(2.00 pm)

                 MR NICK DAVIES (recalled)
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  Mr Davies, you're still subject to
    the oath or affirmation that you gave at the end of last
    year.
A.  Understood.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  The subsequent period revealing quite
    a fair amount of further material.
                           19
A.  Yes.  Just yesterday alone was pretty extraordinary.
               Questions by MS PATRY HOSKINS
MS PATRY HOSKINS:  Before we start with Mr Davies,
    I understand that there are a number of statements to be
    read.  If I could just make clear which statements they
    are.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  Yes.
MS PATRY HOSKINS:  Mr Brian Adams, Mr Magnus Boyd and
    Ms Jane Winter's statements will be taken as read.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  Thank you very much.  I repeat what
    I've said before.  The fact that these individuals are
    not being called does not minimise the importance of
    their evidence, for all of which I am grateful, but it's
    the inevitable consequence of the timeframe within which
    this Inquiry must be conducted.  Each of these
    statements will, of course, be considered and taken into
    account.
        Right.
MS PATRY HOSKINS:  Mr Davies, I'm going to ask you about two
    distinct topics this afternoon.  First of all, I'm going
    to ask you about your involvement and interaction with
    the police over the years that you've been a journalist,
    official contact and unofficial contact, and then very
    briefly I'm going to touch on some of the sections of
    your book, Flat Earth News, where you deal with police
                           20
    corruption.  The reason I say "very briefly" is,
    of course, because you gave evidence about this on the
    last occasion that you attended and I don't want to go
    over anything that you've previously said.
A.  Okay.
Q.  Let me start with your interaction with the police over
    the years.  Before I ask you any specific questions
    about that, I do want to ask you just a very few
    questions about the context in which you've had contact
    with the police.  You've told us in your statement, in
    your second statement and your first statement, that
    you've been a journalist now for some 35 years; is that
    correct?
A.  Mm-hm.
Q.  You tell us in your first statement it's essentially
    since 1978 you've worked as a Fleet Street reporter.
    You've specialised in crime and home affairs and more
    recently in long-term investigations of issues, such as
    social issues including poverty in the UK, failing
    schools, the criminal justice system, falsehood and
    distortion in the news mediA.
A.  Mm-hm.
Q.  And of course, you've become very well-known for your
    investigations into phone hacking and so on.
        Having set that in context now, I do want to ask you
                           21
    first of all about authorised and official contact that
    you have had over the years with the police.
A.  Okay.
Q.  Turn to the second page of your second statement.
A.  All right.
Q.  I will always be referring to your second statement,
    unless I say otherwise.
A.  Understood.
Q.  You explain that although you're not a specialist crime
    reporter, in the course of the 35 years we've just been
    describing you've often dealt with the police in the UK
    and occasionally abroad.  You start off by saying:
        "Normally, if I need a piece of information what
    I would do is I would approach a UK force simply by
    calling their press office to put a particular question
    or to ask for them to arrange a meeting with
    a particular officer."
        Is that generally the first port of call when you
    have a question about a particular subject?
A.  Yeah, that's the equivalent of just simply going to the
    front door of the house, because that's the easiest way
    in.  So you call the police, you speak to the press
    office, or the alternative I mentioned in the statement
    is that it sometimes arises as a side issue from a big
    trial at a Crown Court, that as the trial progresses you
                           22
    go and make contact with the senior investigating
    officer, and almost invariably the SIO would run that
    approach through the press office, and so you get this
    kind of officially sanctioned contact.
Q.  All right.  You point out that it's not just you
    contacting the police in this official way.
A.  Mm-hm.
Q.  Occasionally, you say, you've been approached by police
    who knew that you had covered a particular story in some
    depth and wanted some help from you on a particular
    subject.
A.  Yes, in fact, police contacting me could be one of two
    forms.  Occasionally an officer would get in touch out
    of the blue and say, "Here is something you need to
    know", and also it has happened as I described there,
    that police get in touch and say, "You've been covering
    this.  Can you help us?" So I have the meeting and then
    see how it goes.
Q.  All right.  This is page 2 -- sorry, the paragraphs
    aren't numbered but I'm sure we can find our way
    through.  At page 2, under the small (b), you explain
    that there are boundaries in relation to this official
    contact.  You explain that you would not expect to be
    given any material which violated privacy, unless that
    was clearly justified in the public interest, or
                           23
    material which would impede an inquiry or jeopardise the
    safety of an individual.  Are those the boundaries that
    you would see as being the appropriate boundaries in
    respect of official contact between the press and the
    police?
A.  I would see those boundaries as being necessary and
    appropriate for both official and unofficial contact
    between me and serving police officers.
Q.  We'll come back to "unofficial".  Sticking with official
    contact for the moment, you explain at the bottom of
    that page that there might be a question initially of
    whether or not an officer speaks on or off the record,
    and you conclude that you don't see anything sinister
    about having an off-the-record conversation with
    a police officer in this way, and in fact more often
    than not, if you're conducting an interview, for
    example, an office may well say that they would rather
    speak to you off the record.  Have I fairly
    summarised --
A.  Yes.  I would say -- well, in general terms, 90 per cent
    of the work I do is off the record, with whatever
    sources I'm dealing with, and certainly that includes
    officially authorised briefings with police officers.
    They feel more comfortable talking off the record in
    various different ways.
                           24
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  What's the impact of that, by saying
    "off the record"?  What do you mean by "off the record"?
A.  It's a good question, because there's confusion about
    it.  American journalists and a few British use that
    expression to describe material which is being provided
    on the condition that it isn't used at all, but I use it
    in the way that most British reporters use it, which is
    to say that the information is off the record if it's
    been given to me for use but not to be attributed to the
    source.  Is that the current use that you've had in the
    Inquiry?
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  So in other words "a police source
    says" could be an off-the-record briefing?
A.  Correct.  If what they're saying is really sensitive,
    they would make it clear that even that much of an
    attribution would be a problem, and so I would take it
    away as raw material and develop it, and if asked, would
    deny having had the conversation with the officer.  And
    that's very common, even with the officially sanctioned
    contact.
        If all you're doing is to ring a press office and
    ask a very specific question, probably they'll give you
    something on the record.  Quite often -- if you could
    quantify it, maybe 30 per cent of the time -- they'll
    say, "Here's the on-the-record answer.  Just for your
                           25
    ears privately, here's another little bit we can give
    you, unattributably."
        Where you actually have what we call a briefing,
    you're sitting down with an officer, there's probably
    a press officer in the room, then before you start
    talking you sort out your terms of engagement and very
    often -- sorry, the table is squeaking -- very often,
    that will involve an agreement by all parties that this
    is off the record, ie not attributable.
MS PATRY HOSKINS:  Why do you discuss this topic of
    off-the-record briefings under the heading "official
    contact"?
A.  Because it's officially sanctioned.  By which -- in
    practical terms, the police service -- you mean that the
    press office has agreed that it should happen.  It just
    makes everybody more comfortable.  As I said in the
    statement, it really isn't sinister.  I think the
    immediate fear that police officers have when they sit
    down with a journalist is that they're going to get
    misquoted, and if you can say, "This is unattributable,
    ie you are not going to get quoted at all", then that
    fear is removed.  That I would say is the primary reason
    why it happens.  It really isn't sinister.  It's
    mainstream, normal, unsurprising, over and over again.
Q.  Can I turn to the top of Page 3, please.  You explain
                           26
    that all of this, everything we've just been discussing,
    would broadly apply across all police forces, but then
    you describe that there is an important difference
    between a big city force, which might have a press
    office that works around the clock, and a smaller more
    provincial force which has a more limited service.  Can
    you just explain that difference?
