 16 Q. Then there are a series of telephone calls. On 20 June 17 2011, you discuss Mr Salmond's interest in Scottish 18 independence, do you see that? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. Then there's another meeting, December 2011, this time 21 you discuss News Corp's investments in Scotland, do you 22 see that? 23 A. I don't know who wrote this, but -- 24 Q. Well, it's reconstructed. 25 A. -- it wasn't to ask for anything. It might have been to 18 1 apologise because we reduced Sky's employment numbers 2 quite dramatically in Scotland. We decided to break up 3 our call centre from many, many thousands of people into 4 three different ones around the United Kingdom. Just 5 for security reasons. 6 Q. Having, in your eyes, perhaps -- 7 A. But we are, you know, we still remain a very large 8 employer in Scotland through that and through the 9 Scottish Sun. 10 Q. Yes. 11 A. And, of course, the lesser activities like distribution 12 of films and books and so on. 13 Q. How would you describe your relationship with 14 Mr Salmond? Is it warm or is it something different? 15 A. Today? 16 Q. Yes. 17 A. I would describe it as warm. 18 Q. And over this period, is the general impression we might 19 derive that your relationship is continuing to improve 20 throughout? That's the period 2007 to the present day. 21 A. Yes. I mean, I don't know Mr Salmond well, but we've 22 had three meetings here and he's an amusing guy and 23 I enjoy his company, I enjoy talking with him, or 24 listening to him. 25 Q. Can I invite you, please, to look at some correspondence 19 1 that Mr Salmond's office has released? It's in my 2 tab 93 of the second file. The first page says: 3 "Alex Salmond releases Rupert Murdoch papers." 4 Unfortunately, this isn't paginated. But on 5 24 October 2007, which is a number of pages through 6 this, Mr Murdoch, Mr Salmond writes to you in New York. 7 See if you can find that, please. 8 A. This is BBC News. 9 Q. Yes. BBC News are announcing that Mr Salmond's office 10 has released the papers which we're about to look at. 11 I wonder if you might be given some assistance on this 12 to find this letter of 24 October 2007. It's about six 13 pages into this bundle. 14 A. Yes. Is this the -- 15 Q. This is Mr Salmond -- 16 A. October 2007? 17 Q. That's right. 18 A. 24th, I think it says. 19 Q. Yes. He met you in New York in early 2007, we can see 20 that, can't we? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. And he found your views both insightful and stimulating, 23 there was a reference to a book by Mr Webb which you 24 gave him to read, and then he's telling you about 25 GlobalScot. 20 1 Then on 31 October 2007, which is the next page -- 2 A. This was a book by -- well he's now temporarily 3 Senator Webb, who wrote some years ago talking about the 4 Irish Scots and their persecution, it was very 5 fascinating, and how they had gone -- but they were 6 great fighters, but how they went and settled in 7 Virginia and Tennessee and so on, but who -- if you go 8 through the names of casualties in American wars, you 9 see a disproportionate number of them there. 10 Q. Okay. He writes to you again on 31 October, which is 11 the next page, inviting you to go to see a play called 12 "Black Watch" in New York, but warning you that it's 13 quite challenging: 14 "A rough, tough production." 15 Did you go and see that play? 16 A. I'm afraid not. 17 Q. There are other letters which pass between you. I'm not 18 going to look at all of them, I'm just going to pass 19 over them. Mr Salmond to you in February 2009. Then 20 in -- 21 A. Sorry, excuse me, I'm not with you. 22 Q. It doesn't really matter, Mr Murdoch. I'm just passing 23 over it. 24 A. Okay. 25 Q. Then the Scottish Sun supports the SNP in the Scottish 21 1 election of 2011, I think it is, although the Scottish 2 Sun is neutral on the issue of independence. You follow 3 me? 4 A. I don't see that in this letter. 5 Q. No, you don't, because I'm moving on. 6 A. Oh. 7 Q. It's a matter of public record that the Scottish Sun 8 supported the SNP in the Scottish election, although it 9 was neutral on independence. Was that a decision you 10 contributed to? 11 A. I don't remember, but probably, yes. 12 Q. And why did you support Mr Salmond's party? Can you 13 recall? 14 A. Well, it's a little emotional, but I am attracted by the 15 idea, but I'm not convinced, and so I said we should 16 stay neutral on the big issue, but let's see how he 17 performs. 18 Q. Of course your emotions have taken you to a different 19 place previously. As we've seen, in 2007 you didn't 20 support the SNP. Indeed, there was the head in the 21 noose headline, wasn't there, which I mentioned about 22 ten minutes ago? 23 A. I didn't write that. 24 Q. You wouldn't have been responsible for the detail of the 25 headline, but would you have been responsible for the 22 1 general tenor of the political endorsement in 2007? 2 A. I think we decided to support Labour, yes, throughout. 3 Q. The emotional attraction to the SNP was not manifested 4 by you in any way in your choice of endorsement in 2007, 5 was it? 6 A. I don't know much about the SNP. I just have met 7 Mr Salmond a few times, and find him an attractive 8 person, and as I say, I said to you, it's a nice idea. 9 Q. There's only one further point arising out of this, and 10 I don't think it's necessary to turn up the letter, 11 Mr Murdoch. But Mr Dinsmore, the general manager of 12 News International Newspapers Scotland, wrote to 13 Mr Salmond on 9 May 2011 congratulating him on last 14 Friday's "quite astonishing victory", and points out 15 that the result was "born out of a desire for change and 16 the reinvigoration of Scotland". He says: 17 "I look forward to News International playing its 18 part in helping to make the country a place where 19 outward looking, forward thinking and risk taking are 20 the norm." 21 A. What letter is that? 22 Q. 9 May 2011. 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. It might be said -- 25 A. Short letter. 23 1 Q. -- that you had an ally in Mr Salmond now and you were 2 pointing out what News International -- rather, 3 Mr Dinsmore was pointing out what News International 4 hoped to achieve in Scotland in the future; would you 5 agree with that? 6 A. Well, Mr Dinsmore may have gone a little too far in his 7 enthusiasm. I can only tell you, as a matter of 8 interest, that if we didn't continue to support 9 Mr Salmond at this stage, I really would have an 10 insurrection up there. 11 MR JAY: Mr Murdoch, I am certainly beginning to flag, 12 whether you are or not I don't think matters. I think 13 it's probably right, as I'm going to move on to a -- 14 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: Mr Murdoch, this is my decision. 15 I think we've probably had enough today. I'm sorry to 16 have to inconvenience you tomorrow as well -- 17 A. It's quite all right. 18 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: -- but I think it's more important 19 that we take this in a measured way, without getting too 20 tired. So thank you very much indeed. 10 o'clock 21 tomorrow morning. 22 A. Thank you, sir, for your consideration. 23 (2.48 pm) 24 (The hearing adjourned until 10 o'clock the following day) 25 24