A.  That was something I came across talking to provincial
    reporters when I was researching that book, that some of
    them complained that the press office of the local
    police force was so understaffed that the routine was
    that they would call the press office and get a recorded
    message saying, "Here's the story we've selected for you
    today", and they would just be expected to copy that
    down and put it into the paper.  They couldn't even
    pursue it.
        Close to that also is press officers posting stories
    on websites, their own websites, for journalists to put
    into the paper, and there's a big reporting problem with
    that, because you're allowing the police force to make
    all of the editorial decisions about what should be
    reported and with what angle and language and quotes,
    and I think that's not done for -- maybe I'm being
    too -- I was going to say it's not being done for
    malicious motives.  It's about shortage of resources
                           27
    cuts, not enough press officers, whereas a big city
    force like the Met, I don't come across that.  You can
    get a human being on the end of the phone.
Q.  You've told us a bit about the forms of office contact,
    the contact through the press office, the contact where
    a police officer will come and speak to you off the
    record but nevertheless that's sanctioned and then you
    go on to tell us the problems that you see with the
    current system.  This is page 3, so that you can remind
    yourself.
A.  Okay.
Q.  You explain that this kind of authorised conduct can
    also be problematic and you set out some reasons why
    that might be.  Is there anything that you particularly
    want to add to --
A.  Firstly, just to note the fact that it can also be very
    good.  So there's a whole chunk of stuff there where I'm
    saying: clearly this works in everybody's interests.
    The journalists get good stories, the public get
    information, the police get credit for their work, they
    can send signals of various kinds.  There's lots of good
    stuff goes on with these official and -- including the
    off-the-record contacts.
        The problem really isn't peculiar to police forces.
    There is a general problem in the relationship between
                           28
    reporters and press officers, which is that a good
    press officer works in the interests of the organisation
    or individual who's paying that press officer.  That's
    what they're there for.  It isn't controversial or
    wrong.  That's what they're there for.
        But the reporters' interest is different, and
    therefore there will frequently be a conflict between
    the two as to what they need, and so it can be -- the
    officially sanctioned route can be deeply unsatisfactory
    as a way of covering that organisation because the
    official channel is designed to protect the reputation
    of that organisation.
        So in small ways, this is to do with -- if the
    organisation has a choice of stories.  Which stories
    will we put out today?  They are highly likely to choose
    the stories that make them look good and not draw
    attention to the story that makes them look bad.  It's
    as simple and natural and uncontroversial as that.  But
    if we're trying to cover the organisation and tell
    people what's going on inside it, it cannot be enough to
    rely on them to choose what we cover.
        It can get a bit more subtle than that.  If there's
    information which they have to put out because they
    think it's going to be found out or because there would
    be a terrible row if they concealed it, there are all
                           29
    sorts of games that can be played.  You remember that
    famous thing about: "This is a good day to bury bad
    news."  You choose a day when there's masses of news
    going on, put out your press release -- it isn't going
    to get attention.  Or you put it out, as they did on a
    famous occasion, during the hacking scandal. The
    Metropolitan Police had a piece of information which
    they put out at 7.30 on a Friday night.  Any press
    officer, any journalist knows you're not going to get
    any coverage, and lo and behold they didn't.
        So there are ways of manipulating the whole system,
    and occasionally it is a fact that press officers
    generally, confronted with a reporter who has an
    embarrassing story, left with no wriggle room, they'll
    lie.  It doesn't happen terribly often, because it's not
    in the press officer's long-term interest to lie because
    it damages their credibility and therefore damages their
    chance of influencing the reporter the next time they
    speak, but certainly, occasionally and in principle,
    press officers will, if they have to, lie.
Q.  That leads me neatly onto a question that I've been
    asked to put to you.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  I'm not sure that I quite see the
    link between the words "in principle" and "lie".  I find
    those quite difficult, actually, to put together.
                           30
A.  Because it's not a principle?  Okay --
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  I understand what you mean, but it's
    the concept.
A.  Badly expressed.  Okay, as a matter of general
    experience, dealing with press officers from all sorts
    of organisations, if you put them in a corner and no
    option is left, then occasionally they will lie.  They
    hate it if you say that, but of course it happens.
        The mainstream problem is about them making the
    editorial judgments for you and occasionally
    manipulating the release of information so that it
    doesn't get coverage.
MS PATRY HOSKINS:  I was simply saying that that leads me
    neatly to a question I've been asked to put to you about
    these incidents of lying or misleading by press
    officers.  You say in your statement that it's unusual
    for a press officer to engage in knowing falsehood, and
    you tell us why:
        "However, under pressure, some press officers will
    certainly lie to reporters in order to protect their
    organisation."
        Was that comment intended to be limited to
    a particular police force or to the police in general?
A.  No, there I'm talking in principle.  I'm talking in
    general terms about the way that press officers work
                           31
    with journalists.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  You're not talking about police
    people necessarily; it's anything?
A.  Exactly.  It could be a private corporation, a trade
    union, a police service, whatever.
MS PATRY HOSKINS:  Have you ever reported these incidents of
    lying or misleading to anyone, either at the MPS or
    other organisations, if it was another organisation
    involved?
A.  No.  I mean, on the whole, you wouldn't bother.  What's
    the point?
        I can remember one occasion when I felt a senior
    officer from a particular force was giving the press
    office misleading information, so I asked the press
    office if I could submit one final question to this
    officer, and they said yes, so I said, "Could you ask
    him how stupid he thinks we are?"  So it's not an
    official complaint, but it's: "Don't for a second
    believe that we're fooled by what you're telling us."
Q.  Before we leave official and authorised contact, can I
    ask you please to turn to the top of page 4, where you
    refer to a worrying development.  You say this at (g):
        "The underlying difficulty is that it has become
    accepted policy -- in police forces and some other
    organisations -- for the press office to be a monopoly
                           32
    supplier of information.  This has been reinforced by
    internal regulation which has made it a disciplinary
    offence to speak to the press without permission.  In
    a particularly worrying development, the last six months
    has seen some attempt to make it a criminal offence for
    an officer to speak to a reporter without permission."
        Why to you see that as a "particularly worrying
    development"?
A.  First of all, I need to tell you what's been happening,
    I think.
        The way everybody's focus has been on the four
    enquiries which Deputy Assistant Commissioner Sue Akers
    is running -- and I think in total they've arrested
    37/38 people -- outside the ambit of those operations,
    nothing to do with the four Sue Akers is running, there
    have been a couple of arrests of police officers in
    cases where I know quite a lot about the circumstances,
    and what has happened there is that the officers have
    been arrested and bailed, they've been told they will be
    charged with the common law offence of misconduct in
    a public office, and to the best of my knowledge, being
    quite familiar with these cases, there is no allegation
    of any kind of bribe or inducement.  There is no
    allegation of the kind of harm that I'm talking about
    behind boundaries where you've interfered with an
                           33
    ongoing inquiry.  What those officers are being told is:
    "You will be charged and you can expect to get a prison
    term of up to 18 months because you've spoken to
    a reporter without permission."
        Now, those two things are live and we don't know how
    they'll turn out.  No charges have been brought.  It may
    well be that the Crown Prosecution Service will say,
    "Hang on a moment, this doesn't apply", but I think it's
    worrying that -- it's in the aftermath of the phone
    hacking thing -- that this has happened, that you have
    a sort of backlash where -- a completely unjustifiable
    and unnecessary reaction to the allegation of collusion
    between News International and the Met, which is one
    thing.  Police forces -- it's not just the Met.  I've
    heard of several police forces going way overboard in
    the other direction, and that is the most alarming
    example you can see of this backlash.
        What worries me is that the ultimate effect here may
    be, if we're unlucky, to prevent -- we're going to come
    onto this in a moment -- unauthorised contact between
    journalists and police.  If you lose that, you're
    really, really in dangerous territory.  We have to
    defend unauthorised contact.  Without unauthorised
    contact, the Metropolitan Police would have been allowed
    to carry on misleading press, public and Parliament
                           34
    about the phone hacking scandal.  It's an absolutely
    classic example of the danger of the official flow of
    information.
Q.  I promise we'll come back to that.
A.  All right.
Q.  The question I've been asked to put to you on this is
    that the current media policy on relations and standard
    operating procedure makes clear that any officer of
    inspector rank or above can speak to the media without
    prior authorisation and that officers below inspector
    rank can do so with the approval of a senior officer.
    That doesn't seem so sit comfortably with what you've
    just said about a culture of trying to discourage
    officers from speaking to the press.
A.  There are two points, I suppose.  Over the longer term,
    that may be the standard operating procedure.  I've
    never come across it in practice in the Metropolitan
    Police or any other force.
        When I was a trainee journalist in the provinces,
    certainly then it was the routine that you could call
    a police station and speak to any officer you wanted to.
    But over the period that I've been working, that has
    ceased be common practice.  So I've never heard of that
    standard operating procedure.  Perhaps it's written down
    somewhere.  In practice, I have routinely been told by
                           35
    ordinary officers: "I can't speak to you.  Go to the
    press bureau."  That's just common practice.
        So that's the first thing, and then the second thing
    is there are these worrying signs that more recently, in
    the aftermath of the hacking scandal, there has been
    a real tightening up.
Q.  Thank you.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  Mm.
MS PATRY HOSKINS:  Sir, I don't want to interrupt
    a question.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  No, I need to think a bit more before
    I ask a question.  Yes.
MS PATRY HOSKINS:  Before we move away completely from
    official contact, authorised contact, you've told us
    a bit about how it works, your criticisms of the current
    system, the worrying developments that you've
    identified.  How would you see an effective authorised
    system of contact working?
A.  It's really difficult because of that basic conflict.
    It would be very interesting for this Inquiry to get to
    the bottom of what went wrong with the official flow of
    information in this case.  I've done something like 90
    stories on the phone hacking, and I've had a lot of
    trouble getting information out of New Scotland Yard.
    This includes, for example -- I mean, really quite
                           36
    simple things like asking them the basic statistics in
    relation to the material that was seized from Goodman
    and Mulcaire in August 2006.  So I asked them way back:
    "Can you tell me how many names are in there, how many
    phone numbers, how many PIN codes, how many recorded
    voicemail messages and how many transcribed messages?"
    and I put that through the press bureau and they said
    no.  Bear in mind this is information that has since
    been disclosed by Sue Akers at Select Committees and
    I think here without the sky falling in, without any
    terrible, bad side effects.
        So the press bureau said, "No, you can't have it."
    This is important.  So I submitted a freedom of
    information application and you know they have to be
    answered within 20 working days?  20 working days went
    by; no answer.  I'm phoning, emailing.  More days go by.
    Eventually, after 40/45 days, they replied and they give
    me the number of PIN codes.  They said it's 91.  But the
    rest -- they said it's too expensive for us to collect
    this information.
        So number one, that was interesting because it said
    that they still -- this was, I think, January 2010.
    They still hadn't got to grips with all the material
    that they had seized in August 2006.
        So then I redrafted the application so that it was
                           37
    more general and therefore they didn't have to gather so
    much information to answer it, and eventually,
    eventually -- I think it took a total of 14 months.
    I might be wrong, but months and months and months.
    They came back with some statistics on it, and what's
    then worrying is that it looks to me as though the
    statistics they gave me were wrong.
        For example, I was asking them how many transcribed
    voicemail messages are there in that material that's
    been seized, and specifically, are there any other
    transcripts other than those in the email for Neville,
    which by then had been a public domain document?  They
    came back and said there were none.  When I queried
    that, they said there's one that possibly could be.
        Well, for example, as I understand it, Simon Hughes
    says in his statement that when Operation Weeting
    finally showed him his Mulcaire material, that included
    the transcripts of voicemail messages.  Why didn't they
    say that?  Why all these delays?  Why say no in the
    first place?  And then why all these delays?  And then
    why not tell me that there are transcripts of voicemail
    messages?  That's the official channel, reinforced by
    the Freedom of Information Act.
        I asked them similar questions about how many
    victims.  I said, "How many people did you inform back
                           38
    there in 2006?"
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  When were you making these enquiries?
A.  The exact date?
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  No, broadly when.
A.  After we'd done the Gordon Taylor story in July 2009,
    I'm pursuing it.  I think actually it was probably early
    2010 before I put in this question about how many people
    they had informed.
        So: "How many victims did you go and warn back there
    in 2006?"  And this is obviously important because in
    the official version of events, they're saying, "We
    warned all potential victims."  Not just in John Yates'
    original statement but repeatedly to Select Committees,
    they say, "If there was the minutest chance of somebody
    being a victim, we told them."  I say: how many?  And
    they say, "You can't have that."  The press bureau says,
    "You can't have it."  So I put in a freedom of
    information application.  It's the same routine.  They
    break the statutory deadline.  They then say no.  I then
    appeal.  You know, the appeal has to go to the
    Metropolitan Police in the first place.  They knock it
    back.  I have to go to the Information Commissioner's
    office.
        Again, it took something like 15 months and finally
    they said, "Okay, we informed 28 people back there in
                           39
    2006 and another eight after the Gordon Taylor story was
    published."  Why not release that information in the
    beginning?
        So if your question is "what's wrong with these
    official sources", it exemplifies it.  They are paid to
    protect the reputation of their organisation.  That's
    not a smear on them.  That's what a good press officer
    does, and therefore a good press officer is frequently
    out of step with the needs of the press and the public,
    and therefore you have to have official -- unofficial
    sources.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  I'll now come in with the question
    that I was formulating in my mind, because it actually
    just links into that which you've said.  You may have
    heard -- I don't know whether you were in here for the
    evidence of Mr Jefferies --
A.  No, I missed almost all of it, sorry.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  -- just this afternoon, where he was
    complaining, with justification, about leakage of
    information from whatever source -- and he believes it's
    the police, the police say it isn't; I say I'm balanced
    in that immediately -- and therefore he is one of those
    who support the proposition that it should be an offence
    for the police to disclose inappropriate information to
    members of the press, that naming uncharged suspects,
                           40
    the private members bill that was introduced, should
    indeed be criminal.
        Now, that's the fight-back to which you just
    referred, the reaction to which you referred a moment
    ago.
A.  The backlash.  Mm.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  But the question is: do you see the
    danger inherent in -- you're not suggesting
    a free-for-all but let me use that phrase -- in the
    rather more relaxed attitude to the release of
    information that's subsequent upon what you have
    proposed, and which may cause problems for individuals
    in the circumstances of Mr Jefferies?
A.  Okay.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  The reason it comes in to what you
    just said is because you made the point that it was also
    important in the needs of the public for this
    information to come out.
A.  Yes.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  He might say, "Well, hang on --"
A.  Okay.  So what we have to do is to identify the source
    of the problem and be precise about it.  So first of
    all, I would argue that it isn't that official sources
    are inherently good or that the unofficial, unauthorised
    sources are inherently bad.  They are equally good or
                           41
    bad, equally liable to operate in the public interest,
    equally vulnerable to be being abused.
        So that's the first thing.  Don't identify the
    unauthorised source as the cause of the problem.
    I could give you examples, even in the phone hacking
    saga, of a press officer calling me up in order to
    encourage me to run a smear story.  Talking off the
    record.
        Similarly, it would be a mistake to say off the
    record is the source of the problem.  Off the record
    isn't sinister.  Off the record helps people to tell the
    truth.
        So, having said that, look at official and
    unofficial, on the record, off the record, as all being
    morally equal, for want of a better way of putting it.
    No more likely the one than the other to cause damage.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  But that's not quite right.  I'm
    prepared to assume it.
A.  Just for the sake of my argument, because I think
    there's two points that can be made.  Basically, you
    have the police and the reporters.  There's one problem
    at the reporters' end, which is that we have useless
    media law and useless self-regulation at work, and
    therefore -- I mean, that's what you have spent the last
    module talking about.  Reporters have been free to
                           42
    fabricate vicious falsehoods against people like
    Mr Jefferies, probably assuming that he can't afford to
    sue them, and who cares about the Press Complaints
    Commission?  So part of the problem is there, insofar as
    it's the reporter who is the active ingredient causing
    damage, already module one is looking at ways of helping
    there.
        Then, insofar as it's the police officer who,
    whether for financial reasons, he's going to get paid,
    or just because he's an idiot or show-off or he wants to
    upset his senior officer -- if there's a malicious
    officer, then my argument is the more closed the system,
    the more likely it is he'll get away with it.  If you
    open the system up, then when he says something -- if an
    officer -- I don't know the case.  If an officer was
    responsible for leaking something inappropriate about
    Mr Jefferies, then it would help enormously if his
    brother officer could tell me, without fearing that he
    would be the victim of disciplinary or criminal
    offences.  The more open, the less likely you are to get
    abuse, is my argument.
        But what's wrong is to try and close down all
    off-the-record briefings or all unauthorised access.
    It's like saying, "Because I got food poisoning last
    night, I'm never going to eat again." It's too
                           43
    destructive.
        What do you think?  You're looking pensive.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  Sometimes that is so.
MS PATRY HOSKINS:  That leads us neatly on to unofficial or
    unauthorised contact with police officers, Mr Davies.
    This starts at section 6 of your statement on page 4
    onwards.  Can we start at the top of page 5, please.
    You're asked a number of questions and you say this.
    I'm going to read out three short paragraphs because
    a number of questions flow from them:
        "Working in stories that involve the police, I have
    often dealt with officers without the knowledge or
    authority of the press office.  I have worked in this
    way with officers from the lowest rank to the highest,
    in the Metropolitan Police and in other forces.  This is
    a common and well-established practice and one which
    I believe is essential if reporters are to work
    effectively.  I have always regarded this as legitimate,
    as long as it remains within the boundaries I have
    described."
        Now, A number of questions arise from those
    particular statements.  The first question is really
    about who has given you information in this way.  You go
    on to explain that you've been given unofficial
    assistance by officers of every rank, from constable to
                           44
    chief constable; is that correct?
A.  Correct, yeah.
Q.  The second question which arises from what you've said
    is how often this happens.  What do you mean give
    "often"?  Do you mean every time you work on a story
    where there might be police input or -- what do you mean
    by "often"?
A.  It's difficult because I'm not a specialist crime
    reporter.  I said elsewhere in the statement I might go
    through a period where I talk to the police every day
    for a month and then a period where I don't speak to
    them at all for a year.
        In principle -- I'm using that expression again --
    in general terms, if I'm working on a story and I feel
    that an officer could help me, I would try to get that
    officer to speak, whether through official channels or
    unofficial, and would have a reasonable expectation of
    success.
        I should say that when I'm talking about
    chief constables, it must be the case that they have the
    right to authorise themselves to speak to journalists.
    Where they're in a more interesting area is when they
    talk about Home Office policy, where they are certainly
    wanting to speak off the record and without official
    blessing, perhaps because they think that what the
                           45
    Home Office are doing is damaging.  I mean, that does
    happen and it's interesting when they speak in that way,
    so just to explain why chief constables could be
    included under the heading of "unofficial".
        It's a little bit difficult to talk about the scale
    on which that happens.  It's case by case.
Q.  You also say this is a common and well-established
    practice.  Can I take from that that it's not just you
    who obtains assistance in this way; it's something that
    you're aware that other journalists do?
A.  Yes.
Q.  Can you give us anything more on that?
A.  It's a little bit difficult but actually journalists
    do -- they work together more than you might think.  If
    there's four or five of us from different titles working
    on the same story and the story is difficult, we would
    often work together to some extent, and so you would be
    aware of other people getting briefings.  It's a kind of
    "cover your back" thing.  What happens is none of you
    wants to get shouted the by the news desk for failing to
    get the story, so it's better to put your heads together
    and work together.  It may also be on a really tricky
    thing that you can actually help each other out.
        So in general terms, through contacts with other
    reporters, I would say this is just not unusual, it
                           46
    isn't controversial, it isn't considered illegitimate or
    bad.
Q.  Two other words you used in the statements I read out
    are "essential" and "legitimate".  You've told us a bit
    about the failings of official contact.  Is that one of
    the reasons why you consider unofficial contact to be
    essential and legitimate?
A.  Yes.
Q.  Are there any other reasons why such unofficial contact
    is, in your view, essential to the work of a journalist
    like yourself?
A.  The big point is that you can't trust the official
    sources because of what we've said.  I don't want to say
    that official sources are always wrong, but there is an
    inherent limit to how much truth they'll give you.
        The only other thing is that there may be occasions
    when the officer has a perfectly good motive for
    disclosing information and everybody would agree it's in
    the public interest, but for some internal reason he's
    not going to be allowed to do it, and therefore -- so
    it's not a question of saying there is some great truth
    which needs to be disclosed in the public interest
    because it's being concealed.  We're not necessarily
    talking about improper police behaviour.
        You could just have, let's say, a chief inspector on
                           47
    a division in a big city.  He's down on the ground, his
    people have done a great job and he thinks (a) the
    public should know that they've done this great job so
    they can be reassured, (b) the people on his squad
    deserve the publicity of having done their job well, and
    the press office will organise their stories and they'll
    say, "We haven't got a gap for it.  We're putting this
    out tomorrow and then the chief constable's giving
    bravery medals and we can't put it out."  In that case,
    he might approach a local newspaper editor and say,
    "Here's a great story."  He hasn't got permission to do
    it but it isn't quite in the category of the public
    interest disclosures.  Do you see?  It's a complicated
    world in there.
        Then there's the bureaucratic thing -- I gave that
    example of a very senior officer from the Met who showed
    me minutes of what I think they used to call the policy
    group but they now call the senior management team, and
    I can remember him doing this and he was doing it
    because he wanted to show me that the Met were taking
    seriously a problem that was causing public disquiet,
    and he said, "Look, they've told me I can't do this",
    and as far as he was concerned they were being
    bureaucratic and silly, and he said, "Here they are, you
    read them and you can see that we're addressing this
                           48
    problem", and I thought: this is a good man and because
    of a little bit of an internal blockage, he's decided to
    take the initiative.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  It depends on the eyes through which
    you're looking at it.  You would certainly say he is
    a good man.  The guy who is running the organisation,
    who might have different reasons for not letting it out
    at just that moment, may not take the same view.
A.  Yes.  I accept what you say.  The funny thing is that
    all news is built out of these judgments and there's
    lots of judgment going on.  When you asked me that
    question before, I rambled on for a while and meant to
    say and forgot to say: the other thing that's been
    missing is clarity.
        So I have just been told there's a standing
    operating procedure at the Met.  I've never heard of it
    in 35 years, I don't know what it's about, and I think
    it's been the same from the point of view of police
    officers.  It hasn't been entirely clear.  So it would
    be helpful if we said, you said, somebody said --
    I mean, my favoured version would be that you should do
    something more like an American model, where, on the
    whole, police officers are allowed to say things,
    because these organisations are funded by the public,
    their legitimacy flows from the democratic process in
                           49
    the name of the public, they have these powers over the
    public, and only these prescribed areas can't be
    discussed --
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  But you wouldn't necessarily restrict
    that to the police, would you?
A.  No.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  This conversation I've just been
    contemplating you could have had with hospital managers.
A.  Yes.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  With all sorts of --
A.  Every government department, local authorities.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  Exactly.  So this is not
    a police-specific issue.
A.  I agree, and I think it's -- one of the things that
    makes the police worrying is that when they get upset
    with their employees for talking out of turn, talking
    without permission, instead of saying, "How dare you",
    because they have their hands on the levers of the
    criminal justice machine, they start to deploy it
    against them.  It's your right.  But I think in
    principle -- there we go again, "in principle" -- they
    are no different to any other organisation.
        If you look at the Freedom of Information Act as
    a sort of theoretical model, the basis of thought there
    is: all information should be disclosed unless it is
                           50
    covered by the following exemptions.  There are far too
    many exemptions in our Act, but I would like to see the
    same principle clearly used with the police.  The
    default position is they can tell us what they're doing.
    Why shouldn't they?  Well, there are several subheadings
    which they definitely can't disclose.  If you're going
    to interfere with a current inquiry, you can't do it.
    If you're going to disclose confidential information
    about somebody that isn't in the public interest you
    can't do it.  Do you see?
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  But then you're making every single
    police officer or every single hospital worker or every
    single local authority their own judge of the public
    interest.  You can't get around that.
A.  Well, what could happen in theory -- but I can't see it
    happening in practice -- is that they could ask the
    press office: "Do you reckon I'm all right on this, in
    terms of these Leveson rules", as we now call them.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  They won't be called that.
A.  Right.  But if you had a press office who operated in
    that way, as a sort of arbiter, that would be great.
    Then the officer would say, "I know that I'm not in
    those exemption areas and that it's okay to speak",
    because in principle we should speak.  You don't want
    secret police forces.  They've got much too much power.
                           51
    Or secret government departments or hospitals.  Patient
    confidentiality, clearly it's exempt, but the default
    position, the beginning point is: why not be open?
    I think that helps with the abuse.  Do you see?
MS PATRY HOSKINS:  Mr Davies, I'll come back to test the
    parameters of the suggestion you've just made.
A.  Okay.
Q.  Let me just touch on a few points of detail before we do
    that.  Can we just note a few of the paragraphs under
    the heading "Unofficial and unauthorised contact".  On
    page 5, 5(d), you note that you've never been given
    prior notice of raids or arrests.  You say that would be
    much more likely to happen with specialist crime
    reporters.  Can you give us any information at all about
    other journalists being tipped off in this way?
A.  No.  I mean, other than what's obvious.  Occasionally
    you see it in a newspaper or television that clearly the
    reporter was taken along for the ride, but it's not an
    area I've had experience in.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  It's very difficult to see why
    a reporter or photographer should be outside somebody's
    home at 5 o'clock in the morning.
A.  Unless they've had prior advice.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  Yes.
A.  But is that always wrong?
                           52
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  All right.
A.  I'm not saying -- you could say, from the police point
    of view -- let's suppose there has been some persistent
    crime in a community which has caused real fear.  I'm
    not saying that I have the answer, but could it possibly
    be right to indicate --
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  Oh, I have no problem with
    recognising the public interest, not least in the
    support for the police in their exercise of their
    responsibilities to reassure the public that criminal
    justice is safe in their hands and that they are being
    proactive.  But it's not quite so two-dimensional.
A.  No.  A lot has gone wrong, and that's really a starting
    point, in a way.
MS PATRY HOSKINS:  You then go on to explain the various
    types of information that you've been provided with over
    the years.  So you've already told us that you were
    given the minutes of a particular meeting, you've been
    given information about crime figures, you've been given
    evidence.  Is it right to say that each case will simply
    be different on its facts?
A.  Yes.  Bear in mind that it isn't unusual to have this
    unofficial contact, but yes, there's different sorts of
    stories coming out for different reasons in different
    ways.
                           53
Q.  You've told us why you might want to have unofficial
    assistance in this way, that you're suspicious of
    authorised contact for a start, but why, in your view,
    would police officers be motivated to act in this way?
A.  Different stories, different reasons.  So I've mentioned
    here two different occasions on which officers in two
    different forces have become aware of the senior command
    organising the fiddling of the crime figures, so
    misrecording the levels of crime committed, misrecording
    the number of crimes solved, and that's done to please
    the Home Office and it affects your funding.  In both
    cases, the officers had tried internally to stop that
    happening, because it means that the victims of crime
    are being cheated of justice because their crimes are
    being recorded as solved when they haven't been.
    Perpetrators are allowed to go free.  It really matters;
    it isn't just about statistics.  And having tried
    internally to get things done, they got nowhere.  So on
    both occasion, I ended up dealing with them and putting
    lots of material into the public domain to expose that,
    which infuriated some of the senior command.
        So I suppose that's kind of classic whistle-blowing
    stuff, isn't it?
Q.  Yes.
A.  Hang on, I can't remember the other examples I gave you.
                           54
Q.  They're on pages 5 and 6.
A.  One force conducting an independent inquiry into alleged
    corruption in another force.  I think theirs was
    a variation on that, in that they felt there was a real
    danger that the force that allegedly contained the
    corruption would conceal that corruption and that by
    talking to me and other reporters, they could create
    a kind of political pressure on that force not to do
    that.  So you could almost see that as a kind of
    operational motive.
Q.  Yes.
A.  And then sometimes it could be something like I was
    describing a moment ago, where the officer says, "This
    is a story that, from the point of view of reassuring
    the public or making good the morale of my squad really
    ought to be in the public domain, but I can't persuade
    the press office to put it out so I'll put it out."
        I mean, you get bad motives too.  There was an
    officer I dealt with quite a lot who clearly loathed
    another squad who he saw as being useless and
    furthermore trespassing on his patch, so he was
    extremely keen on disclosing material which made them
    look bad.  I don't want to give you a rosy picture that
    everybody who talks to a reporter is some kind of angel.
    It's complicated out there, but then the reporter's job
                           55
    is to try and pick their way through it and work out
    what's true and what's worth saying.
Q.  I'm going to go back to your suggestion about more
    openness, more transparency, and whether or not there
    could be any boundaries set on this type of unofficial
    contact or whether that's just a pipe dream.  Can we
    explore it in practice a little.
A.  Yes.
Q.  Clearly, there is a view that this type of official
    exchange is fraught with potential difficulty.  For
    example, information given to a journalist, not
    necessarily you, could, for example, prejudice an
    important investigation, could compromise someone's
    safety, may violate someone's price.  I want to
    understand, please, the limits or boundaries that you
    impose on yourself in this regard.  Can we look, please,
    at page 7 of your statement under question 8.  You say
    this -- and I want you to answer we me this question,
    whether this statement I'm about to read accurately
    reflects the limits that you would impose on yourself:
        "I think contact with police becomes illegitimate or
    improper in principle [there it is again] if (a) the
    means of acquiring the information is itself illegal or
    improper (bribes, hacking) or (b), as above, if
    publication violates privacy without a clear public
                           56
    interest justification, impedes an inquiry or
    jeopardises the safety of any individual."
        Is that the boundaries that you impose on
    yourself --
A.  Yes.
Q.  -- in receiving information in this unofficial way?
A.  There are some legal ones that I haven't bothered
    mentioning there, but.
Q.  Would you want to touch on those?
A.  Not just with police sources, but if someone is talking
    generally, your are alarm bells would ring if it's
    sub judice.  Your alarm bells would ring if it's
    defamatory.  You start wondering if you're going to be
    able to find the evidence to justify it, if you're
    challenged.
Q.  Can we just explore the first of these principles.  The
    means of acquiring the information itself is illegal or
    improper.  Let's take the example of bribes.  Why does
    the fact that a police officer may be paid a bribe by
    the journalist mean that unofficial contact now becomes
    improper?  Why do you take that view?
A.  The immediate answer is it's against the law.
Q.  Assume now for a moment that it's not.  Just assume.  As
    a matter of principle, does paying a bribe somehow make
    it worse or more improper?
                           57
A.  So in this question, it's no longer illegal?
Q.  Mm-hm.
A.  I think paying a bribe is a rather odd way of putting
    it.  Is there something inherently wrong in paying money
    for information?
Q.  Indeed.
A.  I talked about this in the first statement I put into
    this Inquiry, that it seems to me that paying for
    information does create a problem.  The problem isn't
    ethical.  I don't mind if a newspaper wants to pay an
    actress to describe her married life or whatever it is.
    The problem is practical, that where you pay people to
    talk to you, you run the risk that you are giving them
    a motive to fabricate, to earn their fee.  That's the
    worst end of it, and at best, I think that -- I've seen
    this with other journalists paying sources who I've been
    working with without payment.  What they get for their
    money is the bare minimum, because they haven't
    genuinely motivated the person to help them.
        So I think there are practical problems with it, but
    in principle I am not saying that it is always wrong to
    pay.  I think there are circumstances in which that's
    okay.  I mean, there is a lot of nonsense talked about
    it.  On the whole, newspapers don't pay people to talk;
    they pay people to sign a contract not to talk to other
                           58
    newspapers.  That's most of what goes on.  So it's not
    really about disclosure; it's about exclusivity.
        If you take the law away, I don't think it's an
    ethical problem.
Q.  Looking back at the statement at the top of page 8,
    moving aside bribes now and turning to the three
    principles that you set out there, you would --
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  I'm sorry, you mean question 8?
MS PATRY HOSKINS:  Sorry, did I say paragraph 8?
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  We're still talking about the
    paragraph --
MS PATRY HOSKINS:  The same paragraph, the boundaries that
    Mr Davies has indicated he would impose.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  The fact is you don't permit the
    acquisition of information illegally or improperly, even
    if it is in the clear public interest?
A.  No, clearly that's always illegal.  It was interesting
    when Keir Starmer was here -- I think it was him --
    saying there was a residual decision about whether there
    could be a public interest.  I can't imagine
    the situation, but maybe somewhere in the outer reaches
    of possibility it could be conceivable that somebody
    would pay a public official to disclose something and we
    would all say, "I'm glad you did that."  It's parallel
    to the Telegraph paying for the CDs which had been
                           59
    stolen from the House of Commons which contained all the
    information about the MPs --
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  It is parallel.  Query whether
    stolen.  Query whether you can steal intellectual
    property.  I mean, there are all sorts of issues there.
    But I just wanted to --
A.  Try and think of an example.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  -- analyse the boundaries of that
    first example.  That's all I'm doing with you.
A.  Fine, good.  What was the question?  I've slightly lost
    you.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  My question is: the acquisition of
    information that is itself illegal, the means of
    acquisition, whether it's because of hacking or because
    of bribing, is not made legitimate or proper by public
    interest, on your evidence here.
A.  Because it's against the law.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  Yes.
A.  And that is the way the law stands at the moment, yes.
    But when I was here before, I was trying to argue for
    some advisory body that could tell reporters and others
    where the public interest boundaries are, case by case,
    and if we had something like that, I would like the
    public interest defence to be more widely available for
    more laws.
                           60
        To honestly answer your question, I haven't this
    through whether -- I think you're asking me: could it
    ever be right to bribe someone; is that right?  I don't
    think I have an answer to that because it isn't
    something I've thought through.  It feels really, really
    dodgy.  It feels like the answer must be no, but
    somewhere in brackets I kind of think maybe there is
    a circumstance where -- I mean, is it that -- okay, so
    I'm in a country where there's a dictatorship and the
    public official says, "I have the secret that can cause
    much good for the public, but if I disclose this secret,
    I have to be able to escape the country, I have to take
    my family with me, I have to have £20,000."  So I give
    him £20,000, which could reasonably be construed as
    a bribe, yes?  He then gives me in the information which
    is hugely in the public good and he escapes from the
    country.  I mean, I haven't got an answer to your
    question, I haven't thought it through but I begin to
    think it could be right to do that.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  Mr Leigh gave evidence, which you may
    or may not have seen -- your colleague on the Guardian.
A.  Yes.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  Who spoke about using a PIN number,
    intercepting somebody's voicemail message in
    a particular circumstance -- I think I have that right?
                           61
MS PATRY HOSKINS:  Yes.
A.  Yes.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  -- which he felt was very much in the
    public interest.
A.  Yes.  I think it's interesting.  If we took the public
    interest -- because this is -- like you were saying
    yesterday, this Inquiry is not an attack on press
    freedom.  You have the capacity to increase our freedom.
    That's an example.  You yourself can't do it but if we
    legislated to broaden -- to increase the number of laws
    for which there was a public interest defence, it could
    well be that we would say that the interception of
    communications ought to have a limited public interest
    defence in principle, that if the only way to rescue the
    child --
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  The bands of your advocacy may be
    going a tad too far, Mr Davies.
A.  Isn't that what you want me to do in a way, to test the
    boundaries?
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  As long as you appreciate where I'm
    coming from on this.
A.  Maybe I've misunderstood your question.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  No, you haven't.  You haven't.  And
    if you'd seen what Mr Starmer was asked to do, what he
    was asked to do by me wasn't to suggest that the law
                           62
    should be changed to permit a public interest defence in
    relation to any particular crime, but he was asked by me
    whether he would be prepared to enunciate a policy which
    would be relevant to the public interest test that he
    applies under the Code for Crown Prosecutors in relation
    to the work of journalists, and he is presently
    formulating just such a policy to try to clarify
    circumstances in which he, as the DPP, will not consider
    it appropriate or necessary to prosecute,
    notwithstanding that the ingredients of an offence might
    be made out.
A.  Right.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  So I've gone that far with you
    without suggesting there should be changes to the
    substantive law.  I say I've gone that far with you;
    I've gone that far with you to investigate what it would
    look like.  Ultimately, that policy is for him and not
    for me.  But he's doing that, in part because
    I requested him to do so.  He could have said, "I don't
    think this is the right way to go", in which case,
    that's the end of it, but he didn't.  But there are
    limits.
A.  Yes.  But I think if we're just talking here
    theoretically, the factual position is it's against the
    law to intercept communications, full stop, no public
                           63
    interest defence written in.  It isn't like Section 55
    of the Data Protection Act, yes?  I'm saying that if we
    were inventing the world so that it was perfect, we
    might want to consider the possibility which David Leigh
    was referring to, that there could be cases where you
    would want a journalist to be able to intercept
    a communication.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  I understand the point, I understand
    the point.  I think we'll give the shorthand writer
    a break now.
(3.32 pm)
                      (A short break)
(3.40 pm)
MS PATRY HOSKINS:  Mr Davies, we're still at the top of
    page 7 and the statement you make there under heading
    question 4, paragraph 8.
        We've discussed now at some length the issue about
    whether it's wrong in principle to pay a bribe.  Can I
    turn to the principles you set out thereafter.  The
    first one you set out is you consider that contact with
    the police becomes illegitimate if publication violates
    privacy without a clear public interest justification.
    Just so I can give you an example of that, violating
    privacy without a clear public interest justification,
    would an example of that be the police officer who tips
                           64
    off a journalist that, say, a celebrity has been the
    victim of a particular crime?
A.  Yes, exactly.
Q.  Is there anything else you want to say about that before
    we move on to impeding enquiries or jeopardising safety?
A.  Just that it's implied by that that the corollary also
    is true, that a police officer could be justified in
    disclosing something that was inherently private or
    confidential precisely because it was in the public
    interest to do so.
Q.  Let's turn to then information which -- well,
    publication which might impede an enquiry or jeopardise
    the safety of an individual.  Can we again think about
    this practically.  Imagine a hypothetical situation
    where you get a telephone call from X, a police officer,
    and he says to you, "Nick, come in, I need to have
    a chat about something" --
A.  Can I just ask you, did you say "an ex" as in a former
    police officer?
Q.  No, just X, as in --
A.  He's a serving police officer?
Q.  He is just a police officer.
A.  GotchA.
Q.  "Nick, come in, I need to have a chat about something.
    I can't possibly tell you on the phone, come down and
                           65
    see me." Fine, you go down and attend.  He then proceeds
    to tell you something very interesting, I won't describe
    it as a bombshell, but an interesting piece of
    information that would be of interest to you to publish.
    Can you see that regardless of public interest
    considerations, regardless of prejudice to
    investigations or to safety or to anything like that,
    you now know the information, you as a journalist now
    know that information.
        At that point, it could be said that the onus is on
    you to set the boundaries: you decide whether it's in
    the public interest to publish, you decide whether it
    will prejudice an investigation, whether it will
    compromise safety.  But what I want to understand is how
    you, or another journalist who's given information in
    this way, would know the full context?  How would you
    know whether it prejudices an investigation, for
    example?  You might not know the full facts of the
    investigation or the full context or whether someone is
    at risk.
A.  Okay.
Q.  How would you ascertain that?
A.  I think one of the things that -- if the companion of
    all reporting life is anxiety, you are constantly
    worrying about what could go wrong with this story.  So
                           66
    when he tells me this thing, first of all, both of the
    alarm bells are going to ring: am I sub judice here, is
    there a trial in place, am I in libel trouble here?  And
    then certainly, and particularly clearly with a police
    officer, it would be less clear if it was a banker
    telling me this, but I'm going to think, "Is there
    a current enquiry going on, we're going to crash into
    it, are we going to get into trouble over it?"  So that
    sort of basic anxiety is going to be flashing up warning
    signs.
        In the reality, I would then talk to him and say,
    "Just supposing I get sued on this, where are we on
    evidence?  Is there a current enquiry, are we going to
    get nicked?  Is this sub judice?"  We'd have that
    conversation and I would find out.
        Plus in those circumstances is it going to be the
    case that a police officer says, "Guess what, X is
    true", and I'm just going to bung it in the paper?  You
    go off and you have the to talk to other people to check
    it and get all the surrounding context so that you can
    tell the story properly, and in the course of that it
    would be very surprising if you didn't come across the
    material that you need to make those judgments that
    we're talking about.
Q.  But doesn't that assume -- isn't this one of the
                           67
    problems with unofficial contact?  That rather assumes
    that you are a scrupulous journalist.  Isn't one of the
    problems that the information might be imparted by the
    police officer to someone who is far less scrupulous and
    who just cares that it's an interesting piece of
    information that would sell newspapers?
A.  Yes, this is what I was trying to describe before the
    break.  If you want to make sure the system works well,
    don't go closing down whole channels, but recognise that
    the problem is twofold.  It may be something malicious
    or improper at the police end or it may be the kind of
    stuff you've been discussing in module one: just crazed,
    fact-free journalism.
        The great prize of this Inquiry is to try to find
    solutions to that.
        Any time you're dealing with a malicious or
    irresponsible journalist, almost any information they
    get hold of is potentially damaging.  But what would be
    horribly unfair would be if we ended up in a situation
    where the really destructive behaviour of that very
    small minority started to close down channels of
    information which all the other journalists need.
Q.  I'm just trying to explore the boundaries of your
    general principle.
A.  Yes.
                           68
Q.  If greater openness and transparency is the answer, I'm
    just trying to explore the boundaries of how that would
    work in practice.
A.  Yes.  Again this applies to the official sources as much
    as to the unofficial sources.  Either of them are
    capable of giving you information which is designed to
    cause trouble for somebody or which can be distorted to
    cause trouble for somebody or misused in some way.  In
    order to make the system work properly, you need clarity
    and some level of enforcement for both parties.  The
    police need to be clear where the lines are, we need to
    be clear where the lines are and there needs to be a way
    of sorting things out when they go wrong.
Q.  Linked to this problem is the problem of police officers
    building up particular relationships with particular
    journalists and then that relationship becoming open to
    abuse and so on.  Can you see that problem?
A.  Well, to a certain -- we need to be clear what it is the
    problem might be.  I have no problem at all with me
    building a special relationship with a serving police
    officer or banker or prison officer or anybody.  They're
    just contacts.  I don't have any problem with that
    across the whole board of human activity.  I build
    relationships with paedophiles, with fascists, with
    communists, with socialists, with the lot.  That's what
                           69
    we do for a living.  Nothing wrong with that at all.
    And if we have a police officer who has a relationship
    of trust with me so that within the boundaries that
    we've described, he favours me, that's to say that if he
    wants to get something into the public domain he comes
    to me, I'm happy, he's happy and I hope you would be
    happy.  It's not a bad thing.
        Where it becomes a problem really isn't at the level
    of the reporter and the police officer.  I mean, other
    than those -- if there's abuse of information, all
    right, but where -- the problem that is in the
    background to this Inquiry is something quite different,
    which was a relationship at the top of two
    organisations, between the very summit of the
    Metropolitan Police, the very summit of
    News International, and even that wasn't a problem.
    I don't think that, generally speaking, having lunches
    and meeting people and having drinks is problematic.  It
    only became a problem -- or it is a problem if the
    reality is that that was part of the reason why the Met
    failed to investigate the phone hacking properly.
        I still don't quite understand what went wrong.
    Something went catastrophically wrong in that Inquiry
    and in the subsequent public statements about it.
        So the Met are saying it's all to do with resources.
                           70
    That was really the core of the argument yesterday.  If
    you find that in fact part of that failure was to do
    with the cosy relationship that existed between the tops
    of those two organisations, then you can see how the
    relationship can go wrong.  But it doesn't seem to me
    that if that is the case that tells you anything at all
    about what was going on between the lowly reporter and
    the lowly officer meeting in a pub to talk about
    a story.  That's just not what created the -- or the
    potential problem.
        Does that make sense?
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  I can follow that, but I am rather
    concerned that you make the point -- let me just find
    it -- that if you're dealing with a malicious or
    irresponsible journalist, almost any information they
    get hold of is potentially damaging, but it would be
    horribly unfair for those who aren't malicious or
    irresponsible to suffer as a consequence.
A.  The closing down of whole channels of communication.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  I understand that's your point and
    I recognise the point.  But freedom of expression
    responsibilities make it very difficult to tackle the
    problem from the individual's perspective, to say,
    "Well, you're an irresponsible, mendacious journalist
    and therefore we can't trust you; you are a responsible
                           71
    journalist who we can trust", and you can't tackle it
    that way because that way leads to licensing, which
    I don't anticipate you would support.
A.  No.  "Mendacious" is an interesting word --
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  I'm very sorry I used the word,
    because I absolutely didn't intend to.  Please, let's
    move off that word.
A.  But try falsehood and distortion then.  Let's say the
    police officer, officially or unofficially, supplies the
    journalist with some information.  That journalist is
    the irresponsible kind, so he or she then goes off to
    produce a story which is riddled with falsehood and
    distortion and that produces bad results for somebody
    like Chris Jefferies or for the Inquiry itself.  What we
    need is a system that is quick and cheap and effective
    to deal with falsehood and distortion generally.  For
    me, that's the biggest problem we have in the media, is
    the ease with which irresponsible reporters can
    fabricate stuff and get away with it, and what are the
    victims supposed to do?  Sue for libel?  It's
    ridiculously expensive and slow and hopeless, and the
    PCC -- so if you had a system, if in the future we had
    a system that gave the victims of falsehood and
    distortion a fair, quick crack at an effective solution,
    that would make it much harder for the irresponsible
                           72
    reporter to infect the information he's been given with
    falsehood and distortion.  We don't have that at the
    moment.  It's the Wild West out there.  But it's amazing
    how few reporters take advantage of it, actually, if you
    see how useless the system is on falsehood and
    distortion.
        Similarly with privacy, if we can devise a better
    way of protecting people's privacy, which is difficult,
    then if it's the malicious officer who says, "Here's
    some information about a celebrity", there is more
    chance that the irresponsible officer/irresponsible
    reporter won't be able to do the damaging thing that
    invades people's privacy.  So all your module one
    thinking helps us here.
        In addition, if we have real clarity inside the
    police, instead of -- I think it's incredible that the
    Metropolitan Police are telling us there's a standard
    operating procedure which, in 35 years, I've never heard
    of.  I've never come across an officer quoting it.  It's
    a muddle out there.
MS PATRY HOSKINS:  I need to touch on your paragraph where
    you explain that you have an area of concern that the
    relationship between News International and the
    Metropolitan Police may have become too close.  You've
    touched on that in oral evidence.  That relevant
                           73
    paragraph is at the bottom of page 7, and there's a
    number of questions I've been asked to put to you about
    that.
A.  Yes.
Q.  What do you believe is the Metropolitan Police's
    interest in co-operating in this way with
    News International?  Is it not simply to ensure proper
    investigation of crime and do you have any evidence of
    favouritism?
A.  Okay, I've slightly touched on this already.  Brian
    Paddick was saying yesterday that John Stevens, as
    Commissioner, set out to build bridges with the news
    media and that Dick Fedorcio was instrumental in that.
    It seems to me there's nothing wrong with that.  I think
    there's nothing wrong with the Commissioner meeting the
    editors and talking about policy or even specific
    stories.  If it emerges from that that there's some
    favouritism shown by the press office to the particular
    newspapers which seem to Dick Fedorcio or John Stevens
    to be most powerful, that's very irritating for the
    reporters who are left out, but I don't think that's
    a great big ethical worry we need to get worked up
    about.  That was a problem only if we now discover that
    it was an active ingredient in the subsequent failure to
    investigate News International effectively.
                           74
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  How about a perception?
A.  I'm not too worried about that.  I think we can get
    overanxious here.  I thought Brian Paddick was being
    overanxious yesterday, "wouldn't even pay for my drink".
    I think that's silly.  I mean, we can all get too
    uptight about this and I think there is too much
    uptightness around.  So I think it's all right for
    John Stevens and Nick Fedorcio to have lunch with Neil
    Wallis and Andy Coulson and that isn't a national
    scandal.  It's only if that led to the police failing to
    do their job.
        I can't sit here and speak against favouritism.
    I spend my life trying to procure human sources who will
    talk to me.  I don't want them to run off and talk to
    other newspapers.  It's kind of inherent in a reporter's
    job.  I want my story exclusively, if possible.  It
    makes sense.
MS PATRY HOSKINS:  Two paragraphs above that, on page 7, you
    say that you believe some senior police officers were
    the targets of voicemail hacking.  This was certainly
    implied, you say, by evidence given by the police to the
    culture, media and sports Select Committee in September
    2009.  Again, I've been asked a question about this.
    Are you referring there to the evidence of --
A.  Is this on the screen?  Sorry, what page are you on?
                           75
    I'm terrible sorry.
Q.  Page 7.  It's the third paragraph from the bottom.
A.  Got it, okay.
Q.  When you say that this was implied by the evidence
    given, are you referring to the evidence of Assistant
    Commissioner Yates and Superintendent Phil Williams on
    2 September 2009?
A.  They actually put in a written memo, Yates and Williams,
    in which they were talking about the extent to which
    they wanted to say they had been in touch with victims
    and potential victims of hacking and they said that
    apart from those who had been approached with a view to
    being -- charges for the indictment, they had also set
    out to approach people in four national security
    categories.  That was royal, government, military and
    police.  So the implication there was there was at least
    one victim or potential victim of hacking in the police.
        I followed that up with yet another attempt to ask
    for a simple statistic, and it was yet another example
    of the press bureau saying no, huge long freedom of
    information wrangle, at the end of which they claimed
    that there was one police officer who had been
    approached and warned.  Whether or not that's the whole
    picture, I don't know.  Are they saying they didn't?
    Or --
                           76
Q.  No, that's the extent of my question that I needed to
    put to you.
A.  Okay, all right.
Q.  Finally, before we move on to the extracts from your
    book briefly, page 8, please, under paragraph 13,
    question 9.  You were asked in general terms what your
    impressions are about the culture of relations between
    the police and the mediA.  I think you've touched more
    or less on all of the points you make there.  Is there
    anything else that you would want to add to that?
A.  No, I think we have covered those points, unless there's
    something you want to come back on.
Q.  Okay.  Before I turn to the extracts from your book, is
    there anything else that you would like to say about
    official contact or unofficial contact or the system as
    it works now, any recommendations for the future that
    would make you particularly fearful or anything else?
A.  I think we've covered it.  I'm happy to answer questions
    if I can clarify things, but I think we've covered it.
Q.  Some very brief questions indeed about the extracts from
    your book.  You have a whole section from pages 359 to
    379 of your book, Flat Earth News, that deals with this.
    You were asked some extensive questions by Mr Jay on the
    previous occasion when you gave evidence about
    a gentleman called Z.  I don't want to ask you questions
                           77
    he's already asked you.
        The book was published in January 2008.  Is there
    any evidence you can give us to update us on the
    position as set out in your book?
A.  I don't think there's anything special.  I mean, clearly
    there's been an awful lot coming into the public domain,
    as, for example, from Sue Akers yesterday, but I think
    there's nothing on Z that I can add beyond what was in
    the book and beyond what I said in November, giving
    evidence.
Q.  You also allege in the book that reporters from titles
    that I won't mention have admitted to you that payments
    were made not just to police officers but also to public
    officials.  Again, is there anything other than what's
    in the book, that you would like to add?  Any up to date
    information, other than what is in the public domain?
A.  No, I don't think I've been looking into that.  I stand
    by what's in the book and what I said in November, but
    I don't think there's anything important to add.
MS PATRY HOSKINS:  Mr Davies, those are all my questions.
    Is there anything that you would like to add?
A.  No.
MS PATRY HOSKINS:  Sir?
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  No.  Mr Davies, thank you very much
    indeed.  As ever, you give much food for thought.  Thank
                           78
    you.
A.  All right.
MS PATRY HOSKINS:  Sir, that completes the evidence for
    today, a slightly shorter day than unusual.
LORD JUSTICE LEVESON:  I'm very upset we have half an hour.
    Mr Jay, how have you allowed us to have half an hour?
    All right.  Thank you very much indeed.  10 o'clock
    tomorrow morning.
(4.00 pm)
(The hearing adjourned until 10 o'clock the following day)